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 Recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
6.12 The committee recommends that the Australian Government extend the 
activities of the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce to support victims of abuse in 
Defence, including allowing new complainants to make claims up to 
30 June 2015. 
Recommendation 2 
6.21 The committee recommends that the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and 
Response Office (SeMPRO) develop resources to clearly advise persons 
considering contacting SeMPRO regarding options for the collection of forensic 
evidence and support options for former members of Defence.  
Recommendation 3 
6.22 The committee recommends that the Australian Government provide 
additional resources to SeMPRO to facilitate further outreach activities and 
personal support to victims of sexual assault in Defence.  
Recommendation 4 
6.27 The committee recommends that following the next interim report of the 
Taskforce, the Minister for Defence table a formal substantive response to the 
systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review.  
Recommendation 5 
6.29 The committee recommends the Australian Government introduce 
amending legislation to remove the three year minimum service requirement for 
eligibility for Non-Liability Health Care (NLHC) and to make NLHC available to 
any person who has had completed any service. 
Recommendation 6 
6.33 The committee recommends that the Minister for Veterans' Affairs direct 
the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) to commence consultation with 
veterans' representative organisations and to report back on: 
• the legal and practical barriers there are to victims of abuse in the ADF 
succeeding in establishing the facts necessary to access entitlements to 
DVA benefits; 
• what Defence and DVA could do and what resources they will require to 
gather and share information which could assist such individuals to 
establish those facts to the satisfaction of DVA and tribunal decision-
makers; 
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• what can be done in liaison with veterans' groups, other Australian 
Government agencies and community groups, and what resources will be 
required to reach out to individuals affected by abuse who may be eligible 
for DVA benefits – including individuals who have previously applied and 
been rejected. 
Recommendation 7 
6.36 The committee recommends the Department of Veterans' Affairs examine 
options to provide financial assistance to support a national, sustainable 
community-based approach to assisting veterans who have suffered abuse. 
Recommendation 8 
6.44 The committee recommends that the Taskforce and the Australian 
Government assess the appropriateness of a range of responses to abuse in 
Defence, in addition to determining whether a Royal Commission should be 
established. The welfare of victims of abuse in Defence should be the primary 
consideration in any decision made.  
Recommendation 9 
6.49 The committee recommends that no further parts of Volume 2 of the DLA 
Piper report should be released in summary or redacted form. 
xii 
 
  
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Referral of inquiry 
1.1 On 27 March 2014, the Senate referred an inquiry into the accessibility and 
adequacy of processes to support victims of abuse in Defence to the Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee for inquiry and report by 28 August 2014.1 
On 27 August 2014, the Senate agreed to extend the reporting date for the inquiry to 
30 October 2014.2 On 30 October 2014, the Senate extended the reporting date to 
31 October 2014. 
1.2 The terms of reference for the inquiry are as follows: 
With reference to the committee's earlier report into the review of 
allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence, the accessibility and 
adequacy of current mechanisms and processes to provide support to 
victims of sexual and other abuse in Defence, taking into account:  
(a) the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce (DART) process to date;  
(b) Defence's response to the DLA Piper Review and the work of DART;  
(c) successive governments' responses to the DLA Piper Review and the 
work of DART;  
(d) the desirability of releasing a true reflection of volume two of the 
DLA Piper report in a redacted form or by way of a summary; and  
(e) any related matters. 
1.3 At the commencement of the inquiry, the committee made the following 
statement regarding the inquiry: 
In terms of setting expectations, the committee emphasises that it is not in a 
position to resolve individual disputes or settle complaints about alleged 
abuse in Defence. As the terms of reference of the inquiry indicate, the 
committee's focus is on the processes established to manage and respond to 
such allegations. Please note that all documents sent to the inquiry become 
committee documents on receipt, and are only made public following a 
decision of the committee. Material which is not relevant to the inquiry's 
terms of reference or which reflects adversely on others may not be 
accepted or published by the committee. 
1  Journals of the Senate, 27 March 2014, pp 743-744. 
2  Journals of the Senate, 27 August 2014, p. 1313.  
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Conduct of the inquiry 
1.4 The committee wrote to interested individuals and organisations requesting 
submissions by 2 June 2014 and advertised the inquiry on its website and in 
The Australian. The committee received 26 submissions, some of which were 
accepted by the committee as confidential. Other submissions were published with 
redactions as they contained personal information, adverse comment or material 
irrelevant to the inquiry. Public submissions are listed at Appendix 1 and are available 
on the committee's website at: www.aph.gov.au/senate_fadt. 
1.5 The committee held public hearings for the inquiry in Canberra on 
13 August 2014 and 26 September 2014. A list of the witnesses who appeared at the 
public hearings is available at Appendix 2, and the Hansard transcripts are available 
through the committee's website.  
1.6 In relation to term of reference (d), the committee agreed secure access 
arrangements for Volume 2 of the DLA Piper Review with the Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce (Taskforce) and the Minister of Defence, the Hon Senator David 
Johnston. Members of the committee had the opportunity to view Volume 2 of the 
DLA Piper Review at Parliament House on 17 July 2014, 1 August 2014 and 
11 August 2014. 
Structure of the report 
1.7 The committee's report is in six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background to 
the inquiry including the Defence cultural reviews, the DLA Piper Review, the 
establishment and progress of the Taskforce and the Pathway to Change reforms. 
Chapter 3 covers the Taskforce processes. Chapter 4 considers the response to the 
DLA Piper review report and the work of the Taskforce. Chapter 5 covers other 
matters raised during the inquiry, such as the release of Volume 2 of the DLA Piper 
report, access to veterans' entitlements and the need for a Royal Commission into 
abuse in Defence. Chapter 6 contains the committee's conclusion and 
recommendations. 
Acknowledgements  
1.8 The committee thanks all those who contributed to the inquiry by making 
submissions, providing additional information or appearing at hearings to give 
evidence. In particular, the committee wishes to acknowledge those victims of abuse 
in Defence who assisted the committee by sharing their personal experiences. 
Note on references 
1.9 References to the committee Hansard are to the proof Hansard. Page numbers 
may vary between the proof and the official Hansard transcripts.  
 
 Chapter 2 
Background 
Introduction 
2.1 As the terms of reference indicate, the current inquiry follows the committee's 
previous report titled Report of the DLA Piper Review and the government's response 
which was tabled in the Senate on 27 June 2013. This chapter will draw on, and 
update, the background material in that report.1   
2.2 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has had a history of incidents of 
reported abuse and harassment (including sexual abuse) within its ranks, as well as 
related inquiries, reviews and reforms. Abuse in Defence has often been related to 
Defence training establishments or have involved junior members of the ADF. For 
example, in May 1970, the Four Corners program covered the 'bastardisation scandal' 
at the Royal Military College, Duntroon.2 In particular, in 1998, the Department of 
Defence released the Grey Review, a report concerning 'bastardisation' and sexual 
harassment at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) conducted by a 
Defence official, Ms Bronwen Grey. The Grey Review found that a high level of 
unacceptable behaviour was occurring at ADFA, including sexual harassment and 
sexual offences.3 
2.3 The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee has 
also previously conducted other inquiries which have addressed, or touched on, abuse 
and sexual harassment in Defence. Other relevant inquiries undertaken by the 
committee have included: 
• Inquiry into an equity and diversity health check in the Royal Australian Navy 
- HMAS Success (September 2011); 
• The effectiveness of Australia's military justice system (June 2005); and 
• Sexual Harassment in the Australian Defence Force (August 1994).  
Events leading to the DLA Piper Review 
2.4 In April 2011, media reports indicated that an incident had occurred at ADFA 
where a first year female cadet was filmed without her consent having sex with a male 
1  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, pp 5-24.  
2  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Duntroon: Marking Time, Four Corners, 2 May 1970, 
available at: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2011/08/08/3288457.htm (accessed 
20 May 2013).  
3  Department of Defence, Report of Review into Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual 
Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy, June 1998, p. xi. 
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colleague and the footage sent via Skype to other cadets in a nearby room.4 Following 
the so-called 'Skype incident', the then Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith 
MP, (Minister) described the pursuit of disciplinary proceedings against the female 
cadet by the management of ADFA in relation to other matters as 'inappropriate, 
insensitive and wrong' and 'almost certainly faulty in the law'.5 The Commandant of 
ADFA, Commodore Bruce Kafer AM CSC, was subsequently directed to take leave.6 
2.5 On 11 April 2011, Minister Smith announced a range of reviews into Defence 
culture generally and an inquiry into the 'Skype incident' in particular (the Defence 
cultural reviews). These Defence cultural reviews included:  
• an inquiry, under Defence regulations, to be conducted by 
Mr Andrew Kirkham QC, into the management of the 'Skype incident of 
March 2011' (Kirkham inquiry); 
• a review of treatment of women at ADFA and the treatment of women in the 
ADF and pathways for women into ADF leadership; 
• a review into employment pathways for women in the Department of 
Defence; 
• a review of the use alcohol in the ADF;  
• a review of social media and Defence; 
• a review of personal conduct of ADF personnel; and 
• a review of management of incidents and complaints in Defence.7 
2.6 Further, Minister Smith noted that 'a large number of public and private 
allegations of sexual and other forms of abuse' had been drawn to the attention of his 
office. The Minister stated: 
These allegations are of concern and must be dealt with methodically and at 
arm's length from Defence. The Secretary of the Department of Defence 
will engage an independent legal firm to review each allegation raised to 
determine the most appropriate way for these complaints to be addressed 
4  For example, Ian McPhedran, 'Defence sex scandal: Cadet secretly filmed liaison with 
colleague', Adelaide Advertiser, 6 April 2011, p. 17. 
5  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Interview with David Speers SKY News 
PM Agenda', Transcript, 6 April 2011. 
6  Commodore Kafer was reinstated as Commandant of ADFA following the inquiry by 
Mr Andrew Kirkham QC. 
7  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Sex Discrimination Commissioner to lead 
review of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Australian Defence Force', 
Media Release, 11 April 2011, pp. 1-2. 
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and whether further independent action is required to deal with any such 
matters.8 
Defence culture reviews 
Kirkham inquiry 
2.7 On 7 March 2012, the Minister released the outcomes of the Kirkham inquiry. 
The Minister stated that the inquiry had found that neither the ADFA Commandant, 
nor the Deputy Commandant, had made an error of judgement in their decision to 
commence and conclude disciplinary proceedings against the female cadet. 
Nonetheless, the Minister remained of the view that this was an error of judgement.9 
The Minister indicated that the inquiry report would not be publicly released. 
Commodore Kafer subsequently resumed his position as Commandant ADFA.10 
Treatment of women at ADFA and in the ADF 
2.8 The Review into the Treatment of Women at ADFA and the Review into the 
Treatment of Women in the ADF were both conducted by the Australian Human 
Rights Commission, chaired by Ms Elizabeth Broderick, the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner. 
2.9 The report of the Review of the Treatment of Women at ADFA made a large 
number of recommendations. These included the establishment of an ADFA specific 
'hotline' for cadets, staff and families to provide advice and referral and the 
establishment of a database to record, track and manage complaints and incidents of 
unacceptable conduct, including sexual harassment, abuse and assault and sex 
discrimination.11 
2.10 The report of the Review into the Treatment of Women in the ADF also made 
a large number of recommendations in relation to sexual abuse and harassment. In 
particular, the report recommended the establishment of a dedicated Sexual 
Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO) 'to coordinate timely 
responses, victim support, education, policy, practice and reporting for any 
misconduct of a sexual nature, including sexual harassment and sexual abuse in the 
8  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Sex Discrimination Commissioner to lead 
review of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Australian Defence Force', 
Media Release, 11 April 2011, p. 2. 
9  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Outcomes of the Kirkham Inquiry', 
Media Release, 7 March 2011. 
10  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Outcomes of the Kirkham Inquiry', 
Media Release, 7 March 2011. 
11  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force Academy, Phase 1 Report, October 2011, pp. 99-100. 
                                              
6 
ADF'.12 The report also recommended the ADF should investigate mechanisms to 
allow members to make confidential (restricted) reports of sexual abuse to 
SeMPRO.13 
Review of the Personal Conduct of ADF Personnel 
2.11 The Review of Personal Conduct was undertaken by Major General 
CW Orme AM, CSC. The report, titled 'Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust 
and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms' was completed on 
3 August 2011. The recommendations of the review centred on the promotion of 'the 
Australian profession of arms' framework of values within the ADF. Other 
recommendations included: continuing initiatives to improve avenues for members to 
report concerns, improved programs of socialisation; a strategic communication 
program; and appropriate research to inform policy development.14 
Use of Alcohol in the ADF 
2.12 The Review on the Use of Alcohol in the ADF was undertaken by an 
Independent Advisory Panel on Alcohol, chaired by Professor Margaret Hamilton AO, 
and completed on 19 August 2011. While the Panel did not explicitly address the 
relationship between alcohol and abuse in the ADF, it did note that while the ADF is a 
highly safety focused and discipline based organisation, 'it is not immune to alcohol 
related transgressions by its members'.15 
Social media and the ADF 
2.13 The Review of Social Media and Defence was undertaken by 
George Patterson Y&R. It found that Defence is in a similar position to other 
organisations dealing with social media and there is 'no evidence of systemic abuse by 
Defence personnel in their official or unofficial use of social media'.16 It made a 
number of recommendations including a unified social media strategy, a review of 
policies and training in relation to social media and developing a social media crisis 
management plan.17 
12  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force, Phase 2 Report, August 2012, p. 36.  
13  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force, Phase 2 Report, August 2012, p. 37. 
14  Department of Defence, 'Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the 
Australian Profession of Arms', Report of the ADF Personal Conduct Review, August 2011, 
pp. 43–44.  
15  Department of Defence, The Use of Alcohol in the Australian Defence Force, Report of the 
Independent Advisory Panel on Alcohol, August 2011, p. 15.   
16  Department of Defence, Review of Social Media and Defence, August 2011, p. ix. 
17  Department of Defence, Review of Social Media and Defence, August 2011, p. ix. 
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Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints 
2.14 The Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence 
including Civil and Military Jurisdiction was undertaken by the Inspector-General of 
the ADF (Inspector-General ADF), Mr Geoff Earley AM, and completed on 
6 September 2011. The review report made 38 recommendations which, in particular, 
highlighted a number of inconsistencies in Defence policy documents regarding the 
management of incidents and complaints. The recommendations included that: 
• greater use of alternative dispute resolution across Defence should be 
encouraged;  
• DI(G) PERS 35-3 Management and Reporting of Unacceptable Behaviour 
and DI(G) 35-4 Management and Reporting of Sexual Offences should be 
reviewed to clarify the administrative action that may be taken when 
disciplinary action is pending; 
• Defence's administrative policies should be amended to allow for 
administrative suspension from duty; 
• the ADF should not adopt restricted reporting (whereby a victim can report 
abuse outside of the chain of command and access support services, but an 
investigation is not triggered without the consent of the victim); 
• case officers to support complainants and respondents should be appointed in 
all cases;  
• the policy on management of unacceptable behaviour and sexual offences 
should be combined in a single policy document; and 
• privacy law exemptions should be made to enable outcomes of discipline and 
administrative proceedings with names redacted to be made available to 
Defence personnel to ensure the transparency of military justice outcomes.18 
The DLA Piper Review 
Conduct of the DLA Piper Review 
Review members 
2.15 While the Review has come to be known as the 'DLA Piper Review', 
Volume 1 of the report notes that the 'Review leaders were to provide a report based 
on their own findings and they did not represent the law firm with which they were 
associated'.19 The Department of Defence selected Dr Gary Rumble, a partner with 
18  Department of Defence, Review of the management of Incidents and Complaints in Defence 
including Civil and Military Jurisdiction – A report by the Inspector General Australian 
Defence Force, September 2011.  
19  DLA Piper Review, Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence: 
Facing the problems of the past, Volume 1 – General findings and recommendations, 
October 2011, p. xxi (Volume 1).  
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law firm DLA Phillip Fox (later to become DLA Piper), one of Defence's panel of 
legal services providers, as a suitable person to lead the review. 
Professor Dennis Pearce AO (formerly the Defence Force Ombudsman between 1988 
and 1990) and Ms Melanie McKean (both, at that time, also associated with 
DLA Phillip Fox) were appointed joint leaders of the Review with Dr Rumble.20 All 
three leaders of the DLA Piper Review moved to another law firm, HWL Ebsworth, 
during the course of the Review. 
2.16 Following concerns raised regarding the independence of DLA Piper as a 
provider of legal services to Defence, the Review released a statement on 
21 June 2011 which clarified that the report 'will contain and will only contain 
assessments, conclusions and recommendations of the Review members': 
The Minister expects the Review [members] to provide our own honest 
assessment and recommendations, regardless of whether or not doing so 
may involve criticism of aspects of Defence's response to allegations.  
The Review members would not be participating in the Review if we 
thought it was a sham.21 
Terms of Reference 
2.17 The terms of reference were notified to the DLA Piper Review team by the 
Minister's office on 21 June 2011. The terms of reference directed that the review 
would be conducted in two phases and that DLA Piper had been engaged by the 
Secretary of Defence to conduct Phase 1: 
The Review will consider all relevant allegations, whether referred from the 
Minister's Office, raised in the media or coming directly to the Review 
which have been or are made in the period 01 April – 17 June 2011… 
Phase 1 will review all allegations of sexual or other abuse and any related 
matter to make an initial assessment of whether the matters alleged have 
been appropriately managed and to recommend further action to the 
Minister. 
Phase 1 will also report on whether Phase 1 has identified any particular 
systemic issues that will require further investigation in Phase 2… 
Phase 2 is expected to provide oversight of Defence's implementation of 
Phase 1. 
Phase 2 will also review Defence's processes for assessing, investigating 
and responding to allegations of sexual or other forms of abuse to consider 
with any systemic issues identified in Phase 1 and any other systemic issues 
20  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 1. 
21  DLA Piper Review, 'DLA Piper Review responds to concerns raised about conduct of Review 
of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse (and Related Matters) in Defence', News Release, 
21 June 2011, p. 3.  
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and to make appropriate recommendations about all systemic issues that 
have been identified.22 
Advertising 
2.18 The DLA Piper Volume 1 report noted that following the announcement of 
the Review via an internal Defence publication on 10 May 2011 the rate of 
communications to the Review was 'initially slow'.23 However: 
After [Defence] organised print-media advertisements, towards the end of 
May 2011, there was a clear increase in the number of people contacting the 
Review. In the beginning of June 2011, as the date for making allegations 
to the Review was approaching, the number of persons contacting the 
Review continued at a steady level.24 
2.19 A report by the ABC's Four Corners program on abuse in Defence titled 
'Culture of Silence' on 13 June 2011 significantly increased the number of persons 
raising matters with the DLA Piper Review. Approximately 550 communications 
came to the Review in the four days following the broadcast.25 
Review reports and releases 
2.20 On 25 August 2011, Minister Smith announced the reporting date of the 
DLA Piper Review would be extended to 30 September 2011. 
2.21 On 11 October 2011, the Minister received Volume 1 (General Findings and 
Recommendations) of the DLA Piper Review report and the first tranche of Volume 2 
(Individual Allegations). On 7 March 2012, the Minister released an extract of the 
Executive Summary of Volume 1. 
2.22 A Supplement to Volume 1 was delivered to the Minister in April 2012. The 
Supplement to Volume 1 added to, and updated, the recommendations and findings of 
the original Volume 1 report.26 An updated Volume 2 report was also provided in 
April 2012, which was a consolidated report dealing with all the individual allegations 
before the Review. 
22  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, Appendix 7, pp. 275–276. 
23  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 4.  
24  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 4.  
25  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Culture of Silence, Four Corners, 13 June 2011, available 
at: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2011/s3239681.htm (accessed 29 October 2012); 
DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 108. 
26  DLA Piper Review, Report of the Review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence: 
Facing the problems of the past, Volume 1 – General findings and recommendations, 
Supplement to Volume 1, April 2012, p. ix (Supplement to Volume 1). The Supplement to 
Volume 1 was prepared only by Dr Rumble and Ms McKean, as Professor Pearce had 
withdrawn from the Review due to ill-health. 
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2.23 On 14 June 2012, under Freedom of Information provisions, the complete and 
un-redacted Executive Summary of Volume 1 was released. On 10 July 2012, the 
Minister released all of the Volume 1 report of the DLA Piper Review, subject to a 
small range of redactions.27 
Cost 
2.24 At the Budget Estimates hearing in May 2012, the Department of Defence 
indicated that $9.9 million had been expended on the DLA Piper Review for 'over 
27,000 hours of activity'.28 At the October 2012 Supplementary Estimates hearing, the 
Department of Defence indicated this expenditure had increased to $10.49 million. It 
also noted that DLA Piper continued to provide on-going services in relation to the 
Review.29 On 3 June 2013, Defence indicated that about $11.3 million had been 
expended on the DLA Piper Review.30 
DLA Piper Review—Volume 1 
2.25 Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Review report contained 10 recommendations, 
23 issues, and 29 findings. The concluding remarks of Volume 1 also called on the 
ADF, the Australian Government and the Parliament 'to give proactive support to 
those in the ADF who have the courage to stand up for what is right when others in 
the ADF do, or have done wrong'.31 
2.26 For convenience, the issues and findings identified in Volume 1 can be 
grouped into a number of key themes including that:  
• ADF environments typically have factors which indicate a high risk of abuse; 
• a substantial number of persons suffered abuse in the ADF or experienced 
inadequate Defence management of abuse allegations; 
• a substantial number of boys and young people have suffered abuse, including 
serious sexual and other physical abuse in the past; 
• those who suffered abuse in ADF may have later participated in inflicting 
abuse on others; 
• the ADF and the Australian Government have in the past failed to take steps 
to protect those vulnerable to abuse; 
27  Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith MP, 'Release of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper 
Report: Allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence', Media Release, 10 July 2012, p. 1. 
28  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates, 
Committee Hansard, 28 May 2012, p. 51. 
29  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Supplementary Estimates, 
Committee Hansard, 17 October 2012, p. 31. 
30  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Budget Estimates, 
Committee Hansard, 3 June 2013, p. 16. 
31  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, pp. 199–200. 
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• many perpetrators of abuse, or those responsible for the mismanagement of 
allegations of abuse, have not been identified, called to account or 
rehabilitated and these persons may have advanced to more senior positions in 
the ADF (creating serious risks); 
• the victims of abuse in the ADF may be at risk of suffering mental health, 
substance abuse and associated physical health and employment problems, 
and these victims may need counselling and other assistance; 
• Phase 2 of the Review should examine improvements which could be made to 
the mechanisms which track and record unacceptable behaviour in the ADF to 
enable commanders to identify and manage potential serial perpetrators;  
• Phase 2 should examine relevant Defence Instructions (General) and other 
aspects of ADF procedures in responding to allegation of sexual offence to 
allow appropriate use of administrative action by commanders;  
• the culture of the ADF discourages the reporting of abuse and a substantial 
number of victims of abuse have not reported abuse they may have suffered; 
• Phase 2 of the Review should consider changes to procedures for Defence 
procedures for responding to allegations of abuse and to assist victims of 
abuse;  
• Phase 2 should consider Defence's response to review of the ADF 
Investigative Service (ADFIS) and the retention of personnel in ADFIS to 
ensure skills in management of abuse allegations are maintained. 
2.27 The recommendations made in Volume 1 included that:  
• further information should be considered and reported on in a supplementary 
report to the Minister and Secretary; 
• Phase 2 of the Review should undertake discussion with Defence regarding 
the clarification or amendment of Defence Instructions (General) – 
Management and Reporting of Sexual Offences to permit administrative 
action to be taken in respect of sexual offences; 
• new Defence Instructions should be considered to direct relevant 
Commanding Officers to consider taking administrative action even if an 
incident has been reported to civilian police; 
• relevant Defence Instructions should be redrafted to provide simpler advice 
and guidance to management regarding sexual offences and 'unacceptable 
behaviour'; 
• if a new complaint resolution scheme is established, it should not be limited to 
those who contacted the Review and allegations in Volume 2 should be 
reassessed; 
• further investigations made during Phase 2 should be conducted by an 
external review body similar to that which conducted Phase 1; 
12 
• a capped compensation scheme for the victims of abuse within Defence 
should be considered; 
• a framework of private facilitated meetings between victims, perpetrators and 
witnesses of abuse with Defence should be considered;  
• the special counselling and health services in place for the duration of the 
Review be extended to Phase 2 while a plan for providing health services to 
victims of abuse is prepared.  
2.28 Finally, Volume 1 of the report recommended that a suite of options be 
adopted to afford reparations to persons affected by abuse in Defence comprising: 
• public apologies/acknowledgements; 
• personal apologies; 
• a capped compensation scheme; 
• facilitated meetings between victims and perpetrators; and 
• provision of health services and counselling. 
Previous incidents of serious sexual offences at ADFA 
2.29 A particular area of concern for the Review was information regarding the 
investigations made by Lieutenant Colonel Northwood during the period of the Grey 
inquiry of ADFA. The Review noted that this material, which was accessed late in the 
Review process, had affected their consideration of appropriate action for Phase 2.32 
The Review noted that Lieutenant Colonel Northwood had 'identified around 24 cases 
of rape at ADFA in the late 1990s'. The Review raised the issue that it was possible 
that 'male cadets who raped female cadets at ADFA…and other cadets who…did not 
intervene may now be in "middle" to "senior" management positions in the ADF'. The 
Review noted these possibilities 'carry serious risks for the ADF'.33 
2.30 The Review raised the issue that Phase 2 should consider the possibility of 
establishing a Royal Commission to clarify whether persons suspected of having 
committed rape (or those who did not intervene) were still in the ADF and 'if so, how 
to deal with that situation'.34 
DLA Piper Review—Supplement to Volume 1 
2.31 The Supplement to Volume 1 report contained five additional 
recommendations (replacing one recommendation made in Volume 1), 12 additional 
issues and 9 additional findings. The findings of the Supplement to Volume 1 
confirmed the original findings made in Volume 1.  
32  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 115. 
33  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 121, Issue 3.  
34  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 121, Issue 4.  
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2.32 The additional recommendations made in the Supplement included that:  
• further information received regarding allegations not be considered until 
Phase 2 commences; 
• the findings and issues in Volume 1 be taken into account in Defence's 
Pathways to Change strategy;35 
• concerns raised in Volume 1 regarding taking administrative action after an 
allegation of sexual assault be drawn to the attention of the Inspector-General 
ADF, the Directorate of Rights and Responsibilities and others reviewing 
relevant Defence Instructions (General); 
• the formulation of personal and general apologies should take into account 
criteria for formal apologies set out previously by the Law Commission of 
Canada and the Senate Community Affairs Committee; and  
• for each personal apology recommendation which is accepted, a 
representative of the Service Chief should liaise with individuals regarding 
details of the apology. 
2.33 The Supplement to Volume 1 highlighted the difficulties of the Review in 
accessing Defence file material and ADFIS material, noting this had 'significantly 
delayed' the Review's initial assessment of allegations in Volume 2.36 
2.34 A number of other issues were raised in the Supplement to Volume 1 for 
consideration in Phase 2 of the Review including:  
• improved access to reports of administrative inquiries; 
• Defence systems for tracking and responding to media allegations of abuse 
with the ADF; 
• arrangements between Defence and Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) 
regarding abuse in the ADF; 
• consultation with DVA regarding its role in informing and contacting those 
persons who may be eligible for benefits; 
• options for increased liaison with DVA and additional roles for DVA; and 
• reform of spent convictions legislation to add recruitment into the ADF to 
existing exclusions. 
2.35 The Supplement to Volume 1 also expanded the findings of the Review in 
relation to possible incidents of rape or indecent assault at ADFA and the possibility 
that perpetrators (or witnesses who did not intervene) may now be 'middle' to 'senior' 
management in the ADF. It also found that there 'seems to be a very clear indication 
35  Further information on the Defence Pathway to Change cultural reform strategy is detailed 
below. 
36  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, p. 17. 
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that no action was taken [by Defence] in relation to the suspected individuals'. Issue 
S1 suggested that Phase 2 of the Review should consider the possibility of a 'Royal 
Commission or Court of Inquiry' into whether those persons identified by Lieutenant 
Colonel Northwood and 'any other Cadets who engaged in similar conduct at ADFA 
in the years preceding the Grey report' are still in the ADF and, if so, how to deal with 
this situation.37 
2.36  The Supplement to Volume 1 also contained assessments made by the 
DLA Piper Review of the allegations raised by the five former defence members 
featured in the Four Corners report 'Culture of Silence'.38 This Appendix was redacted 
in the publicly released Supplement to Volume 1. 
DLA Piper Review—Volume 2 
2.37 Volume 2 contained the Review's preliminary assessments of, and 
recommendations in respect of, each individual allegation received by the Review. 
While Volume 2 has not been publicly released by the Minister, the Supplement to 
Volume 1 contained information about the structure and format of its contents. It 
outlined that Volume 2 contains: 
• assessments of 1,095 allegations of abuse raised by 775 sources; 
• 494 Fairness and Resolution Branch database matters; and 
• 49 ADFIS matters.39 
2.38 A number of other matters were considered by the Review but were 
determined not to be within the terms of reference, or were matters which were 
assessed as having been managed appropriately. 
2.39 The Supplement to Volume 1 report included 'tallies' of the allegations 
contained in Volume 2. For example, these tallies indicated that:  
• 40% of the subjects of abuse were female;  
• 18% of the subjects of abuse were under the age of 18; 
• the largest portion (39%) of the subjects of abuse were in the Army at the time 
of the alleged incident, while the smallest portion was in the Australian Public 
Service (6%);  
• ADFA (5.7%), HMAS Cerberus (5.3%), Kapooka (4.9%) and RMC Duntroon 
(3.8%) were the four of the most frequent locations for alleged incidents of 
abuse; 
37  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, p. 59. 
38  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, p. 3 and Appendix 1.  
39  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, p. 3. 
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• 80.8% of allegations were assessed as 'plausible', 0.6% of allegations were not 
assessed as plausible and no finding was made for 18.6% of allegations; 
• 58.3% of allegations were identified as having been managed by Defence; 
• of those allegations managed by Defence, in 4.5% of cases the management of 
allegations was appropriate, in 21.2% of cases the management of allegations 
was not appropriate and 74% of cases the management of allegations required 
further investigation; and 
• 61.6% of the Review's recommendations recommended further external 
investigation during Phase 2 of the Review; 23.9% recommended internal 
referral - in the majority of cases to single Service Chiefs and apology. Only 3 
incidents (0.2 %) were referred for external review for further action. For 
14.3% of incidents the Review recommended no further action. 
2.40 The report emphasised that the DLA Piper Review had only carried out an 
initial assessment of specific allegations, and accordingly has not found as fact that 
any one of the allegations of abuse received by the Review has been made out. The 
Review considered that a 'substantial' number of former and current ADF personnel 
had not reported abuse which they suffered in the ADF.40 
2.41 The Supplement to Volume 1 stated that 'approximately 100 [Assessment 
Worksheets]' included a recommendation that: 
The 'circumstances of the alleged abuse suggest strongly that the alleged 
perpetrator(s) might have been serial perpetrator(s)'. The matter should be 
referred to the ADFIS and Service Chief for consideration on that basis'.41 
2.42 Many Assessment Worksheets in Volume 2 had a recommendation that 
allegations be referred to the ADFIS for possible action under the Defence Force 
Discipline Act 1982 and/or referral by ADFIS to civilian police.42 
Australian Government response to DLA Piper report and Defence 
cultural reviews 
Pathway to Change  
2.43 Following the reports of the Defence cultural reviews, Defence released a 
strategy document titled Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture: A Strategy 
for Cultural Change and Reinforcement (Pathway to Change) in March 2012. This 
40  DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, p. 108.  
41  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, Attachment 7, p. 1. 
42  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, Attachment 8, p. 1.  
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strategy document outlined that Defence agreed, or agreed-in-principle, to all of the 
recommendations made in the reviews into Defence's culture.43 
2.44 In the Pathway to Change strategy, Defence committed to implementing 
actions in six areas: leadership and accountability, values and behaviour, right from 
the start; practical measures; corrective processes; structure and support. The members 
of the Secretary and CDF Advisory Committee were nominated as leading these 'key 
levers for change'. While the Pathway to Change strategy noted that implementation 
'will commence immediately', it acknowledged that 'substantial change in our culture 
will take some years'–suggesting five years as the 'likely time for cultural effect' in 
some areas.44  
2.45 While the Pathway to Change document did not refer to the findings of the 
DLA Piper Review, the Supplement to Volume 1 stated that the recommendations of 
DLA Piper Review 'will positively support the cultural changes that [the Secretary of 
Defence] and the CDF have identified in the Pathway to Change strategy as being 
"cultural changes that [Defence] must make if we are to continue to mature and evolve 
as an institution and as a community of professionals"'.45 
2.46 Following receipt of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Review report, Minister 
Smith stated that the report's findings and recommendations 'will now be considered 
and dealt with carefully and methodically'.46 He also noted that this included 'a full 
opportunity for Defence to carefully consider and respond in relation to the Review 
report'. Further:  
Defence's response to the systemic issues identified in the Review will be 
based on Defence's 'Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture' 
document, released by the Secretary of the Chief of the Defence Force in 
March this year.47 
The government's response to the DLA Piper Review reports 
2.47 On 26 November 2012, the then Minister for Defence, the Hon Stephen Smith 
MP, announced the government's response to the DLA Piper Review report. The 
components of government's response included: 
43  Department of Defence, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture—A Strategy for 
Cultural Change and Reinforcement, March 2012, p. 31. 
44  Department of Defence, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture—A Strategy for 
Cultural Change and Reinforcement, March 2012, p. 7. 
45  DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, p. vii.  
46  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'DLA Piper report', Media Release, 
11 October 2011.  
47  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Release of the Executive Summary of 
Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Report: Allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence', 
Media Release, 14 June 2012, p. 3.  
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• an apology in Parliament (delivered by Minister Smith on 
26 November 2012); 
• a telephone hotline for anyone wishing to find out more about the proposed 
arrangements or report new information; and 
• a Defence Abuse Response Taskforce (also referred to as DART or the 
Taskforce), headed by the Hon Len Roberts-Smith QC, to assess individual 
allegations made to the DLA Piper Review, and any additional allegations 
made before 11 April 2011, and work with those who have made allegations 
to determine an appropriate response in individual cases. These responses 
may include: 
- possible restorative justice/conferencing processes where a victim 
and alleged perpetrator are brought together in a facilitated process;  
- referral to counselling; 
- determination of compensation (capped at $50,000); 
- referral of appropriate matters to police for formal criminal 
investigation and assessment for prosecution; and 
- referral of appropriate matters for disposition by the military justice 
system. 
2.48 Minister Smith noted that the Taskforce would be based in the Attorney-
General's Department and '[a]ll the costs of this exercise will be met from within the 
Defence budget'. He explained:  
In the end, when there is inappropriate conduct in an institution, whether it's 
an agency, a department or an institution outside of Government, in the end, 
there's a price to pay, and that will be part of the price which Defence has to 
pay for inappropriate conduct in the past, but, more importantly, with the 
steps we're putting in place, we want to get zero tolerance and appropriate 
conduct into the future, and we'll manage that in the same way that we 
manage other Defence budget issues.48 
2.49 The Minister also announced the government's response to the Review of 
Treatment of Women in the ADF conducted by the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner, Ms Elizabeth Broderick, and provided an update on the 
Defence cultural reform program, Pathway to Change. In particular, this included 
accepting recommendations for the establishment of a dedicated Sexual Misconduct 
Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO). Other recommendations accepted 
included the implementation of restricted reporting (allowing defence personnel to 
make confidential reports of sexual harassment, discrimination or abuse), and the 
introduction of waivers for Initial Minimum Provision of Service and Return of 
48  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Press Conference, 26 November 2012. 
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Service Obligations for victims of sexual assault/harassment (to allow them to 
discharge from the ADF expeditiously and without financial penalty).49  
2.50 Minister Smith stated that to 'ensure that ongoing implementation of these 
essential reforms receives the highest levels of oversight, the Minister for Defence 
will on an annual basis provide a report to the Parliament on Defence's 
implementation of the reform program'.50  
2.51 On 26 November 2012, the then CDF, General David Hurley, also made an 
apology to those who had suffered sexual, physical or mental abuse while serving in 
the ADF: 
Accepting that the rigors of training in the Army, Navy and Air Force will 
be tough and demanding every ADF member must be able to pursue their 
aspirations in an environment free from physical, mental and sexual abuse 
in accordance with the ADF's values and associated behaviours. 
The allegations received through the DLA Piper review process 
demonstrate that the ADF has not always provided such an environment. 
That it hasn't done so is evident in alleged incidents of sexual, physical and 
mental abuse… I, as the head of the ADF, recognise the suffering that some 
have experienced. On behalf of the ADF, I say that I am sorry to those who 
have suffered sexual, physical or mental abuse while serving in the ADF.51 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce  
2.52 The terms of reference for the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, signed by 
Minister Smith and the then Attorney-General, were released on 21 January 2013: 
The Taskforce is to: 
(i) assess the findings of the DLA Piper review and the material gathered 
by that review, and any additional material available to the Taskforce 
concerning complaints of sexual and other forms of abuse by Defence 
personnel alleged to have occurred prior to 11 April 2011, the date of the 
announcement of the DLA Piper Review; 
(ii) include in this assessment the 24 Australian Defence Force Academy 
(ADFA) cases noted by DLA Piper and the cases of abuse identified by 
reports into physical violence and bullying at HMAS Leeuwin, and whether 
the alleged victims, perpetrators and witnesses in relation to these cases 
remain in Defence; 
49  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Treatment of Women in the ADF', 
Media Release, 26 November 2012. 
50  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Implementation of Defence cultural 
reform—Pathway to Change', Media Release, 26 November 2012. 
51  Department of Defence, 'Statement from General David Hurley, Chief of the Defence Force', 
Transcript, 26 November 2012, http://news.defence.gov.au/2012/11/26/statement-from-
general-david-hurley-chief-of-the-defence-force/ (accessed 5 August 2014). 
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(iii) determine, in close consultation with those who have made 
complaints, appropriate actions in response to those complaints; 
(iv) will also, as appropriate, gather additional information relevant to 
consideration of the handling of particular allegations eg relevant records 
held by Defence; 
(v) take account of the rights and interests of alleged victims, accused 
persons and other parties; 
(vi) liaise with the Minister for Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and 
the Secretary of the Department of Defence on any implications of its work 
for Defence's 'Pathway to Change' and other responses to the series of 
reviews into Defence culture and practices in particular the work done by 
the Sex Discrimination Commissioner into the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) and ADFA;  
(vii) report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence every 
3 months on its progress and issues arising, including whether the funding it 
has been provided is adequate so as to enable the Attorney General and 
Minister for Defence to report to Parliament as appropriate; 
(viii) report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence by 
October 2013 on whether, in what form, the Taskforce should continue in 
effect beyond the initial 12 month period and the funding that would be 
required so as to enable the Attorney General and Minister for Defence to 
report to Parliament as appropriate; and 
(ix) to advise whether a Royal Commission would be merited into any 
categories of allegation raised with the DLA Piper review or the Taskforce, 
in particular the 24 ADFA cases.52 
2.53 On 14 March 2013, the Minister tabled in the Parliament the First Interim 
Report of the Taskforce. The report indicated the Taskforce had completed its 
'Establishment phase' of constructing the Taskforce, meeting with stakeholders and 
establishing practices and processes and was moving to its 'Operational phase': 
During this phase the Taskforce will conduct an initial assessment of DLA 
Piper and other allegations of abuse and Defence mishandling of reported 
allegations. Preliminary enquiries of plausible allegations will be made, 
including obtaining further information and material from Defence and 
other sources. 
In consultation with complainants, appropriate action will be determined 
and where necessary appropriate allegations will be referred to external 
agencies such as Police agencies, the Defence Force Ombudsman or other 
entities. 
With respect to the ADFA and HMAS Leeuwin cases, enquiries will be 
made as to whether alleged victims, perpetrators or witnesses remain in 
Defence. Where the circumstances so require, the Chair will make 
52  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, 'Taskforce releases Terms of Reference', Media Release, 
21 January 2013.  
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recommendations to the CDF in relation to appropriate action he may wish 
to pursue. 
The Taskforce Chair will also make recommendations for action to the 
Minister for Defence, Secretary of Defence and CDF or other Service 
Chiefs in Defence as appropriate in individual cases. Further, the Chair will 
liaise with the Minister, Secretary and CDF on any implications for 
Pathway To Change or other reviews.53 
2.54 The report also anticipated a 'Conclusion and Legacy phase' during which the 
Taskforce would provide its final report to ministers, make recommendations in 
relation to any outstanding matters and organise storage of the Taskforce's materials.54 
2.55 The Minister announced that, on the advice of the Chair of the Taskforce, the 
timeframe for the Taskforce would also be extended to the end of May 2014. Further: 
[T]he cut-off for the Taskforce accepting new allegations of abuse that are 
alleged to have occurred prior to 11 April 2011 will be 31 May this year, 
giving the Taskforce a full year in which to assess these allegations and 
conclude its work. This announcement will ensure that people who have 
experienced abuse prior to 11 April 2011 but who have not yet brought 
their case forward have the time to consider doing so.55 
2.56 On 20 June 2013, Minister Smith made a statement on the Taskforce and 
provided his first annual report on the implementation of the Pathway to Change 
Defence cultural reforms. In particular, the Minister reported on the progress in 
implementing the recommendations of the Defence cultural reviews, noting that 82 of 
the 160 recommendations had been completed. He expected the remaining 
recommendations to be implemented 'over the coming year'.56 
2.57 The Taskforce's second interim report was also tabled by the Minister on 
20 June 2013. The report indicated that:  
Up until the reporting deadline of 31 May 2013, the Taskforce received a 
total of 3251 enquiries, which were received through DLA Piper, from law 
firms or directly to the Taskforce. Approximately 331 complaints have been 
identified as duplicates or multiple lodgements by the same person and 
53  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, First Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister 
for Defence, March 2013, p. 5.  
54  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, First Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister 
for Defence, March 2013, p. 5.  
55  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Response to allegations of abuse in 
Defence', Media release, 14 March 2013, 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/03/14/minister-for-defence-response-to-allegations-
of-abuse-in-defence (accessed 20 May 2013).  
56  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Paper presented on the Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce', 20 June 2013.  
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approximately 510 have not provided consent for information to be passed 
to the Taskforce yet. 
As at 31 May 2013, it is estimated there are 2410 complaints which will be 
assessed by the Taskforce. Of these, 1535 are new complaints (post 26 
November 2012) and 875 are complaints that the Taskforce has consent to 
reassess, which came from DLA Piper…. 
More than 240 complaints were at various points of the assessment process 
on 6 June 2013 and eight complaints had been provided to the Reparation 
Payments Assessor for consideration.57 
Bipartisan support for the Taskforce 
2.58 In the Taskforce's third interim report in September 2013, the Chair of the 
Taskforce acknowledged the 'ongoing bipartisan support and commitment expressed 
by both the new Government and Opposition'. This support for the Taskforce's 
activities was illustrated during the election period when the Chair of the Taskforce 
met the Minister and the Shadow Minister who 'gave their ongoing support for the 
procurement activities of the Taskforce during the caretaker period'.58 
2.59 On 19 March 2014, Senator the Hon David Johnston, the Minister for 
Defence, announced that the Taskforce had been extended to 30 November 2014.59  
Recent events and progress 
2.60 Once a complaint has been assessed as 'in scope' and 'plausible', the Taskforce 
consults with the complainant to determine which outcomes they would like to pursue 
through the Taskforce processes. These outcomes may include: 
- a referral for counselling under the Defence Abuse Counselling Program; 
- a Reparation Payment of up to $50,000 under the Defence Abuse 
Reparation Scheme, with the amount of payment determined by the 
independent Reparation Payments Assessor, Ms Robyn Kruk AM; 
- referral of appropriate matters to civilian police for assessment and 
possible investigation and prosecution; 
- referral to the matter to the CDF for administrative or disciplinary action; 
and/or 
- a Restorative Engagement Conference with a senior Defence 
representative arranged under the Defence Abuse Restorative Engagement 
Program.60 
57  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Second Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, June 2013, p. iii.  
58  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Third Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2013, p. 4. 
59  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, 'Taskforce Extended to 30 November', Media Release, 
19 March 2014.  
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2.61 The fifth interim report of the Taskforce provided an update on the Defence 
Abuse Restorative Engagement Program. It stated: 
One of the Programs likely to continue after 30 November 2014 is the 
Defence Abuse Restorative Engagement Program. The Taskforce has 
completed Phase 1 of the Restorative Engagement Program. However, 
Phase 2 will require significant logistical, administrative and specialised 
resources in order to provide Restorative Engagement Conferences to the 
anticipated 1000 plus complainants who request this as an outcome.61 
2.62 The fifth interim report also noted that delays in the restorative engagement 
program had resulted from the caretaker period and also noted the Taskforce had been 
required to seek a partial exemption from the interim public service recruiting 
arrangements implemented by the new government.62 
2.63 The seventh interim report stated that, as at 31 July 2014, the Taskforce total 
expenditure since its establishment was approximately $67.2 million, comprising 
$19.4 million for administration of the Taskforce and $47.8 for the delivery of 
outcomes for complainants. It estimated that total cost of funding the Taskforce 
between 2012-13 and 2015-16 would be $157.3 million.63 The seventh interim report 
also included a summary of the Taskforce's achievements:  
As at 11 August 2014, the Taskforce had: 
- supported complainants as their matters progress through the various 
Taskforce processes to resolution; 
- provided a Case Coordinator to more than 1277 complainants; 
- fully or partially assessed 2272 complaints to determine whether they are 
within scope of the Terms of Reference and are plausible; 
- liaised with complainants and Defence to obtain further information in 
relation to particular complaints; 
- released the details of the national Defence Abuse Counselling Program; 
- approved 2361 counselling sessions to complainants under the Defence 
Abuse Counselling Program; 
- made Reparation Payments to 878 complainants, totalling more than $36 
million; 
60  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Sixth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, June 2014, p. 6. 
61  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Fifth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, March 2014, p. 11. 
62  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Fifth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, March 2014, p. 11. 
63  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 30. 
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- prepared 191 senior Defence representatives across Australia to participate 
in the Defence Abuse Restorative Engagement Program; 
- facilitated 48 Restorative Engagement Conferences (including one follow-
up Conference); under the Defence Abuse Restorative Engagement 
Program; 
- referred 73 cases to State and Territory police for assessment and 
consideration of criminal investigation and prosecution; 
- referred 22 matters to the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) for 
consideration or administrative or disciplinary action; 
- continued collecting and analysing data through the Taskforce Case 
Management System (CMS) to better inform the Taskforce, the 
Government and Defence about systemic issues arising in the complaints 
received by the Taskforce; 
- released a detailed parliamentary Report on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin 
(HMAS Leeuwin Report) during the 1960s to 1980s; 
- provided a copy of the HMAS Leeuwin Report to the Royal Commission 
into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse…64 
ADFA 24 
2.64 As noted above the terms of reference for the Taskforce included a 
requirement to assess the so-called 'ADFA 24' – cases of serious sexual assault 
highlighted by the DLA Piper Review. Further, the Taskforce was required to advise 
whether a Royal Commission was merited into any categories of allegations raised 
with the DLA Piper Review 'in particular the 24 ADFA cases'. The Department of 
Defence provided the committee with an update on this matter:  
On 16 October 2013, the Taskforce referred preliminary information to 
Defence on 19 cases related to the 'ADFA 24'. Defence is in the process of 
reviewing the information and considering whether administrative or 
disciplinary action is available. These matters relate to serving ADF 
members, active and inactive Reserves.65 
2.65 In relation to the 'ADFA 24', the seventh interim report stated:  
The Taskforce has conducted a thorough analysis of all available 
information held by Defence on this cluster of cases. 
On 16 October 2013, the Taskforce provided its analysis to the former 
CDF, General David Hurley AC, DSC. This analysis included 
recommendations in relation to specific cases, where it appeared that it was 
open to Defence to take administrative, disciplinary or other action against 
64  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 4. 
65  Submission 17, p. 4.  
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alleged abusers or individuals involved in the management of complaints of 
abuse who are still serving in Defence… 
The Taskforce is continuing to focus on finalising individual complaints 
relating to abuse alleged to have occurred at ADFA, both from 
complainants who allege sexual abuse occurring at ADFA in the mid-1990s 
and from complainants who made allegations of abuse occurring at ADFA 
during other time periods… 
The Taskforce has now received complaints from 11 women who allege 
that they experienced sexual abuse at ADFA in the mid-1990s. The 
Taskforce has been contacted by an additional three women who allege that 
they experienced sexual abuse at ADFA during the same period of time as 
this cluster of cases (1991—1998) and are considering whether they will 
make a complaint. The Taskforce will continue to accept complaints from 
these women and any other woman who experienced sexual abuse at ADFA 
during this time period. We are able to do this only because of the 
uncertainty of what cases actually comprised the so-called 'ADFA 24'. 
In total, the Taskforce has received 72 complaints relating to abuse alleged 
to have occurred at ADFA. The assessment of the vast majority of these 
complaints is complete. 
The Taskforce will produce a de-identified public report regarding abuse 
alleged to have occurred at ADFA, including cases of sexual abuse 
occurring at ADFA in the mid-1990s, later this year.66 
HMAS Leeuwin 
2.66 The terms of reference for the Taskforce also included a particular 
requirement to consider allegations of abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, a Junior Recruit 
Training Establishment operated by the Royal Australian Navy in Fremantle, Western 
Australia between 1960 and 1984. On 18 June 2014, the Taskforce released its report 
on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, which was based on the personal accounts of more than 
200 complainants who trained at the facility.67 Almost all of the complainants were 
aged between 15 and 17 at the time of the abuse. The report noted complaints of abuse 
at HMAS Leeuwin formed the single largest group of complaints relating to any 
Defence establishment received by the Taskforce.  
2.67 The HMAS Leeuwin report's findings included: 
• widespread abuse of junior recruits occurred at HMAS Leeuwin, particularly 
during the 1960s and 1970s; 
• there were patterns evident in the complaints of abuse at HMAS Leeuwin; 
66  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, pp 1-2. 
67  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Report on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, 2014, available at: 
https://www.defenceabusetaskforce.gov.au/HMAS-Leeuwin/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 
1 August 2014). 
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• Defence failed to take appropriate action to prevent, stop and respond to the 
abuse at HMAS Leeuwin; and 
• the abuse at HMAS Leeuwin has had serious and long lasting impacts.68 
Parallel processes 
Re-thinking systems of inquiry, investigation, review and audit in Defence 
2.68 On 8 November 2011, the Secretary of Defence and the CDF commissioned a 
review of all investigation, inquiry, review and audit systems in Defence: 
The objective of the review is to make recommendations regarding the 
establishment of a system that is fair, timely, simple to implement, provides 
whole of Defence outcomes and which takes into account legislative 
requirements, with the initial step being to: 
- summarise current structures, demonstrating key strengths and 
weaknesses; 
- outline the key factors that prevent quick, decisive, whole of Defence 
outcomes; and 
- identify the essential components of an optimal system for the future.69 
2.69 The Department of Defence provided an update on this process: 
In March 2014 following CDF's consideration of the Rethinking Systems 
Review report, the Chiefs of Service Committee considered proposals to 
enhance ADF decisions making guidance, redress of grievance process and 
investigation and inquiry practice.  
The proposals include simplifying decision-making and fact-finding 
guidance to provide more flexible options to empower commanders to act 
decisively; streamlining the redress of grievance processes to remove 
multiple layers of internal review and strengthening governance of the 
process through oversight by the Inspector-General ADF (IGADF); 
consolidate incident reporting policy; and enhancing the function and 
independence of the IGADF. Lieutenant General Mark Evans (retd) has 
been appointed to implement the Chiefs of Service Committee decisions.  
The end state is a simple and efficient administrative inquiry process, more 
responsive to command requirements for timely decision making, a fair and 
succinct ADF Redress of Grievance process that appropriately balances a 
member's right to complain with interests of timeliness and certainty in 
decision making, and improved oversight.70 
68  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Report on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, 2014, pp 90-92.  
69  Department of Defence, 'Report on Stage A (Research and Analysis stage)', Re-thinking 
systems of inquiry, investigation, review and audit in Defence, 1 August 2012, p. 5.  
70  Submission 17, p. 7.  
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Royal Commission into institutional child abuse 
2.70 On 12 November 2012, the then Prime Minister, the Hon Julia Gillard MP, 
announced that a Royal Commission into institutional child abuse would be 
established. Following the announcement, the Acting Minister for Families, the Hon 
Brendan O'Connor was asked if the Royal Commission's investigation would include 
consideration of the abuse of Defence cadets. The Acting Minister noted that 'there is 
an ongoing investigation into those matters' and that the terms of reference of the 
Royal Commission would be determined 'before the year's end'.71 The Letters Patent 
of the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse do not appear to 
exclude those who suffered abuse in Defence institutions when they were underage.72 
The Defence Abuse Response Taskforce has reported it has had discussions regarding 
establishing an information sharing protocol with the Royal Commission.73  
Previous Senate committee inquiry  
2.71 On 10 October 2012, the Senate referred matters relating to the report of the 
review of allegations of sexual and other abuse in Defence, conducted by DLA Piper, 
and the response of the government to the report, to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade References Committee for inquiry and report.74 The committee tabled its report 
on 27 June 2013. In its conclusion the committee stated: 
The committee is hopeful that the legacy of the DLA Piper Review and the 
Defence cultural reviews—the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce and the 
Defence cultural reform strategy Pathway to Change—will both bring 
resolution to victims of past abuse and prevent further abuse from occurring 
in the future. In both cases it is too early to form a conclusive judgement on 
the government's response, however, on the evidence received, the 
committee considers that significant progress has been made.75 
2.72 The committee's report made 10 recommendations. The Australian 
Government's response to the committee's report was released in March 2014. For 
71  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Minister explains abuse Royal Commission decision', 
7.30 Report, 12 November 2012, available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2012/s3631175.htm (accessed 13 November 2012).  
72  Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 'Letters Patent', 
http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/LettersPatent/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 
20 May 2013). 
73  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Second Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, June 2013, p. 44. 
74  Journals of the Senate, 10 October 2012, p. 3106.  
75  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, p. 81. 
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convenience both the committee's recommendations and the government response to 
each recommendation are extracted at Appendix 4.76 
Consideration of access to Volume 2 
2.73 The committee's earlier inquiry considered the matter of appropriate access to 
Volume 2, particularly the 'vexed issue' of whether Volume 2 should be provided to 
the Secretary of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Service 
Chiefs. While noting there were competing interests in relation to this issue, the 
committee considered that the actions taken in providing Volume 2 to the Taskforce 
were 'a sensible and responsible approach to these issues'. The committee noted that 
the Taskforce would be able to refer matters to Defence or to Commonwealth, State or 
Territory police. Further, the committee noted a statement from the Chair of the 
Taskforce that:  
[I]n a small number of cases, where an alleged abuser remains in Defence 
and is alleged to have perpetrated serious sexual or other abuse on one or 
more occasions, I may decide it is necessary to bring the matter to the 
attention of Defence. I envisage that such a recommendation could be made 
where I feel that, for the safety and wellbeing of other Defence employees, 
it is necessary so intervention can occur. 
2.74 While the committee commended this approach, it also believed that the Chair 
of the Taskforce should go further and 'inform the Secretary of Defence and the CDF 
of any serving member who, in the Chair's opinion, has a serious and credible 
allegation of abuse made against him or her'.77 However, the committee did not make 
a recommendation on this matter. In his additional comments to the committee's 
report, Senator Xenophon recommended that '[i]n the interests of transparency, 
Volume 2 of the DLA Piper Review be released publicly with the appropriate 
redactions at this stage to avoid compromising any likely future action'.78 
 
76  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, pp xi-xii. 
77  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, p. 70. 
78  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, p. 86.  
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Chapter 3 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce processes 
Introduction 
3.1 This chapter will consider the processes of the Taskforce (or DART), 
including: 
• the conduct of the Taskforce; 
• awareness of the Taskforce; 
• the cut-off dates; 
• the scope of abuse covered by the Taskforce; 
• the use of the evidential threshold of plausibility; 
• referrals to law enforcement and Defence;  
• the restorative engagement program; 
• counselling services; 
• the reparation scheme;  
• legacy issues: and  
• anonymous complaints and complaints in the media. 
Conduct of the Taskforce 
3.2 As at 23 September 2014, the Taskforce indicated that it had assessed 
2223 cases as raising plausible allegations of abuse (relating to a total of 1657 
complainants). Of these 2223 cases, allegations of abuse were received from 
complainants across all three services:   
• 39 per cent (859 cases) involved abuse of people serving in the Navy; 
• 39 per cent (877 cases) involved abuse of people serving in the Army; and 
• 17 per cent (376 cases) involved abuse of people serving the Air Force.1 
3.3 The following types of abuse were raised by complainants (noting that many 
complainants experienced more than one type of abuse during their careers in 
Defence): 
• Sexual abuse – 38 per cent (834 cases); 
• Sexual harassment – 17 per cent (389 cases); 
1  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to question on notice from hearing on 
26 September 2014, pp 1-2.  
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• Physical abuse – 48 per cent (1067 cases); and 
• Harassment and bullying – 66 per cent (1464 cases).2 
3.4 A wide range of views were received in evidence regarding the conduct of the 
Taskforce and the overall outcomes achieved. For example, the Defence Force 
Welfare Association was of the opinion that 'the Taskforce has been very effective in 
investigating the cases reported to it, and have been very sensitive in its dealings with 
the individuals who have been subject to abuse'.3 Mr Brien Briggs from Slater and 
Gordon Lawyers also praised the achievements of the DART overall:  
Whilst I note that certain individuals, groups and associations have raised 
issues regarding the DART, the experiences of myself and my team at the 
Military Compensation Group of Slater and Gordon Lawyers, have been 
nothing but positive. The job of the DART has been challenging given the 
fact that within a limited time frame it has had to assist people who have 
been denied recognition and support for many years.4 
3.5 Mr Adair Donaldson from Shine Lawyers characterised the DART as an 
'overwhelming success'. He highlighted 'the proactive manner in which the DART has 
been able to deal with survivors with great empathy, understanding and most 
importantly independence'.5 
3.6 Other submissions, particularly from some complainants and the Association 
for Victims of Abuse in Defence, highlighted negative experiences in dealing with the 
Taskforce. For example, the Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF considered 
that the Taskforce was 'controlled by a military general who seems more concerned 
with keeping a lid on things rather than fully supporting victims and properly 
informing Parliament'. It considered that 'the issue of investigating, dealing with and 
compensating the victims of abuse in the Australian Defence Force should be taken 
out of [the Taskforce's] hands and given to a truly independent statutory civilian 
authority reporting to the Parliament'.6 
Terminology 
3.7 The terminology used to describe victims of abuse in Defence was also the 
subject of comment. The Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF objected to the 
use of the term 'complainant' by the Taskforce '[a]s if [victims of abuse in Defence] 
were whingers'.7 The Taskforce addressed this terminology issue in their submission:  
2  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to question on notice from hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 2. 
3  Submission 1, p. 1.  
4  Submission 4, p. 1.  
5  Submission 12, p. 2.  
6  Submission 14, p. 1. 
7  Submission 14, p. 21.  
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The advice the Taskforce received was that many individuals who have 
experienced abuse do not see themselves as 'victims' and object to the term 
being used. They also indicated that some consider themselves to be 
'survivors' rather than 'victims' of abuse and view the term 'victim' to be 
disempowering… 
The other reason was that the Taskforce received reports from individuals 
who were not themselves victims of abuse, rather they reported abuse on 
behalf of someone else, or, they witnessed the abuse. Therefore, the term 
'complainant' captured all individuals who registered with the Taskforce.8 
Awareness of the Taskforce 
3.8 The awareness of victims of abuse of the Taskforce's processes and the 
deadlines for making applications was questioned during the inquiry. For example, 
Dr Rumble considered that one of the key reasons that the Taskforce's work could not 
be relied on to have 'fixed' all or even most issues of abuse in Defence was because it 
was 'likely that the DART has only reached a small proportion of people affected by 
abuse in the past'.9 Similarly, Mr Adair Donaldson from Shine Lawyers identified that 
'a lack of appreciation and a lack of knowledge' that the Taskforce existed were key 
factors which prevented survivors of abuse in Defence from coming forward.10  
3.9 The Taskforce noted that it 'relied upon various forms of media to raise 
awareness of our work' and at different points in time widely advertised its work in 
newspapers and other media, informing people of the deadlines for registration and 
the provision of personal account forms.11 The Chair of the Taskforce considered 
there was 'a lot of media publicity about the Taskforce to start with'.12 He stated:  
My impression is that there was comprehensive publicity on a number of 
occasions and generally over the life of the Taskforce. Of course, we should 
all bear in mind that there was considerable publicity prior to and during the 
course of the DLA Piper review. So we are talking about a period of 
probably around three years.13 
3.10 Defence also advised that it had 'communicated as widely as possible the 
existence and purpose of the Taskforce, including through establishing internal and 
external websites, to ensure that current and former members of the ADF were able to 
access information that would assist them to approach the Taskforce'.14 
8  Submission 21, p. 2.  
9  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 3.  
10  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 7.  
11  Submission 21, p. 2. Also see Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 35.  
12  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 35.  
13  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 31.  
14  Submission 17, p. 2.  
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Cut-off dates 
3.11 There were several cut-off dates associated with the work of the Taskforce. In 
particular, the terms of reference for the Taskforce direct it to assess complaints of 
abuse which 'occurred prior to 11 April 2011, the date of the announcement of the 
DLA Piper Review'. On 14 March 2013, the former Minister for Defence tabled the 
Taskforce's first interim report in Parliament and announced that people would have 
until 31 May 2013 to make a complaint of abuse to the Taskforce. 
This cut-off date was widely advertised in major metropolitan newspapers, 
Defence publications, on the websites of the Department of Defence and the 
Taskforce and in a media release from the Taskforce and a joint media 
release from the Minister for Defence and Attorney-General. The Taskforce 
also worked with Defence to communicate the cut-off date through internal 
channels within Defence—including a DEFGRAM on 21 May 2013—and 
on the Department of Defence intranet.15 
3.12 It was subsequently announced that '[i]n order for the Taskforce to complete 
the work set out for it by Government within the agreed timeframes and to ensure 
complainants receive outcomes that are available to them in a timely manner, it is 
necessary for complainants to provide all relevant documentation and information to 
the Taskforce by 30 November 2013'.16  
3.13 The 'cut-off dates' for applications to the Taskforce were criticised by a 
number of witnesses and in submissions to the inquiry.17 For example, 
Mr Adair Donaldson from Shine Lawyers could not see the rationale in the Taskforce 
only being able to assess claims in relation to abuse that occurred prior to 
11 April 2011. He considered that survivors that were abused between 11 April 2011 
and 30 November 2013 should have been entitled to lodge claims with DART. 
Further, Mr Donaldson highlighted that 'many victims of abuse in the defence force 
are wary of coming forward'. He explained: 
[S]urvivors of abuse had until 30 November 2013 to lodge their claim. For 
many of the claimants this was their first time reliving the horrors of their 
past. It took great courage for them to come forward. Further, based on 
experience with survivors from other institutions the writer believes that 
there would still be a large number who have not come forward.18 
3.14 Similarly, Mr Briggs from Slater & Gordon Lawyers stated:  
15  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Sixth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, June 2014, p. 6. 
16  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Third Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2013, p. 3. 
17  For example, Ms Rachael James, Slater and Gordon Lawyers, Committee Hansard, 
13 August 2014, p. 1.  
18  Submission 12, p. 3.  
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I note that the terms of reference [of the Taskforce] only allow abuse cases 
up to the cut-off date of 1/4/11 to be considered and later abuse is out of 
scope. The cut-off date of 1/4/11 has created criticism and angst among 
claimants. This will create a vacuum because some ADF personnel 
continue to feel unable to report incidents post April 2011 for the usual 
reasons such as impact on their career, deployment opportunities, the risk of 
further degradation, humiliation and ongoing abuse etc.19 
3.15 The Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF also argued that 'this date 
was chosen on the false assumption that all abuse magically stopped on this date as a 
result of Defence's "Pathways to Change" [but] [t]he reality is as can be seen; the 
abuse did not stop - only compensation to the Victims'.20 
3.16 The Taskforce noted that as it had not been established as an ongoing agency 
'the former Minister determined a date on or prior to which abuse must have taken 
place for a complainant to be considered, and, a date upon which to register with the 
Taskforce. Further, '[d]eadlines for registration and the provision of personal account 
forms were necessary to ensure the work of the Taskforce could be implemented in an 
efficient and timely manner.21  
3.17 The Chair of the Taskforce told the committee it would be impossible to 
estimate how many people affected by abuse in Defence have not been reached by the 
DART processes.22 In September, the Taskforce indicated to the committee that since 
'the cut-off date of 31 May 2013 the Taskforce has been contacted by 273 individuals 
wishing to register their complaint with the Taskforce'.23  
Scope of abuse claims 
3.18 At the hearing on 13 August 2014, the Chair of the Taskforce outlined the 
broad range of sexual and physical abuse cases reported to the Taskforce: 
The categories of abuse with which the task force is able to deal are sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, sexual harassment and workplace bullying and 
harassment. Factually, the actual abuse and the consequences of it can be 
horrific. There are many instances of repeated, serious, physical and sexual 
assaults including gang-rape, ongoing sexual harassment and serious 
workplace bullying. The consequences on the lives of the victims are often 
totally devastating.24 
19  Submission 4, p. 2.  
20  Submission 14, p 37.  
21  Submission 21, p. 2.  
22  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 32. 
23  Correspondence to the committee from the Hon Len Roberts-Smith, Chair, Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce, 20 October 2014.  
24  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 29.  
                                              
34 
3.19 However, some witnesses and submissions argued that the scope of the abuse 
claims assessed by the Taskforce as being within its terms of reference was too 
restrictive. For example, Mr Garry Bates, a retired Air Commodore had determined 
that his claim as a victim of abuse of power in Defence was 'out of scope'. He outlined 
that the Taskforce had stated that '"abuse of power" is not a category of abuse with 
which the Taskforce can deal, unless it amounts to workplace bullying and 
harassment'.25 The Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF also alleged the 
Taskforce was denying abuse by changing the definition and stated that '[a]buse 
encompasses all unlawful acts which abuse the individual'.26 
3.20 Mr Briggs from Slater and Gordon Lawyers commented that 'the restrictive 
definition of abuse and the limitations on the terms of reference' had led to some of his 
client's claims not being accepted by the DART:  
The DLA Piper categories of 'abuse' were originally much broader than the 
eventual definition of 'abuse' used by the DART. This has led to some 
confusion and denial of some claims. For example, the DLA list originally 
included 'negligently causing injury', which is arguably a broad term.27 
3.21 The Taskforce submission stated that its work must be undertaken in 
accordance with its terms of reference and that the Taskforce is 'unable to consider 
allegations of abuse that do not fall within our definitions of abuse'.28 Its submission 
provided some non-exhaustive definitions of abuse for general guidance: 
Sexual abuse means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, committed 
against a person without their consent. It does not require physical contact 
between the person and the alleged abuser and can include conduct in the 
presence of the person. 
Sexual harassment is unwanted and non-consensual conduct of a sexual 
nature. 
Workplace harassment includes offensive, demeaning, humiliating, 
intimidating or threatening behaviour that is unwelcome, unsolicited, 
usually unreciprocated and often repeated. 
Bullying is a form of harassment and is repeated behaviour that does not 
show respect.29 
25  Submission 2, p. 2.  
26  Submission 14, supplementary submission, p. 10.  
27  Submission 4, p. 1.  
28  Submission 21, p. 2. 
29  Submission 21, pp 2-3.  
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Evidential threshold of plausibility 
3.22 The Chair of the Taskforce described the use of the plausibility standard as 
allowing the Taskforce to 'resolve the unresolvable'. He recently commented on the 
use of evidence in assessments of claims of abuse in Defence: 
For many different reasons, including (but not limited to), complainants not 
reporting the alleged abuse at the time nor for years afterwards; minimising 
descriptions of the abuse when it was reported; lack of forensic evidence; 
lack of witnesses; credibility issues because of psychological illness, 
alcohol or drug addiction (often the result of the abuse itself) and the 
absence of documentation, many if not most of the complainants to the 
Taskforce would have no prospect of having their allegations accepted as 
true in any formal administrative investigation or judicial process. The 
application of legal standards of proof ("the balance of probabilities" or 
"beyond reasonable doubt") with the complainant having the onus of 
proving the truth of their allegation, would be an insurmountable obstacle. 
It was against this background that the Taskforce is required to accept an 
allegation of abuse as true, if satisfied on all the material available, that it is 
plausible.30 
3.23 The Taskforce stated that 'the standard of "plausibility" was stipulated by the 
former Minister for Defence so that the Taskforce could provide outcomes to as many 
complainants as possible': 
Noting that much of the alleged abuse occurred many years ago and was 
never reported at the time, the plausibility standard enables the Taskforce to 
proceed without the need for extensive, legally admissible evidence, which, 
over the passage of time, would be difficult if not impossible for a 
complainant to provide.31 
3.24 However some concerns were raised regarding the use of 'plausibility' as the 
standard used by the Taskforce. For example, the Inspector General ADF, 
Mr Geoff Earley described the evidential threshold of 'plausibility' as 'quite low':  
A consequence of this is that a favourable outcome from the DART process 
may raise in some complainants unrealistic expectations about their likely 
success in seeking further relief or recompense from other Departmental or 
Government administrative processes.32 
3.25 Mr Earley noted his office had started to receive referrals in respect of 
complainants who had been assessed as plausible and had received a reparation 
payment. He noted that '[i]n such circumstances some complainants may often feel 
that their complaint has been vindicated and, understandably, have favourable 
30  The Hon Len Roberts-Smith QC, 'Restorative Engagement – Beyond the Horizon', Speech, 
Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia Conference, 3 May 2014, p. 8.  
31  Submission 21, p. 5.  
32  Submission 7, p. 2.  
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expectations about the outcomes of subsequent investigative processes in respect of 
their complaints'.33 He stated: 
There will inevitably be some cases where allegations which have been 
assessed as plausible cannot be proved to the standard required to support 
further legal or administrative action, particularly compensatory action. The 
impact on the health and wellbeing of a potentially vulnerable complainant 
of such an outcome may be ongoing.34 
3.26 Mr Earley told the committee he had raised his concerns with the Chair of the 
Taskforce and that 'in consultation with Defence representatives, a public document 
for the use of complainants and other agencies had been created which clearly sets out 
the difference between DART processes and the standards of proof, both civil and 
criminal, used for other purposes'.35 He also noted that procedural fairness issues 
could potentially be raised by the use of the plausibility standard where 'it is applied in 
circumstances where only one side of the story is known'. He observed:  
To meet the threshold of plausibility, the DART must be satisfied that the 
claim of abuse and/or mismanagement has 'the appearance of 
reasonableness'. I should make it clear I do not wish my comments on this 
aspect to be taken to be critical of this approach. I strongly support the work 
of the DART in providing support to victims of abuse. The fact remains, 
however, that many of the respondents to allegations raised in the DLA 
Piper report and the DART process have not and perhaps will not ever have 
an opportunity to present their side of the story in response to those 
allegations.36 
3.27 The Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) also noted that differences in the 
assessment of claims by DVA and the Taskforce are not well understood by 
claimants:  
[T]his is being addressed by both agencies through several channels, 
including the provision of factsheets to all DART applicants, discussions 
between DART case co-ordinators and Reparation Payment applicants and 
discussions between DVA staff and compensation claimants.37 
In February 2014, DVA obtained agreement from the Chair of the 
DART…that all DART applicants will be provided with an explanatory 
factsheet outlining the key differences between claims which are assessed 
by DVA and the DART. This factsheet was developed jointly by both 
agencies.38 
33  Submission 7, p. 2.  
34  Submission 7, p. 2.  
35  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 19.  
36  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 20.  
37  Submission 11, p. 3.  
38  Submission 11, p. 3.  
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Referrals to law enforcement and Defence 
3.28 A key role of the Taskforce was the assessment of incidents of abuse for 
referral, with the consent of the complainant, to police authorities or Defence for 
administrative or disciplinary action. The Chair of the Taskforce summarised this 
process:  
Where the complainant consents, we refer those matters to civilian police to 
consider possible criminal investigation and prosecution or to the Chief of 
the Defence Force for consideration of disciplinary or administrative action. 
Where the complainant does not consent and if the alleged abuser is still 
serving, we conduct a risk assessment. If that indicates the alleged abuser 
constitutes a potential risk to others in Defence, I would refer the matter to 
the CDF, notwithstanding the lack of consent from the complainant, but in a 
way which would maintain the complainant's confidentiality. We in the 
Taskforce strongly believe that people who abuse others should be held to 
account, but not at the expense of further damage to their victims.39 
3.29 The Taskforce indicated that there were 'approximately 163 individuals 
identified as alleged abusers in cases of sexual abuse or serious physical abuse, who 
have been identified as still serving in the Permanent Forces or Active Reserves (as at 
the date the Taskforce received their service records)'. However, the Chair cautioned 
that the Taskforce was still undertaking a quality assurance process and noted the 
number provided 'may be subject to change at the conclusion of this process'.40 
3.30 The Taskforce has referred 80 matters to state and territory police:  
The matters referred relate to the following offences: unlawful and indecent 
assault; threat to kill; threat to inflict [grievous bodily harm]  stalking and 
intimidation with intent to cause fear; assault and common assault; act of 
gross indecency on a male; rape; use of a carriage service to menace, harass 
or cause offence; and/or burglary with intent to assault.41 
3.31 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) submission provided a useful summary 
of the Taskforce's approach to criminal matters:  
The DART's Crime Group was established to assess matters where a 
criminal offence is alleged to have been committed. The Taskforce Crime 
Group is comprised of a team of experienced investigators. The AFP has 
dedicated four investigators from Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
Policing and one intelligence officer from AFP National. A further AFP 
member will commence with DART in June 2014. 
39  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 22.  
40  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to question on notice from hearing on 
26 September 2014, p.1  
41  'Key statistics' tabled by Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at public hearing on 
26 September 2014, pp 1-2; Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to questions on 
notice from hearing 26 September 2014, p. 2.   
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If a preliminary view is formed that the complaint relates to criminal 
conduct and consent is received from the complainant, the matter will be 
referred to the Taskforce Crime Group to assess whether the matter can be 
referred to a Commonwealth, State or Territory police agency for 
assessment and possible criminal investigation. It is noted that matters are 
then referred to police with the consent of the complainant.42 
3.32 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) indicated that a number of the matters 
referred by the Taskforce Crime Group were to the AFP ACT Policing.43 It outlined: 
In the situation of referrals from the Taskforce Crime Group to AFP ACT 
Policing, the matter in the first instance will be referred to the Sexual 
Assault and Child Abuse Team (SACAT). The SACAT will assess the 
matter and, if appropriate, decide which AFP ACT Policing team is the 
most appropriate to undertake a criminal investigation. Matters relating to 
general assault offences will be referred to an AFP ACT Policing Crime 
Team. Matters involving assault with a sexual element will be investigated 
by the SACAT.44 
3.33 The AFP also outlined the support which may be available to victims 
including referrals through the national Supportlink framework, arrangements with 
local sexual assault victims support organisations and victim liaison officers.45 
3.34 The Taskforce noted there were two main reasons for the low numbers of 
complaints referred to police:  
The first is that where the alleged abuse occurred a long time ago and was 
never reported, the prospect of a successful criminal investigation will often 
not be good. 
The second, more important, reason is that the majority of complainants 
whose allegations could be referred to police simply do not want that. In 
most instances the abuse has resulted in the complainant being traumatised 
and suffering physical, emotional and psychological damage, sometimes for 
decades. They do not wish to experience further trauma from the 
involvement in a lengthy and difficult process of a police prosecution with 
an uncertain outcome.46 
3.35 The Taskforce indicated approximately 107 individuals have been subject of 
an initial risk assessment regarding possible referral to Defence for administrative and 
disciplinary action. The Chair of the Taskforce has referred 39 matters to the CDF 
with a recommendation that he consider administrative, disciplinary or management 
action:  
42  Submission 15, p.1. 
43  Submission 15, p. 2.  
44  Submission 15, p. 3.  
45  Submission 15, pp 4-5.  
46  Submission 21, p. 4. 
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The first cases were those of the ADFA 24, referred to CDF on 
16 October 2013. The next referral occurred on 28 November 2013 and the 
most recent referral at the time of [the question on notice] occurred on 
23 September 2014.47 
3.36 Similar to the approach taken for referrals to law enforcements agencies, the 
Taskforce submission outlined that referrals usually will not be made to the CDF or 
Secretary of Defence for disciplinary or administrative sanction or management action 
unless a complainant consents. However: 
[W]here there is a still serving member of the Defence Force against whom 
allegations of abuse have been made and found plausible by the Taskforce, 
the Chair will further consider whether there are any potential risks to other 
still serving members. If the Chair determines it necessary to refer a matter 
without consent, it will be referred in a way that as far as possible protects 
the confidentiality of the complainant.48 
3.37 The Taskforce indicated there have been four cases where matters have been 
referred by the Chair of the Taskforce to the CDF in a de-identified manner.49 
3.38 The impact of victim-focused processes of the Taskforce was highlighted in 
relation to the outcomes of referrals for administrative action: 
The Taskforce is acutely aware of the difficulties faced by the Department 
of Defence in circumstances where matters are referred for disciplinary or 
administrative sanction where privacy constraints require us to withhold 
certain information. Where a complainant does not provide consent to act 
the Department of Defence will often be unable to act given its legal duty to 
provide procedural fairness to alleged abusers.50 
3.39 Vice Admiral Griggs also commented:  
Additionally, the Taskforce has acknowledged that whether Defence can 
take further action is affected by whether the complainant has provided 
their consent for Defence to do so. In some cases Defence may decide that 
it is not able to take further action because it will not be able to provide 
procedural fairness to the alleged abuser. This may be the case where 
Defence does not have the consent of the complainant to provide 
information about the substance of the allegations. This should not be 
interpreted as anything else other than the fact that Defence is operating 
within the law.51 
47  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to questions on notice from hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 6.  
48  Submission 21, p. 4. 
49  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, responses to questions on notice from the hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 4.  
50  Submission 21, p. 6.  
51  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 51.  
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3.40 This issue was also raised in the Defence submission which emphasised that 
plausibility 'is a much lower burden of proof than that [which] Defence will require in 
order to take specific administrative or disciplinary action'.52  
3.41 However, in relation to this approach, Dr Rumble commented that 'the way 
the DART has carried out its work is not likely to result in many suspected 
perpetrators of abuse being called to account'.53 It was also argued during the inquiry 
that the fact so few victims have agreed to have their cases referred by the Taskforce 
to the ADF for disciplinary or administrative action may indicate a widespread lack of 
confidence amongst victims of those processes.  
Restorative engagement program 
3.42 One of the outcomes the Taskforce can offer complainants is participation in 
the Defence Abuse Restorative Engagement Program which gives complainants the 
opportunity to have their complaint 'heard, acknowledged and responded to by a 
senior Defence representative'.54 The Chair of the Taskforce indicated this was being 
undertaken in two phases:  
Phase 1 consisted of the Chief of the Defence Force, the Vice Chief and all 
the service chiefs each sitting down for more than two hours each with an 
individual complainant, listening to their account and acknowledging it. 
The impact of that experience on those complainants and, indeed, on the 
Defence representatives was profound. We are now moving into phase 2. 
We have conducted about 40 of these conferences so far. They involve 
people from the CDF down to colonel-equivalent across Army, Navy and 
Air Force. We have contracted close to 50 facilitators to facilitate these 
conferences around Australia. We are in the process of gearing up to be 
running possibly about 60 of these a month shortly.55 
3.43 The Chair of the Taskforce argued that, apart from the resolution for victims 
of abuse, the restorative engagement program was also 'having a very significant 
effect on cultural change within Defence':  
The whole dynamic of those senior Defence representatives sitting down 
and listening to the accounts of abuse that these people relate to them and 
those victims having their account listened to by senior representatives and 
acknowledged as having happened and acknowledged as being wrong is, as 
I say, incredibly profound. The impact on the Defence representatives is 
going to be, in my view, very long-lasting and will contribute materially to 
significant cultural change within Defence. These people cannot walk out of 
52  Submission 17, p. 4.  
53  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 3.  
54  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 13.  
55  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 37.  
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those conferences without being emotionally affected by them. That will be 
a cultural driver.56 
3.44 This view of the importance of the restorative engagement program was 
reflected in the evidence of Vice Admiral Griggs:  
The Restorative Engagement Program is, I think, an extremely valuable 
program for both victims of abuse and for Defence... Participation by senior 
ADF representatives is, I think, an important step in demonstrating, through 
action, the commitment of our senior leadership to acknowledge the 
unacceptable treatment and experiences of some people in the past. 
Importantly, this program is exposing today's and tomorrow's senior ADF 
leaders to the pain and to the damage caused by abuse. You simply cannot 
come away from one of these encounters unaffected.57 
3.45 Defence noted it was 'actively participating' in the restorative engagement 
program, and that the CDF and the Secretary of Defence had issued a joint Directive 
to all staff regarding participation. 
3.46 However, the Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF criticised what it 
perceived as a downgrading of the restorative engagement program over time and a 
lack of written apologies being provided to victims of abuse from the process. It 
stated:  
To be downgraded to a Captain or Major sends the message that Defence is 
not truly sorry for what happened to them. If Senior Officers i.e. Generals / 
Admirals / Air Marshals do not have to see the human cost of abuse, it does 
not provides motivation to address the issue.58 
3.47 Mr Briggs also noted feedback from his clients that the restorative 
engagement program and counselling groups appear to be suffering from 
underfunding and a lack of resources.  
Counselling services 
3.48 The Taskforce noted that as at 22 September 2014, 371 complainants have 
been referred to the Taskforce's Counselling Outcome Group. 2731 counselling 
sessions have been endorsed by the Chair and 1147 counselling sessions have taken 
place.59 The Chair of the Taskforce outlined:  
[W]here a complainant needs or seeks counselling as a result of abuse they 
suffered in Defence or the consequences of it, their case coordinator will 
make that recommendation to me. The policy is to approve initially 10 
56  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 37.  
57  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 51.  
58  Submission 14, p. 39.  
59  'Key statistics' tabled by the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at the public hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 1.   
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counselling sessions, with the counsellor to report back after the first five. 
Ordinarily, a maximum of 20 counselling sessions may be approved, 
although approval may be given for more than 20 sessions in exceptional 
circumstances.60 
3.49 The Taskforce outlined that it took a flexible approach in relation to the 
provision of counselling services, allowing complainants to continue to utilise their 
own counsellor provided they have appropriate qualifications.61  
3.50 The Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF gave examples of its 
members' experiences where delays in processing of claims as either 'in scope' or 
'plausible' by the Taskforce had resulted in delays in accessing to counselling 
services.62 However, the Chair of the Taskforce pointed out: 
Under our terms of reference, we cannot spend Commonwealth money on 
complainants who are not within our terms of reference or plausible—that 
is to say, who have not crossed the threshold, if you like—to become 
eligible for Taskforce outcomes.63 
Reparation scheme 
3.51 Under the Taskforce's reparation scheme, a number of categories of reparation 
payment are specified: 
• Category 1 (Abuse): $5,000; 
• Category 2 (Abuse): $15,000; 
• Category 3 (Abuse): $30,000; 
• Category 4 (Abuse): $45,000; and 
• Category 5 (Mismanagement by Defence): $5,000. 
3.52 The Scheme Guidelines provide that a reparation payment may only consist of 
one of the amounts under Categories 1 to 4, or the amount available under Category 5 
(Mismanagement by Defence), or one of the amounts under Categories 1 to 4 and the 
amount under Category 5. The Scheme Guidelines note Category 4 (Abuse) is 
intended to provide reparation for the most serious forms of alleged individual or 
collective abuse. Effectively, this means the maximum reparation payment under the 
Scheme Guidelines is $50,000 ($45,000 plus $5,000), in instances where a person in 
Defence has suffered the most serious forms of abuse and Defence has mismanaged 
this abuse. 
60  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 21.  
61  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 13.  
62  Submission 14, p. 25. 
63  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 31.  
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3.53 The Taskforce provided the committee with some key statistics on the 
reparation payments made to complainants as at 22 September 2014. This outlined 
that 1028 reparation payments have been made to complainants with the total amount 
being $42.01 million. The largest group of payments (577) were those received 
maximum amount of $50,000 (Category 4 (Abuse) and Category 5 (Mismanagement 
by Defence)). The overwhelming majority of the reparation payments made to 
complainants, 1010 payments out of 1028, included the Category 5 (Mismanagement 
by Defence) component.64  
3.54 DVA noted that, in accordance with the intention that reparation payments are 
not intended to adversely affect an individual's rights and entitlements, an amendment 
has been made to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 to exempt these payments 
from income tax.65 
3.55 Both of the associations representing victims of abuse in Defence criticised 
the amount of the reparation payment. In particular, they contrasted the generous 
compensation that alleged abusers would receive for their military service, with the 
situation of victims of abuse who were often forced out of Defence by their 
experiences.66 For example, the Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF stated: 
The maximum payout from the Defence Abuse Response Task Force is 
$50,000 regardless of how many rapes, assault or incidents of abuse you 
suffered. Under any other Crime Compensation, it is payout by incident, not 
one small amount that covers everything. Furthermore it is not in accord 
with community standards.67  
3.56 Mr Barry Heffernan questioned monetary reparation being provided to 
victims of abuse without regard to their individual situation: 
Rather than throw 'up to $50K' to each victim, irrespective of their problem 
I would have given a more accurate view of what I really considered really 
needed in the short term to actually assist these people. It may have even 
meant that the government initially provide something similar to a Gold 
Card to each to allow them to seek all sorts of specialist support and in turn 
possibly showing that the government DOES care and IS showing it. 
I question how 'up to $50K' will assist an alcoholic to 'move ahead'.68 
3.57 However, Mr Briggs from Slater & Gordon Lawyers noted that while there 
are 'many victims who do not agree with the amounts of Reparation being offered for 
64  'Key Statistics' tabled by the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at public hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 1.  
65  Submission 11, pp 3-4.  
66  Submission 23, p. 3.  
67  Submission 14, p. 31.  
68  Submission 22, p. 3.  
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the abuse that they may have suffered… the monetary figure was never meant to take 
the form of compensation'.69 
Legacy issues 
3.58 The Chair of the Taskforce noted that while the current terms of reference for 
the Taskforce expire on 30 November 2014, the work of the Taskforce would 
continue. He noted the Taskforce was already funded 'out to June 2016 to continue 
delivering the Taskforce programs that we are providing and to do the work that we 
are doing, so the work of the Taskforce will continue'.70 
3.59 There was support expressed during the inquiry for the Taskforce to continue 
its work or function in another form after the current completion date of 30 November 
2014. For example, the Defence Abuse Support Association believed the DART 
'should continue, obviously restructured to an appropriate size, so that members, both 
past and serving in the ADF have somewhere to go that is independent from and not 
under control of Defence'. It noted that the DART 'had been trained to deal with this 
situation and it would be an absolute waste of money and resources to see it disbanded 
completely'.71 
3.60 Ms Rachael James from Slater and Gordon Lawyers commented:  
[W]e continue to receive inquiries from clients, and that is a mixture of 
people either not knowing about [the Taskforce] in the first instance or not 
feeling comfortable when they did know about it and wanting to see for 
themselves whether there was credibility in the process and also the fact 
that abuse is continuing. So we would say that there should not be an end 
date to the process.72 
3.61 Similarly, Mr Donaldson from Shine Lawyers stated that the Taskforce had 
'provided survivors with an avenue of support where they are comfortable to share 
what has happened to them without the fear of someone dismissing their claims'. He 
was concerned the expertise and outcomes that the Taskforce had achieved to date 
will be lost when DART have finalised their investigations. He argued that 'DART 
should form the basis of a permanent independent body to investigate and deal with all 
allegations of sexual abuse and sexual harassment in the Australian Defence Force'.73 
3.62 However, the Chair of the Taskforce observed:  
I would point out that one cannot simply say, 'We'll extend it another 12 
months,' or however long it might be and then have a blaze of publicity 
69  Submission 4, p. 3.  
70  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 32.  
71  Submission 23, p. 2.  
72  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 5.  
73  Submission 12, p. 4.  
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about that, because the reality is that, for all the sorts of reasons that people 
have taken a long time to come forward in the past, that will still happen 
into the future. We have had people who just cannot bear to go into the 
garage and open the boxes to look at the documents.74 
[I]f the Taskforce is extended or if there is some other entity taking them 
on, there will continue to be people coming forward for years in the future I 
would think.75 
3.63 The seventh interim report stated that '[t]he final Taskforce report will provide 
an important record of the complaints to the Taskforce of abuse occurring within 
Defence over many decades, and will make a constructive contribution to ongoing 
efforts in Defence to prevent, stop and respond to abuse'. This will include:  
• detailed statistical information about the complaints received by the 
Taskforce, including information about the types of abuse, where abuse 
occurred and during what time period, and collated information about both 
complainants and alleged abusers; 
• a narrative description of the abuse that has occurred across Defence 
including locational case studies on establishments where abuse appears to 
had been most common; 
• analysis of patterns of abuse that are evident in the complaints received by the 
Taskforce and of any factors that appear to have contributed to abuse 
occurring; and  
• note areas in which there may be benefit in conducting more detailed analysis 
of the significant amount of data held by the Taskforce.76 
Anonymous complaints and allegations in the media 
3.64 Dr Rumble argued that media and anonymous allegations reported on in 
DLA Piper in Volume 2 'should be addressed by Government because they raised 
serious issues of abuse, mismanagement of abuse and – in some cases – cover-up in 
the ADF'. He noted his understanding was the DART would 'only consider allegations 
which a complainant consents to the DART considering'.77 Dr Rumble told the 
committee:  
This is simply not good enough. Either the allegations have substance and 
they should be dealt with or they do not have substance and they should be 
answered and rebutted. I recommend the committee request the government 
74  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 32.  
75  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 35. 
76  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 32.  
77  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 7.  
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to consider and respond promptly to our volume 2 assessments and 
recommendations on media, anonymous and other third-party allegations.78 
3.65 However, the Taskforce stated that the 'underlying principle of the Taskforce's 
work is to do no further harm to the complainant' and that it had received advice from 
experts that it should not seek out individuals to register allegations of abuse. It noted 
it 'was established to provide outcomes to complainants': 
The provision of outcomes to an individual necessarily requires the 
Taskforce to know who that individual is. Therefore, the Taskforce is 
unable to deal with anonymous complaints or allegations in the media in 
relation to individuals not registered with the Taskforce. That said, the 
Taskforce does consider allegations in the media and anonymous 
complaints it may hold when considering cultural and systemic issues.79 
 
78  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 12.  
79  Submission 21, p. 4.  
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Defence response 
Introduction 
4.1 This chapter will cover Defence's response to the abuse within its ranks 
highlighted by the DLA Piper Review report, the Defence cultural reviews, and the 
work of the Taskforce. In particular it will consider Defence's approach to abuse, the 
reporting of abuse in Defence, the implementation of the Pathway to Change strategy 
including the implementation of policy and administrative changes and the 
establishment of the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO). 
Approach to abuse   
4.2 Defence noted that 'the general apology made by the Chief of the Defence 
Force to members of the ADF and Defence employees in response to the DLA Piper 
Review [is an] acknowledgement by Defence that abuse is wrong and any abuse that 
has occurred is deeply regretted'. Defence stated that it had 'made a commitment that 
abuse of any kind is not to be tolerated and will be dealt with swiftly and 
appropriately'.1 The VCDF commented on this approach:  
The ADF is using all available mechanisms to actively hold people to 
account who have failed to live up to our values and our expected 
behaviours. There have been a significant number that have had their 
service terminated or have had other disciplinary or administrative 
sanctions imposed.2 
4.3 The range of existing Defence support options for persons who report 
unacceptable behaviour or sexual misconduct were discussed in the committee's 
previous report. These include:  
• the Equity Advisor network; 
• Defence Equity Advice Line which provides an information and referral 
service for all Defence personnel in regards to workplace behaviour and 
equity issues; 
• case officers appointed to assist the complainant or respondent during the 
complaint management process;  
• psychological counselling and support; 
• the Employee Assistance Program for Defence public service officers;  
• Defence Legal Support; 
1  Submission 17, p. 2.  
2  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 51.  
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• peer support; and 
• temporary transfers and the granting of leave.3   
4.4 Defence argued that commanders and managers in Defence are much better 
informed and have more resources at their disposal to support victims of abuse when 
incidents are reported to them than was the case in the past. It noted that commanders 
have access to medical officers, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, chaplains, 
legal officers, unit equity advisers and other health-care professionals to support 
victims.4  
4.5 However, Dr Rumble criticised Defence's current approach to preventing 
abuse within the organisation. He considered there was a need for the 'ADF leadership 
to commit to pursuing zero incidence of abuse in the ADF and not to undermine that 
commitment with any suggestion that there is the level of abuse in the ADF [which] is 
acceptable'. He argued: 
Leaders of the ADF have frequently declared that the ADF has zero 
tolerance for sexual abuse in the ADF. However, zero tolerance only has 
meaning for abuse which is reported or otherwise identified by the ADF. 
Furthermore declarations of zero tolerance put all the emphasis on dealing 
with perpetrators and do not acknowledge the needs of victims.5 
4.6 Dr Rumble recommended that reforms in Defence needed to focus on 
unreported abuse:  
Because of the gaps, delay and stonewalling, Defence is refusing to look at 
indicators of where unreported abuse might be occurring. The leadership of 
the ADF has a declared zero tolerance of abuse. That necessarily only 
applies to the less than 20 per cent of victims who report in a way that suits 
the leaders of the ADF. The ADF is tolerating the other 80 per cent of 
unreported sexual abuse.6 
4.7 However, the VCDF, Vice Admiral Griggs rejected the suggestion that 
Defence should pursue a policy of zero incidence of abuse:  
We will never get to zero incidence. We would like to, but we have 58,000 
people. Is there a town of 58,000 people in this country with zero 
incidence? We are committed to zero tolerance and, through that, we will 
drive down the incidence of sexual assault in the ADF to the lowest 
possible level. I do not think it is worth it to make a statement of 
achievability that is not meaningful. It is much more important to say: 'We 
3  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Report of the DLA Piper 
Review and the government's response, June 2013, pp. 27-28.  
4  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 20, p. 1. 
5  Submission 8, Part 2, Annexure 1, p. 29.  
6  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 10.  
                                              
49 
will not tolerate this. We do not tolerate this. You will get the message 
because if you don't you will be gone.'7 
Reporting and responding to abuse 
4.8 The Whole of Defence Unacceptable Behaviour Survey, conducted in 2013. 
found that the majority of respondents who reported experiencing unacceptable 
behaviour did not seek advice or assistance, nor did they make a formal report or 
complaint. The Sex Discrimination Commissioner's audit noted that '[a]larmingly, 
respondents were even less likely to report or seek assistance in relation to 
unacceptable behaviours if it related to sexual misconduct or sexual offences'.8 In 
contrast, the Inspector General ADF Military Justice Online Survey, launched in 2011, 
indicated some positive trends in relation to the ADF community's view of reporting 
abuse:  
- respondents who believe appropriate action would be taken if they 
reported an incident of unacceptable behaviour has increased six per 
cent (from 82 per cent in 2010 to 86 per cent in 2013); 
- respondents who know where to obtain advice or information on 
unacceptable behaviour has increased by five per cent (from 85 per cent 
in 2010 to 90 per cent in 2013); and 
- respondents who are aware of their avenues of complaint has increased 
by nine per cent (from 64 per cent in 2010 to 73 per cent in 2013).9 
4.9 The Inspector General ADF, Mr Geoff Earley, commented that the audit and 
survey outcomes  have shown that 'most ADF members are generally aware of how to 
go about making a complaint if they need to and that they believe their complaint will 
be dealt with fairly by the chains of command'. He noted: 
A great deal of emphasis is properly put upon dealing with unacceptable 
behaviour. I remain confident that, from the evidence we collect, monthly 
through our audit program and through the inquiries that we do, that the 
problem of abusive behaviour in the ADF is being strenuously tackled and 
that the processes for reporting such behaviour and the mechanisms for 
reducing it and for dealing with it swiftly and fairly when it does happen are 
better now than they have ever been. While it is right that these matters 
have been brought to attention in the way we have seen, it is important that 
further responses, whatever they may be, do not develop into an over-
reaction.10 
7  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 61.  
8  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF - Audit 
report, March 2014, p. 28. 
9  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 5, p. 2.  
10  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 20.  
                                              
50 
4.10 Information provided by the Defence indicated there had been 'a noticeable 
(46.4 per cent) increase in the reporting of sexual offences in Defence in the last two 
years to July 2014'. This included 154 incident reports of sexual assault and other 
related offences recorded by the ADF Investigative Service in financial year 2013-
14.11 Defence suggested that this increased reporting could be viewed as the 
cumulative success of recent initiatives such as the DLA Piper Review, the Taskforce, 
the Broderick reports, and the establishment of the Sexual Misconduct, Prevention and 
Response Office (SeMPRO). Further, Defence considered there was some 'evidence 
that many affected Defence members were now feeling more confident in the 
"system", and were more comfortable with making a report to Defence' and reflected 
efforts by the ADFIS 'to improve sexual assault victims' experience of reporting and 
their improved understanding of sexual-offence-related trauma'.12 
4.11 The challenges and disincentives for victims of abuse to make complaints or 
reports in Defence were reiterated during the committee's inquiry.13 For example, the 
Chair of the Taskforce noted that in 'a very large number of cases' dealt with by the 
Taskforce 'the victim of the abuse has not only never reported it but never told anyone 
including their own closest family'. He stated: 
Even now, while having the courage to come to the Taskforce because they 
want their story to be known, they often become extremely distressed at the 
idea of any action being taken which might lead people to know what 
happened to them—that is to say, which would publicly identify them—and 
they are fearful of being exposed to further trauma by having to be involved 
in a police investigation, or the prospect of being examined or cross-
examined in a criminal prosecution of their abuser, or any kind of internal 
Defence administrative process.14 
4.12 Others expressed scepticism regarding Defence efforts to prevent abuse. 
Dr Rumble restated concerns he had previously raised with Defence regarding the 
problem of under-reporting of sexual and other abuse and the importance of creating a 
'reporting culture' within Defence.15 He referred the committee to material which 
indicated that survey into abuse are not necessarily accurate, and may tend to 
understate the degree to which there are problems with unreported abuse. 
4.13 Dr Rumble argued that the victims of abuse who contacted the DLA Piper 
review and the Taskforce 'represent a very small proportion of the numbers of former 
and current members of the ADF affected by abuse in the ADF'. He stated:  
11  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 14, p. 1.  
12  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 11, p. 1.  
13  For example, Mr Adair Donaldson, Shine Lawyers, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 5.  
14  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 29.  
15  Submission 8, Part 2, p. 3.  
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Most victims of abuse are silent. The pressures to remain silent are 
particularly strong for the members of the ADF. It is very likely that less 
than 20 per cent of abuse in the ADF is reported.16 
4.14 In particular, he considered that Defence needed to deal with the harassment 
of people who report with 'the utmost vigour': 
No matter what commitments the leadership give, there is always the 
potential for someone who was known to have reported to be, at the very 
least, approached with wariness by those around them and for them to 
suffer ignominy and shame. Very often there were recriminations and 
repercussions for people who did report. Reporting seemed to be regarded 
as an act of disloyalty to your unit or your branch of the services.17 
4.15 Mr Briggs from Slater & Gordon Lawyers acknowledged that the ADF had 
'introduced mechanisms in an attempt to improve its handling of abuse cases and to 
address the "culture of silence" that protects perpetrators'. However he stated: 
Many of my clients have expressed scepticism as to the likelihood of these 
initiatives resulting in any permanent changes in the future conduct of some 
ADF personnel despite the best intentions of ADF leadership, including its 
Minister. Unfortunately, we are continuing to receive enquiries and have 
been retained by clients who have been subjected to various forms of abuse 
including sexual abuse within the Defence services in more recent years.18 
4.16 Mr Donaldson from Shine Lawyers identified 'a reluctance to accept that 
sexual assaults and harassment will continue to occur in the Australian Defence 
Force'. He stated:  
It should be appreciated that no matter how much training and preventative 
work that is done there will always be a small minority of employees who 
will do the wrong thing…What will not be accepted is if the ADF does not 
have in place best practice work systems to deal with and to investigate the 
complaints and interactive training to reduce the likelihood of assaults and 
harassment occurring.19 
4.17 Mr Barry Heffernan thought abuse continued to be 'rife' in the ADF and 
advocated an independent ombudsman, reporting directly to the Minister of Defence, 
to investigate all reports of abuse and bastardisation. Similarly, the Defence Abuse 
Support Association held the opinion there may be a 'culture of abuse' in Defence:  
DASA believes that there is a larger problem with members tasked to 
investigate the allegations fail to fully do so, rather push it under the carpet 
16  Dr Gary Rumble, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 12.  
17  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 15.  
18  Submission 4, p. 2.  
19  Submission 12, pp 5-6.  
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and hope it goes away or punish the member that has made the allegations, 
hoping they will withdraw them.20 
Defence response to the Taskforce 
4.18 The Defence submission noted that following the announcement of the 
Taskforce, it had established a dedicated Organisational Response Unit to ensure that 
appropriate support and assistance could be provided to the Taskforce. It noted that:  
The focus to date has been in assisting the Taskforce to meet its information 
requirements to assess matters by providing Defence documentation when 
requested. This information is utilised by the Taskforce in assessing 
matters…In support of the Taskforce's work, Defence completed a project 
to digitise and catalogue Australian Defence Force Investigative Service 
records. This has enabled Defence to effectively search and identify records 
that may be of relevance to the Taskforce.21 
4.19 The 'need for Defence to respect the privacy of individuals and maintain the 
independence of the Taskforce has meant that Defence has been unable to provide 
more direct assistance to individuals in bringing their matter forward'. However, it 
stated that 'Defence continues to encourage people to come forward to seek a proper 
resolution to any matters that are concerning them'. 
4.20 Defence noted that the 'Taskforce has commenced referring individual 
complaints to the Chief of the Defence Force for consideration'. It outlined: 
Defence has established a team within the Organisational Response Unit 
dedicated to managing referrals from the Taskforce. This team reports 
directly to the Chief of the Defence Force. Defence is undertaking detailed 
analysis of all available evidence and information to determine whether 
criminal, disciplinary or administrative action may be taken in response to 
allegations.22 
4.21 However, Defence cautioned that the 'Taskforce assesses matters brought 
before it using a test of "plausibility", which is a much lower burden of proof than that 
which Defence will require in order to take specific administrative or disciplinary 
action in relation to these matters'. It also noted that whether Defence can take further 
action is affected by whether the complainant has provided their consent for Defence 
to do so: 
In some cases, Defence may decide that it is not able to take further action 
because it will not be able to provide procedural fairness to the alleged 
abuser. This may be the case where Defence does not have the consent of 
20  Submission 23, p. 1.  
21  Submission 17, pp 2-3.  
22  Submission 17, p. 4.  
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the complainant to provide information about the substance of the 
allegations.23 
4.22 Defence also highlighted its active participation in the Taskforce's restorative 
engagement program:  
Participation by Defence representatives in the [restorative engagement 
program] is an important step in demonstrating, through action, the 
commitment of Defence's senior leadership to acknowledging the shameful 
treatment and experiences of some members of the Australian Defence 
Force and the Department of Defence. Through this process, Defence will 
learn invaluable lessons of the past, which is especially important as we 
engage in significant cultural change across our organisation to ensure a 
fair, just and inclusive workplace is available to all who chose to serve our 
country, free from abusive behaviour.24 
Pathway to Change 
4.23 Defence described itself as 'two and a half years into a significant five-year 
cultural change journey (through Pathway to Change) to ensure a future organisation 
that is safe, inclusive and respectful of all members'.25 It highlighted the progress 
achieved in relation to the Pathway to Change reforms: 
Actions completed to date include: 
- established mechanisms to increase diversity within leadership groups 
over five years; 
- reinforced a whole-of-Defence perspective as the decision making lens for 
all Colonel/Executive Level 2 and above appointments; 
- conducting Defence-wide discussion on values and behaviours; 
- Defence education and training programs are being informed by agreed 
values and behaviours; 
- reviewing our communication strategy, including social media strategy, to 
communicate values and behaviours underpinning cultural reform; 
- addressing the backlog of grievances and simplifying responses to, and 
management of, unacceptable behaviour to make corrective processes faster 
and more transparent; 
- implementing staffing, structures and review processes that enable 
Pathway to Change; 
- developing supporting policies to ensure full implementation of culture 
review recommendations and associated Defence reform directions; and 
23  Submission 17, p. 4.  
24  Submission 17, p. 3.  
25  Submission 17, p. 2.  
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- establishing research and data collection processes to inform ongoing 
development and implementation of Pathway to Change.26 
4.24 In June, at Budget estimates, the former CDF, General David Hurley, stated: 
As at 29 May this year, 82 per cent of the key actions or recommendations 
have been finalised. There were 15 major or key actions that needed to be 
completed; we have done nine of those. There were about six reviews with 
a total of 160 recommendations, and 135 of those have been finalised to 
date.27 
4.25 Defence stated that 'analysis of the metrics and data so far indicates that 
positive cultural change is occurring within the organisation under each of the six key 
levers'.28 In particular, Defence highlighted that the independent audits conducted by 
the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Ms Elizabeth Broderick, have acknowledged 
that 'real progress has emerged in the 18 months since the ADF Review report was 
tabled' and that she had praised 'the ADF on its significant reform efforts to date'.29 
Policy and administrative reforms 
4.26 A range of policy and administrative changes resulting from the Pathway to 
Change strategy were outlined by Defence. These included policy advice in relation to 
administrative and disciplinary actions, the introduction of a 'good character' test into 
Defence personnel regulations and changes to minimum service obligations.  
Advice on administrative and disciplinary actions 
4.27 Defence noted that following the IGADF Review of Management of Incidents 
and Complaints in 2011, Defence had examined its relevant policy documents to 
consolidate them into a more user-friendly format. It stated:   
In relation to the management of complaints in Defence, many Defence 
Instructions have been, or are in the process of being, redrafted or 
consolidated to provide directive policy only. Detailed processes and 
procedures are being consolidated into one manual, called the Complaints 
and Resolution Manual. Some chapters of that manual have already been 
promulgated, and others are in the final stages of drafting or stakeholder 
comment. This means that commanders and personnel managers will in 
future only need to refer to the one manual to obtain policy guidance 
relating to management of complaints. Similar action is being taken in 
relation to the simplification of policy regarding the management of 
incidents. This includes policy in relation to the conduct of quick 
26  Submission 17, p. 5-6.  
27  Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Committee Hansard, 
3 June 2014, p. 18.  
28  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 9, 
Attachment, p. 3.  
29  Submission 17, p. 4.  
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assessments, non-statutory fact-finding inquiries, and the development of a 
centralised system for reporting these matters.30 
4.28 Previous problems in relation to the advice regarding when managers and 
commanding officers in Defence could apply administrative or disciplinary sanctions 
within Defence were highlighted by Dr Gary Rumble: 
[A Defence Instructions (General)] has been in place for many years which 
seems to say that, if there is an allegation of a sexual offence, the 
commanding officer or whoever is dealing with it should do nothing other 
than refer it to state and territory police—you have heard the statistics as to 
why that very seldom results in a prosecution—and then do nothing else. 
Now, we had correspondence with Defence legal indicating that that DI(G) 
did not mean what it said and should be construed sensibly and that 
commanders should still be able to take actions to respond other than 
simply referring it off to state and territory police. However, it is inevitable 
that commanding officers would read the DI(G) as meaning what it said and 
that many of those closed cases would have been closed because of that 
ridiculous DI(G), which said, 'Send her to the police and don't do anything 
else'.31 
4.29 The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, 
acknowledged that there was a period where Defence 'gave primacy' to the formal 
police investigative process and there was a reluctance to take administrative action. 
The VCDF noted that formal guidance was issued this year to commanders 'to make it 
very clear that there can be concurrent administrative and disciplinary action'.32 The 
Chair of the Taskforce also commented on this situation:  
It was always open to commanders and to Defence to take administrative 
action in relation to the same things from the point of view of military 
discipline and good management…The problem was that there was 
confusion at the time about the Defence Instruction (General), where some 
people understood that what it meant was that you could not take 
administrative action. If that was the understanding, it was incorrect. My 
understanding now is that that situation has changed, because the relevant 
Defence instructions have been amended and the purpose of the policy has 
been clarified within Defence.33 
4.30 Defence confirmed that '[c]ommanders are not prevented from taking 
concurrent administrative action against Defence members who are suspected of being 
involved, or alleged to be involved, in an incident that is being investigated or 
prosecuted'. It noted:  
30  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 19, p. 1.  
31  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 17.  
32  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 57.  
33  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 30.  
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Formal advice was given in 2014 to commanders to better assist them in 
balancing the competing interests and their obligations. That advice 
confirmed that commanders must also ensure that individuals in the 
workplace are protected, that public confidence in the Defence Force is 
maintained and that, where concurrent action is contemplated, a 
respondent's right to fair process is observed. The advice also confirmed 
that a commander may take subsequent administrative action against the 
member, even if a Defence member is found not guilty at their trial.34 
4.31 The updated DI(G) PERS 35-4 Reporting and management of sexual 
misconduct including sexual offences issued on 19 August 2014 provides that:  
A manager or commander may consider initiating formal administrative 
action in respect of Defence personnel while an incident of sexual 
misconduct is under investigation, while criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings are pending or after such proceedings have concluded. The fact 
that an individual is convicted or acquitted of an offence does not, of itself, 
preclude administrative action being taken in respect of sexual misconduct 
that is the subject of such disciplinary or criminal proceedings. A decision 
as to whether or not to initiate administrative action may be reconsidered at 
any time.35 
4.32 Defence also provided recent examples in each of the services where 
'commanders are taking administrative action concurrently with criminal or 
disciplinary proceedings, or taking administrative action subsequent to criminal or 
disciplinary action'.36 
Good character test 
4.33 One of the outcomes of the cultural reviews was that a number of 
amendments were made to the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002. The Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner recommended:  
The insertion of an addition in the list of matters that must be considered in 
all personnel determinations and decisions in the Defence (Personnel) 
Regulations 2002 of the requirement that individuals must be 'fit and proper 
persons' for service in the ADF.37 
4.34 These included adding a 'good character' test to the mandatory decision 
making criteria. A decision-maker must consider these criteria when making a 
decision that affects an individual ADF member, for example appointment or 
enlistment, promotion, posting or termination decisions. Air Commodore Ehlers 
34  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 12, p. 2.  
35  Defence Instructions (General) PERS 35-4 Reporting and management of sexual misconduct 
including sexual offences, 19 August 2014, p. 6.  
36  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 12, p. 2. 
37  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force, Phase 2 report, 2012, p. 37. 
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described it as 'a catch-all phrase that allows a delegate to consider someone's 
character in assessing their suitability to continue to serve'.38 
Return of Service Obligations and Initial Minimum Periods of Service 
4.35 The Sex Discrimination Commissioner's review of the treatment of women in 
the ADF also recommended that Defence should 'amend all policies addressing the 
waiver of Initial Minimum Provision of Service and Return of Service Obligations to 
ensure that a member who has made a decision to discharge from the ADF because of 
sexual assault or sexual harassment, is able to do so expeditiously and without 
financial penalty, upon production of supporting evidence of physical, psychological 
or emotional trauma'.39  
4.36 Accordingly, the follow-up audit welcomed the resulting amendments made 
to the DI(G) 33-5 Arrangements for Service in the ADF to include a reference to 
facilitating release from a service obligation where a member has reported sexual 
assault, sexual harassment or other significant workplace harassment through the 
appropriate channels.40 
Victim support in investigations  
4.37 Defence also noted that Provost Marshal, in command of the ADF 
Investigative Service, had commissioned an Australian Defence Human Research 
Ethics Council approved study into how best to enhance support for victims in the 
conduct of Service Police Investigations: 
The project was initiated to inform ADF (Service Police) Investigators of 
best practice in relation to victims' needs, expectations and the nuances of 
sexually violent crimes. This project aimed to inform Service Police of the 
critical importance of managing a victim's physical, psychological and 
emotional needs while ensuring that vital evidence is recovered at the 
earliest opportunity and the chain of custody strictly maintained in order to 
have maximum success in any subsequent prosecution.41 
Response to DLA Piper review and systemic issues 
4.38 Defence noted that the recommendations of Volume 1 of the DLA Piper 
Review 'centred on the establishment of the Taskforce to examine allegations of abuse 
and work with complainants to achieve an outcome'. It stated that the Taskforce was 
also asked to draw any implications of its work to the attention of the Minister, 
38  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 58.  
39  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force, Phase 2 report, 2012, p. 37.  
40  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF - Audit 
report, March 2014, p. 176. 
41  Submission 17, p. 7.  
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Secretary and Chief of the Defence Force for consideration in the context of Pathway 
to Change: Evolving Defence Culture strategy:  
The Volume 1 report highlighted five risk factors that DLA Piper 
considered as leading to abuse in Defence. This included a lack of adverse 
consequences for abusive behaviour; a culture discouraging reporting of 
abuse; absence of positive support for people who report abuse; issues 
relating to the chain of command; and social/environmental factors, 
including excessive consumption of alcohol and use of drugs. 
The report also highlighted systemic issues in Defence that have been 
present at historical points in time, or remained present at the time of the 
DLA Piper Review. The systemic issues broadly related to the management 
and handling of victims, suspects and the complaint itself; complaint 
monitoring and reporting systems; and oversight of Defence action.42 
4.39 In relation to this matter Defence outlined how it had approached the 
DLA Piper Review recommendations. In particular, it had identified that 
responsibility for implementation fell within two areas – those areas dependent on the 
work of the Taskforce and 'systemic issues which were the responsibility of Defence 
to consider for assimilation into Pathway to Change and/or through the Rethinking 
Systems Review Implementation'. It highlighted that the Taskforce had not yet 
identified to Defence any specific implications of its work that would require 
consideration of further new actions under Pathway to Change.43 
4.40 Dr Gary Rumble was concerned by the lack of response to the systemic issues 
highlighted in the DLA Piper Review report for Phase 2 consideration. He noted the 
committee's previous report has recommended that Defence 'formally respond to the 
systemic issues and findings of the DLA Piper Review in its public reporting on the 
progress of the implementation of the Pathway to Change Defence cultural reforms'.  
4.41 The Chair of the Taskforce told the committee that the '35 issues with other 
things, were very much part of a different Defence examination, which was the 
Rethinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation and Review in Defence, which has been 
ongoing for at least two years'.44 On 2 April 2014, the Taskforce received 
correspondence from Defence which included discussion of the 35 systemic issues 
identified in the DLA Piper report:  
We note your reference to systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper 
Review and your statement that you 'understand these 35 systemic issues 
are being considered by Defence under the Re-Thinking Systems of 
Inquiry, Investigation and Review in Defence. The Rethinking Systems 
Reviews considered the outcomes of many reviews and inquiries in 
42  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 9, 
Attachment, p. 1. 
43  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 9, 
Attachment, p. 2.  
44  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 22.  
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formulating its recommendation, including the DLA Piper Review but it 
was not the sole vehicle by which those matters were considered. With 
respect to the risk factors and systemic issues identified by the DLA Piper 
Review, Defence has and continued to address these through the 
implementation of the Pathway to Change strategy and associated 
activities.45  
4.42 In relation to this issue, the Taskforce noted it had contacted Defence in 
relation to the DLA Piper Review recommendations and in relation to Defence's 
progress on Pathway to Change and the Rethinking Systems Review in Defence. It 
stated: 
The Taskforce will continue to liaise with Defence and others in relation to 
these matters and when analysis of all of the documentation received is 
complete, any systemic issues or matters that may be significant and of 
interest will be raised with relevant parties. In that regard, the Taskforce 
will take into account the 35 systemic issues raised in the DLA Piper 
Report.46 
SeMPRO 
4.43 The establishment of a Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office 
(SeMPRO) was a recommendation of Sex Discrimination Commissioner, 
Ms Elizabeth Broderick as part of her review of the treatment of women in the ADF. 
Her recommendations included:  
• As a priority, [Defence] should establish a dedicated Sexual Misconduct 
Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO) to coordinate timely responses, 
victim support, education, policy, practice and reporting for any misconduct 
of a sexual nature, including sexual harassment and sexual abuse in the ADF. 
This Office is to be adequately and appropriately staffed, including with 
personnel that have experience in responding to people who have been 
subjected to sexual harassment or abuse and is to be headed by a senior leader 
(of no less than one star rank or at SES level) and  located at Defence 
Headquarters (Recommendation 18); and 
• As a matter of urgency, the ADF should investigate mechanisms to allow 
members to make confidential (restricted) reports of sexual harassment, sex 
discrimination and sexual abuse complaints through SeMPRO 
(Recommendation 19).47 
45  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Sixth interim report to the Attorney-General and Minister 
for Defence, June 2014, Appendix D, p. 41.  
46  Submission 21, p. 5.  
47  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian 
Defence Force, Phase 2 report, 2012, pp 36-37.  
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4.44 Defence described the establishment of the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and 
Response Office (SeMPRO) as a 'fundamental change in the way Defence approaches 
and manages incidents of sexual misconduct in the Australian Defence Force'. It 
outlined that the SeMPRO would undertake a number of roles:  
SeMPRO's key role is to coordinate trauma-informed support to victims and 
guide commanders and managers in dealing with reports of sexual 
misconduct in their workplaces in a sensitive manner…In addition to its 
victim support responsibilities, SeMPRO has an important prevention and 
education role as part of Defence's wider Pathway to Change cultural 
change program…SeMPRO is now a central point of data collection and 
analysis for all known incidents relating to sexual misconduct across the 
ADF, which, over time will enable the Defence to develop a deeper 
understanding of the level and nature of sexual assault across the ADF.48 
4.45 The staff  of SeMPRO include 'five Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
personnel (one of whom is a part-time reservist), 10 Australian public servants, a 
contracted mental health professional and four remotely located part-time ADF 
reservists, who are primarily psychologists'.49 Air Commodore Ehlers commented: 
We have set up a small team particularly to deal with support for our 
clients. These are all mental health professionals who are trained in dealing 
with victims of sexual abuse and misconduct. They provide a confidential 
phone service. We call it call, click, text. We have a 1800 telephone 
number, the ability to send emails and the ability to send texts 24/7…50 
4.46 He noted that one of SeMPRO's major roles is 'providing advice and support 
to commanders, managers, health providers et cetera [and]  the vast majority of our 
calls have in fact been requests for advice from commanders, managers, ADFIS…'.51 
Defence advised that SeMPRO has had 176 interactions with victims of sexual assault 
covering 50 clients during the period 1 January – 30 June 2014. It noted that many of 
the interactions have referred to incidents which are 'historic' - which it defined as 
incidents which occurred more than a year ago.52 
4.47 A range of criticisms were expressed during the inquiry regarding the 
establishment of SeMPRO. Mr Donaldson from Shine Lawyers acknowledged the 
establishment of SeMPRO but drew the committee's attention to the United States 
military's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO). He consider 
there was 'much that the Australian Government could learn from SAPRO in relation 
to: resourcing and staff; streamlined process; and focus on prevention'. The 
Association for Victims of Abuse in the ADF argued that Defence 'have focused on 
48  Submission 17, p. 6.  
49  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 17, p. 1.  
50  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 55.  
51  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 55.  
52  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 13, p. 1. 
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sexual abuse through their SEMPRO Office to the exclusion of other types of torture 
and abuse being practiced in the Defence Force'.  
4.48 Mr Barry Heffernan spoke to the committee about questioning a victim of 
abuse regarding the reason why they did not make a report to SeMPRO:  
[H]aving spoken to quite a number of Defence abuse victims, if you ask 
them the general question, 'Why didn't you reported to Defence?' they say, 
'You're kidding,' 'How do I know that the guy or person I am reporting to 
isn't related or best friends with the perpetrator?'. It goes to a privacy thing, 
it goes to a confidence thing and it goes to a trust thing.53 
4.49 Dr Rumble also commented:  
[I]t is significant that SeMPRO is a telephone number and not an on-the-
round presence, as is the case, as I understand it, in the US Army. 
Obviously, there needs to be a very high level of trust and confidence 
involved for someone who has recently been sexually assaulted to contact 
anyone. Without a physical presence at the main training establishments 
and perhaps in operational settings, without the physical representation of 
SeMPRO there, the prospects of ever building that confidence and then of 
collecting fresh forensic evidence to enable action should the victim decide 
they do want some process to happen—I just think that is unrealistic.54 
4.50 The 2014 audit conducted by Ms Elizabeth Broderick, while broadly positive 
about the establishment of SeMPRO, noted it only responds to issues of sexual abuse 
and the existing 'Values, Behaviour and Resolutions Branch in Defence continue to 
manage complaints of sexual harassment and discrimination'.55 
Restricted reporting/disclosure 
4.51 Reflecting the recommendations of the Sex Discrimination Commission, 
SeMPRO was established with an option for victims of sexual offences to make a 
restricted (confidential) disclosure. Defence commented:  
In adopting this approach, Defence has consciously shifted the immediate 
focus from pursuing an investigation of the incident, to caring for and 
supporting personnel who have experienced sexual misconduct. This is a 
significant policy change for Defence and one that is hoped will ultimately 
increase ADF members' confidence in formal reporting and response 
systems.56 
53  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 3.  
54  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 17.  
55  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF - Audit 
report, March 2014, p. 15. 
56  Submission 17, p. 6.  
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4.52 The SeMPRO website provides the following guidance to victims of sexual 
assault regarding restricted disclosures:  
A Restricted Disclosure allows you to disclose your experience directly to 
SeMPRO without involving your chain of command/line management, 
ADFIS or the State/Territory police. This option has been implemented by 
Defence to encourage ADF members who may not otherwise report to 
come forward to receive appropriate support to assist them in their recovery 
to full health. Please note, SeMPRO cannot accept Restricted Disclosures 
from APS employees. 
4.53 However there are a number of exceptions listed where 'SeMPRO may not be 
able to maintain complete confidentiality':  
The exceptions when the SeMPRO can refuse to accept a restricted 
disclosure are circumstances where: 
- there is a death related to the assault; 
- there is a life-threatening serious personal injury; 
- there is a serious or imminent threat to others' safety; 
- the incident is already known, eg to the commander/managers/ 
Australian Defence Force Investigative Service, civilian police or the 
incident is otherwise in the public domain; 
- Commonwealth/State/Territory laws require mandatory reporting (such 
as if the victim is believed to be less than 18 years of age); and/or 
- disclosure to Commonwealth/State/Territory courts or tribunals is 
ordered or required by statute.57 
In addition, when assessing whether a restricted disclosure can be accepted, 
SeMPRO will consider whether: 
- unrestricted reporting could reduce the risk of further sexual misconduct 
to the victim or another person. 
- unrestricted reporting could reduce the risk of serious personal injury of 
the victim or another person. 
- any national security issues or risk to operations exist.58 
4.54 Defence highlighted that while SeMPRO was developed to reflect a similar 
office established by the United States armed forces there were 'significant 
jurisdictional differences between the law applicable to dealing with sexual 
offences…and that 'American practice in this area is not therefore directly transferable 
to the ADF': 
Initial concerns with the concept of restricted reporting or disclosures 
included the potential for inconsistencies to arise between protecting the 
57  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 22, p. 1.  
58  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 22, p. 1.  
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confidentiality of victims complaints (where they desired this) and 
complying with Australian law and ADF policy requiring the reporting of 
allegations of criminal acts and issues affecting workplace health and 
safety.59  
4.55 Defence considered the exceptions to restricted disclosure 'all appear to be 
appropriate and consistent with legal and policy requirements'. It noted that 
'Australian law requires that, in certain circumstances, a victim's desire for 
confidentiality must be overridden for the greater good; such as where failure to do so 
would result in the continuation of a dangerous situation or where the exceptions 
listed above would apply'.60 
4.56 Defence highlighted that restricted disclosures have been received by 
SeMPRO and 'there have been no instances where a restricted disclosure could not be 
accepted':  
Of the 311 interactions SeMPRO had during the period 1 January – 
30 June 2014, 176 were interactions with clients who alleged they were 
victims of sexual assault. Note that there can be multiple interactions per 
victim. The 176 interactions covered 50 clients; 39 clients with unrestricted 
reports and 11 clients with restricted disclosures. During the period, three 
restricted disclosures became unrestricted reports.61 
4.57 The approach Defence had taken to restricted reporting of abuse was 
discussed during the inquiry. In particular, Dr Rumble described the SeMPRO 
restricted reporting framework as a 'much-compromised Clayton's version 
[that]…looks as though it has been set up to fail'.62  He outlined three concerns with 
the version of 'restricted reporting' used by the SeMPRO. 
First - According to the SeMPRO website, when deciding whether to accept 
a report on a confidential basis SeMPRO must consider whether 
'Unrestricted Reporting could reduce the risk of further sexual misconduct 
to you or another person'…This denies the whole rationale for restricted 
reporting… 
Second - there is still nothing on the SeMPRO website to indicate that 
forensic evidence may – with the agreement of the victim - be collected and 
safeguarded when the victim makes a report on a confidential basis… 
Third – there is nothing on the SeMPRO website to indicate that restricted 
reporting through SeMPRO is open to former ADF members.63 
59  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 21, p. 1. 
60  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 22, p. 1.  
61  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 15, p. 1.  
62  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 12.  
63  Submission 8, Part 2, pp 5-6.  
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4.58 Dr Rumble also highlighted that '[i]n the first year of operation, SeMPRO has 
not had a single report of sexual assault within 72 hours of the incident. He considered 
this meant that 'the victims of abuse in Defence are not getting prompt support when it 
is most important, in that first period after the assault'.64 
4.59 In relation to SeMPRO accepting restricted disclosures, Vice Admiral Griggs 
did not consider that the exceptions would be 'significant in the sense of dissuading 
people':  
If the incident is already known to civil police or in the public domain, 
Commonwealth, state and territory laws require mandatory reporting—
again it goes back to the minors issue. Or if disclosure to Commonwealth, 
state or territory courts or tribunals is ordered or required by statute. They 
are the circumstances where we deviate from what might be considered 
pure restricted reporting.65 
4.60 In relation to the collection of forensic evidence, Air Commodore Ehlers told 
the committee:  
Our first priority is to stabilise the client and make sure they are supported. 
We will talk them through their options for making a report. We will talk 
them through the ability for forensic evidence to be gathered. We will work 
with, for example, rape crisis centres to refer them to those institutions 
where they have the ability to capture forensic evidence and secure it until 
the individual is prepared to come forward. We are absolutely supporting 
that.66 
4.61 Defence noted that 'SeMPRO staff will discuss options for collection of 
forensic evidence with clients where collection of the evidence is possible'.  
[T]o date, SeMPRO has not had a disclosure of penetrative sexual assault 
within the 72-hour window required for primary forensic collections. 
Should someone disclose within that window, SeMPRO will facilitate 
support through a medical check and, if agreed, a forensic examination.67 
4.62 Mr Geoff Earley, the Inspector General ADF, noted that he had considered the 
use of restricted reporting in the United States in his review of the management of 
incidents and complaints in Defence (one of the Defence cultural reviews). He stated:  
In that report I did not recommend that the ADF adopt restricted reporting 
because of jurisdictional differences between Australia and the United 
States, and because of the potential for workplace safety issues to arise in 
64  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 11.  
65  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 59.  
66  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 60. 
67  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 16, p. 1.  
                                              
65 
circumstances where commanders had no visibility of offenders in their 
ADF units following a known incident.68  
4.63 However, at the hearing on 13 August 2014, Mr Earley commented: 
SeMPRO has been in operation now for over 12 months. I must say I have 
been impressed with the approach it has taken to providing support to 
victims and with the positive efforts it makes to encourage victims and 
bystanders to come forward…I understand there has actually been only a 
small number of restricted disclosures made to the SeMPRO and these have 
been almost entirely of a historical nature. The workplace safety concerns I 
had originally about the possible impact on units of a restricted reporting 
regime have not therefore materialised, at least so far.69 
Prevention and education 
4.64 SeMPRO also has a role in prevention and education in relation to sexual 
assaults in Defence. In her audit of the treatment of women in the ADF, 
Ms Elizabeth Broderick commented:  
Targeted sexual ethics training is fundamental to establishing a positive 
ethical climate. It is fundamental to ensuring that all members build healthy 
relationships with each other based on mutual respect. It is also 
fundamental to minimising the risk of unacceptable behaviour and the 
exploitation of the most vulnerable across the organisation.70 
4.65 However the audit found that 'progress on the provision of sexual ethics 
training has been slow' and 'urged that ADF to ensure that a robust sexual ethics 
program is also delivered across the broader ADF as soon as possible and in 
collaboration with experts in the field'.71 
4.66 Defence noted that the 'Sexual Ethics and Healthy Relationships' package, 
trialled at the Australian Defence Force Academy, has been provided to all new starter 
training institutions for widespread implementation.72 Air Commodore Ehlers advised:  
[W]e have been working with external experts to develop—I think for the 
first time in any large organisation—a sexual ethics education program. I 
think the previous Chief of Defence Force described it as industrial scale. 
We are looking to create a sexual ethics education in defence strategy. We 
are starting with initial institutions such as the Australian Defence Force 
Academy recruit schools and going through a program of sexual ethics 
68  Submission 7, p. 1.  
69  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 19.  
70  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF - Audit 
report, March 2014, p. 2.  
71  Australian Human Rights Commission, Review of the Treatment of Women in the ADF - Audit 
report, March 2014, p. 173. 
72  Submission 17, p. 6.  
                                              
66 
education—much akin to what some of the sporting codes have done with 
the sporting players, but we are dealing here with a very much wider 
demographic. These are young people, through either enlisted entry or 
officer entry at ADFA et cetera, and exploring with them the issues of 
sexual ethics education.73 
 
 
 
 
 
73  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 56.  
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Chapter 5 
Other matters 
Introduction 
5.1 This chapter will consider some of the other key issues raised during the 
inquiry. These issues included: 
• access to veterans' entitlements and support services;  
• the release of Volume 2 of the DLA Piper report;  
• the need for a Royal Commission; and 
• the Commonwealth's model litigant obligations.  
Access to veterans' entitlements and support services 
5.2 The access of victims of abuse to veterans' entitlements and support services 
was a particular area of concern raised during the inquiry. DVA is required to apply 
specific legislative requirements and a standard of proof to claims. Benefits are 
usually only accessible where a diagnosed medical condition can be linked to a 
service-related incident. Mr Shane Carmody from DVA explained:  
DVA is required by legislation to provide compensation for diagnosed 
injuries or illnesses that were caused by an event linked to service in the 
ADF. Under our legislation—the Veterans' Entitlements Act [VEA]; the 
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act [SRCA]; and the Military 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Act [MRCA]—before determining 
whether an injury or illness is related to service a delegate is required to 
satisfy themselves that the facts of the case are true, including whether the 
alleged abuse occurred. Under the SRCA this is done in accordance with 
'reasonable satisfaction', known as the 'balance of probabilities' standard of 
proof. Under the VEA and the MRCA—the other two acts—this is done in 
accordance with the 'balance of probabilities' standard of proof for peace-
time service, or the 'reasonable hypothesis' standard of proof for warlike, 
non-warlike or operational service. 
These tests must be applied in establishing that an event occurred, that a 
medical condition exists and that the condition was caused by service in the 
ADF.1 
5.3 Between 1 January 2011 and 31 July 2014, DVA completed 259 claims which 
wholly or partly related to sexual or physical abuse. These completed claims involved 
522 separate conditions. Around half of these claimed conditions (222) were refused. 
DVA noted: 
1  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 40.  
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Conditions have been refused for a number of reasons, including: 
- the assault occurred whilst the member was not on duty, or not 
undertaking required ADF duties, i.e. the circumstances of the incident 
did not support a link to service, as required under the relevant 
legislation; 
- there was no diagnosis to support the claimed condition; 
- for Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (VEA) / Military Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act 2004 (MRCA) claims only – the condition did 
not meet one or more factors in the Statement of Principles (SoPs) for 
that condition. The SoPs are legislative instruments that set out the 
factors which can connect particular injuries, diseases or death with a 
person's Australian Defence Force service.2 
5.4 DVA also outlined that where 'a claim cannot be accepted on the available 
evidence, the client is provided with the following options': 
• to have the claim rejected so that it can be taken to the review level; 
• to take the opportunity to submit more evidence to support the claim; or 
• if the client has a claim with the DART, to seek additional information held 
by the DART that may support the DVA claim.3 
5.5 DVA noted that, in August 2012, it established a dedicated team in Melbourne 
to receive and manage all new claims relating to sexual and other forms of abuse 
following the release of DLA Piper Review report. This included the engagement of a 
social worker to provide assistance to DVA clients who can, 'when agreed to by the 
client, act as the single point of contact'.4 
Concerns regarding DVA assessments 
5.6 Concerns were raised regarding the treatment by DVA of victims of abuse in 
Defence who often had limited documentation or evidence to support their claims. For 
example, the Association of Victims of Abuse in the ADF highlighted the hurdles that 
victims of abuse in Defence can have in proving to DVA that abuse occurred. These 
hurdles included:  
• victims discharging at own motion due to abuse;  
• having inaccurate medical and military service records; and 
• having insufficient periods of service to qualify for benefits.5  
2  Department of Veterans' Affairs, responses to questions on notice from hearing 
13 August 2014, pp 5-6. 
3  Submission 11, p. 2. 
4  Submission 11, p. 2.  
5  Submission 14, pp 12-14.  
                                              
69 
5.7 Due to the many challenges involved in proving that abuse in Defence 
occurred, the Association of Victims of Abuse in the ADF recommended that 'the 
various Acts under which the Department Of Veterans Affairs operates under have the 
threshold test for Victim Claims…reduced to that of “Plausibility”'. It also 
recommended the three year service requirement not be applied to victims of abuse in 
Defence.6   
5.8 Similarly, Mr Barry Heffernan considered that DVA assessments in cases 
such as HMAS Leeuwin 'should work on a plausible basis the same as the DART'.7 
He stated:  
[W]hen the minister announced the setting up of the DART initially, it 
should have been better thought through. The DVA should have been more 
a hand-in-hand thing from week one, day one. For people now…talking to 
DVA, and having them say: 'Well, there is no documentation'. When you 
think of the situations that these victims have been in—being assaulted and 
all that—the last thing they are thinking of doing, at 15 years old and 
fearing for their lives at, say, HMAS Leeuwin, is writing a report. They 
feared for their safety, so they would not have reported it higher up. Then, 
through no fault of their own, they are told: 'Sorry, there is no 
documentation. We can't do anything with you'.8 
5.9 Dr Rumble noted that many of the DART complainants 'could well be entitled 
to DVA benefits and assistance which they are not receiving'.9 He considered that 
DVA seemed to be 'profoundly, deeply and entrenchedly unaware… [of] the line of 
Defence reports that say there is a culture which discourages reporting':  
On the DVA checklist, there is 'Did the person report promptly?'. If they 
say no, that is strike 1. That goes to credibility. They must have it explained 
to them—and it is in Defence reports and plenty of other places—that if 
you are a 13-, 14-, 15- or 18-year-old leaving Defence because you have 
been abused, you are not going to report. You are leaving to get out. You 
are not going to report at the doorstep so they keep you there while they run 
a process.10 
5.10 One of his recommendations was that DVA be asked to commence 
consultation with veterans' representative organisations: 
- on what legal and practical barriers there are to victims of abuse in the 
ADF succeeding in establishing the facts necessary to make out 
entitlements to DVA benefits; 
6  Submission 14, covering letter, p. 2. 
7  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 5. 
8  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 2.  
9  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 9.  
10  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 15.  
                                              
70 
- what Defence and DVA could do and what resources they will require to 
gather and share information which could assist such individuals to 
establish those facts to the satisfaction of DVA and tribunal decision-
makers; 
- on what can be done in liaison with Veterans' groups, other Government 
agencies and community groups and what resources will be required to 
reach out to individuals affected by abuse who may be eligible for DVA 
benefits – including individuals who have previously applied and been 
rejected.11 
5.11 The Defence Abuse Support Association believed that victims who had been 
found to have suffered the worst forms of abuse by the Taskforce 'should have their 
applications to the DVA streamlined to avoid putting them through the trauma of 
reliving their abuse again'. It stated: 
DVA needs to look at how it can provide short and long term support to 
victims of abuse in the ADF as required, both past and present. It is a long 
and very difficult process victims of abuse that have come forward to the 
DART have gone through, causing enormous mental anguish and anxiety. 
Many victims also suffer from [post-traumatic stress disorder] as a direct 
result of the abuse they suffered in the ADF.12 
5.12 The DVA commented on this issue:  
It is important to be clear that a decision by the DART regarding a person's 
entitlement to a Reparation Payment will not lead to automatic acceptance 
of a compensation claim by DVA. The assessment of claims for Reparation 
Payments is separate from any assessment of claims for compensation 
payable by DVA and different standards of proof are used in these 
assessments by the DART and DVA.13 
5.13 DVA also noted:  
Compensation claim decisions are not affected by the reason for discharge. 
All claims are investigated and determined on their merits. However, DVA 
is notified of all medical discharges and engages with members to ensure 
that, where possible, such members have a continuation of care when 
transitioning out of the ADF. 14 
5.14 DVA reiterated that eligibility for compensation requires a diagnosed medical 
condition to be linked to a service-related incident. Under DVA-administered 
legislation delegates must be satisfied on the 'balance of probabilities' that the facts of 
the case are true and supported by sufficient evidence before determining whether an 
injury, illness or death is related to service. This was a higher evidentiary standard 
11  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 9.  
12  Submission 23, p. 4.   
13  Submission 11, p. 2.  
14  DVA, responses to questions on notice from hearing 13 August 2014, p. 6.  
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than 'plausibility' used by the Taskforce. DVA acknowledged that these differences in 
the assessment of claims by DVA and DART are not well understood by claimants:  
[T]his is being addressed by both agencies through several channels, 
including the provision of factsheets to all DART applicants, discussions 
between DART case co-ordinators and Reparation Payment applicants and 
discussions between DVA staff and compensation claimants.15 
In February 2014, DVA obtained agreement from the Chair of the 
DART…that all DART applicants will be provided with an explanatory 
factsheet outlining the key differences between claims which are assessed 
by DVA and the DART. This factsheet was developed jointly by both 
agencies.16 
Information sharing and clusters of abuse 
5.15 Dr Rumble also noted that Defence has been gathering and centralising 
records through Plan Millennium which included closed cases involving sexual 
assault. He considered if these reports were de-identified it would assist decision 
makers assess people for DVA benefits.17 Dr Rumble criticised inaction by DVA in 
examining what would be required 'to analyse its own material for clusters and 
patterns of abuse'.18 
5.16 DVA outlined that it had been in ongoing consultation with the Taskforce 
since the Reparation Payment Scheme was established. In 2013, DVA and the 
Taskforce formalised a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to allow the reciprocal 
sharing of personal information with the consent of the claimant to assist with the 
investigation of claims relating to allegations of abuse. However DVA noted:  
Notwithstanding that a formal MoU is now in place, the information 
provided to DVA by the DART may be redacted in certain areas to protect 
the privacy of some individuals and due to the sensitive nature of the 
information collected by the DART. Consequently, DART claimants are 
given the option of either providing particularly sensitive information to 
DVA themselves or expressly requesting the DART to provide this 
information directly to DVA. 
As at 12 May 2014, DVA has submitted 13 requests for claimant 
information to the DART and the DART has made one request for 
information from DVA. To date, all requests for the provision of 
information have been produced within the agreed timeframes prescribed in 
the MoU and all are supported by a consent provided by the individual 
concerned.19 
15  Submission 11, p. 3.  
16  Submission 11, p. 3.  
17  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 14.  
18  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 10.  
19  Submission 11, p. 2.  
                                              
72 
5.17 In its submission, the Taskforce also noted that its Compliant Support Group 
'provides each complainant with information on whether a reparation payment could 
have implications in relation to any current or potential claim lodged with the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs'.20 However, the Chair of the Taskforce indicated the 
privacy legislation 'has been a big obstacle to quite a lot of the work'.21 
5.18 The Taskforce indicated that it recognised that its work may potentially be of 
assistance to DVA in its consideration of applications from claimants for pensions or 
other entitlements and could minimise the distress experienced by claimants 
endeavouring to substantiate their claims of abuse where they have limited evidence:  
To date, the Taskforce has begun to provide DVA with statistical 
information outlining the locations with the highest incidents of abuse, the 
types of abuse and date ranges during which the abuse occurred. This 
information is presented in a manner that ensures it does not identify any 
personal information or breach any obligations required by the Privacy Act 
1988. This statistical information may assist in streamlining DVA's 
evidence gathering process for liability and compensation claims. The 
Taskforce acknowledges that it is a matter for DVA whether or not they 
take account of this information in their assessment process, noting that its 
process is separate to that of the Taskforce and underpinned by different 
standards of proof. 
5.19 The Chair also highlighted that the Taskforce's databases of complaints now 
allowed them to 'run quite a lot of analytical programs' about particular types of abuse 
which the Taskforce has identified 'as coming out of particular institutions at 
particular times'.22 The Chair also noted that Defence's Plan Millennium project to 
digitise service police records has allowed it to identify 'a number of people against 
whom multiple allegations of abuse had been made by different people, different 
victims'.23 
5.20 DVA noted that the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission 
has formally requested information from the Chair of the DART regarding ADF bases 
and locations where clusters of abuse are known to have occurred (including 
timeframes and types of abuse), with a view to possibly using this information as part 
of the DVA claims assessment process to support abuse claims. It indicated that the 
first tranche of the information has been received and is being analysed.24 However, 
DVA also stated that: 
20  Submission 21, p. 3.  
21  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 31. 
22  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 30.  
23  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 26.  
24  Department of Veterans' Affairs, responses to questions on notice from hearing 
13 August 2014, p. 7. 
                                              
73 
Where claims are attributable to service at ADF establishments which are 
not identified as part of the cluster information, or where the 'cluster' 
information does not support the contention, the usual DVA process, which 
relies upon available medical and other corroborating evidence, would need 
to be followed and claims would be considered on a case by case basis. 
This includes establishing a connection between the person's claimed 
conditions and the acknowledged incident, whether by application of the 
Statements of Principles regime (for Military Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act 2004 and VEA cases) or via specialist medical opinion 
(for claims under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988).25 
5.21 Mr Carmody from DVA also advised: 
Some submissions to this inquiry argue that individuals approaching DVA 
may not have any evidence to support their claim, the implication being that 
the claim would therefore be rejected. It is important to note that DVA 
delegates are not bound by formal rules of evidence which would apply 
during a hearing conducted by a civil court. Therefore they can take into 
account all available evidence regardless of origin. This could include 
information used by the DART in its assessment of an alleged abuse claim. 
This is why we work closely with DART to obtain as much information as 
possible to support the claim, with the consent of the client. This is also 
why DART has undertaken to provide DVA with additional data, when 
available, on clusters of abuse which may have occurred, say in a particular 
location or over a particular period of time.26 
5.22 However, Mr Mark Harrigan also from DVA cautioned that where a claimant 
was '[p]urely relying on cluster information in the absence of any other 
information…it would be difficult to satisfy the balance of probabilities test or the 
reasonable hypothesis tests that exist in legislation'.27 
5.23 In relation to its information sharing procedures, Defence stated that 'DVA 
may seek to clarify or confirm details in relation to members' claims for compensation 
with Defence and may request further information through a formal process known as 
the Single Access Mechanism' which 'provides a single point of access for the transfer 
of records between the departments and is managed by the Defence Community 
Organisation'. Further, Defence noted that a SeMPRO client could 'request a copy of 
their SeMPRO file or can ask that their SeMPRO file be released to a third party' 
including DVA.28 
25  Department of Veterans' Affairs, responses to questions on notice from hearing 
13 August 2014, p. 8. 
26  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 41.  
27  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 47.  
28  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 10, pp 1-2. 
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Non-Liability Health Care 
5.24 DVA highlighted recent legislative changes in relation to the Non-Liability 
Health Care arrangements which would potentially assist victims of abuse in Defence: 
Non-Liability Health Care (NLHC) arrangements are prescribed in the 
[Veterans' Entitlements Act] and provide eligible veterans and ADF 
members with access to treatment for certain specified conditions, 
irrespective of whether or not these conditions are related to service. 
Treatment that can be provided under the NLHC arrangements is also 
independent of any claims which may be lodged for specific conditions 
with DVA… 
Subject to legislative amendment (that will also remove the 7 April 1994 
cut-off date), eligible DART recipients will have access to treatment for 
conditions including anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and 
alcohol and substance use disorders from 1 July 2014, regardless of whether 
or not those conditions are deemed to be related to service.29 
5.25 Mr Carmody commented that claimants eligible for non-liability health care 
may be able to access treatment and counselling 'virtually immediately'30:  
We also pay for treatment for certain conditions without the need to 
establish that they are service related. This is important and it is called non-
liability health care—health care in circumstances where we have not 
accepted liability. The conditions which can (from 1 July 2014, when the 
legislation was changed) be treated under non-liability health care include 
post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and alcohol and 
substance abuse.31 
5.26 However, Mr Carmody also indicated that if a person has less than three years 
service, and did not leave on medical grounds, they are unable to access non-liability 
health care.32 
Delays in assessment 
5.27 Other issues with DVA processes for assessment compensation claims were 
also raised during the inquiry. For example, Ms Rachael James from Slater and 
Gordon Lawyers outlined the frustration of some of her clients in relation to the delays 
in decision-making in relation to military compensation schemes:  
Unlike other schemes, such as the seafarer scheme, the Commonwealth 
compensation schemes do not have legislative time frames for the making 
of decisions. Therefore, there is no recourse available to injured personnel 
in the event a decision is not made with respect to their claim within a 
29  Submission 11, pp 3-4.  
30  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 42.  
31  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 40.  
32  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, pp 47-48.  
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timely period or a decision is not made at all. We have long argued that 
time frames for decision making should be introduced into the 
compensation process.33 
5.28 The information provided by DVA indicated that there may be significant 
delays in the processing of claims for compensation. These included for the last 
financial year average waiting times of 75 days for claims under the Veterans' 
Entitlements Act; 144 days for claims under the Military Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Act; and 160 days under the SCRA.34  However, Mr Shane Carmody 
from DVA provided further information on these waiting times:  
[T]he challenge with measuring the claims times that we mentioned is that 
the clock starts ticking as soon as we receive a claim. The claim may not 
have very much detail in it at all or no detail—no diagnosis. It might just be 
the name and address of the person saying, 'I have an injury or illness.' We 
have then to send them to a doctor and work out what we are going to do 
from there. So the claims process is quite protracted because claims are not 
complete when they arrive. Therefore, to even get to that liability stage, it 
takes some time.35 
5.29 Suicide by persons who have suffered abuse in Defence but who had not yet 
received assistance was also raised during the inquiry. DVA outlined the practical 
difficulties in assessing deaths by suicide in the veteran community. While DVA 
indicated that it was working with other agencies to improve understanding of the 
prevalence of suicide among ex-serving personnel, it acknowledged that 'DVA is 
unlikely to ever obtain complete information in relation to the prevalence of suicide 
amongst all those who have served with the Australian Defence Force'.36  
Release of redacted version of Volume 2 
5.30 A range of views were expressed during the inquiry regarding access to, and 
the release of, Volume 2 either redacted or in summary form. 
Supporting further release of Volume 2 
5.31 The Defence Force Welfare Association considered that 'unless there is the 
fullest possible disclosure of all volumes of the report and findings compiled by DLA-
Piper that lead to this Taskforce being created, then there will inevitably be questions 
left in the eyes of the general public concerning the veracity of both the inquiry and 
33  Ms Rachael James, Slater and Gordon Lawyers, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, pp 1-2.  
34  Ms Lisa Foreman, Department of Veterans' Affairs, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, 
p. 42.  
35  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 42.  
36  Department of Veterans' Affairs, responses to questions on notice from hearing 
13 August 2014, p. 2. 
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the response by the ADF'.37 Similarly, the Association for Victims of Abuse in the 
ADF argued that a de-identified version of Volume 2 should be released as it would 
allow Parliament and the electorate to understand the 'extent of the problem', the 
'failure of Defence to deal with it' and take 'the appropriate action based on the true 
facts'.38  
5.32 The Defence Abuse Support Association wished to see Volume 2 of the DLA 
Piper report released and hoped it would negate the need for a Royal Commission on 
abuse within Defence. It believed that 'perpetrators of abuse in the ADF and their 
protectors should be named and shamed for their actions'.39 
5.33 Mr Brian Briggs, from Slater & Gordon Lawyers also supported the release of 
Volume 2 in redacted form or '[a]t least a comprehensive summary with examples of 
the nature of complaints should be provided'. He argued the release of Volume 2 
would 'enable the nature of some of the allegations considered by DLA Piper to be 
transparent and ensure the response by the ADF can be considered for its adequacy in 
a transparent environment'.40 
Against further release of Volume 2 
5.34 In contrast, Dr Gary Rumble, the former leader of the DLA Piper Review, 
noted that many details of the contents of Volume 2 were already available in 
Volume 1 and consequently believed 'it would not be desirable to try to publish a 
summarised or redacted form of Parts 1-23 of Volume 2'.41 He noted that any redacted 
version or summary released would need to remove information that may identify 
complainants, accused perpetrators and individuals accused of mismanaging abuse 
incidents. This action would 'require a lot of resources and would in many cases not 
leave enough coherent information to convey the substance of the individual's 
experience'.42 
5.35 In particular, he highlighted the potential for the release of Volume 2 to 
negatively impact victims of abuse:  
If there was to be any publication of a redacted or summarised version of 
Parts 1-23 of Volume 2, there would need to be well-publicised support 
available for victims who may be distressed by seeing aspects of their story 
being publicised even if they have consented to the publication.43 
37  Submission 1, p. 1.  
38  Submission 14, p. 4.  
39  Submission 23, p. 4.  
40  Submission 4, p. 2.  
41  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 12. 
42  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 31.  
43  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 28.  
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5.36 Similarly, Mr Adair Donaldson of Shine Lawyers noted that Volume 1 
'effectively' already provided a summary of Volume 2 and highlighted that while 'it 
would be desirable for this information to be released the paramount concern should 
be the protection of an individual's privacy'.44 
5.37 The Inspector General ADF, Mr Geoff Earley AM, flagged that it would be 
unlikely that a comprehensive investigation of all the allegations would be possible. In 
the context of the further release of Volume 2, he commented that:   
Persons named or identified as respondents to such unproven allegations 
may therefore be left in the invidious position of either not knowing that 
such allegations about them have been made or alternatively, not being 
given an opportunity to contest the allegation.45  
5.38 Defence noted that as the information in Volume 2 had been provided by 
victims of abuse to the DLA Piper Review on the strict condition of confidentiality, 
'Defence has not been provided a copy of the Volume Two report'.46 In a response to a 
question on notice Defence discussed some of the issues in relation to the release of 
Volume 2:  
Volume 2 documents specific incidents and identifies victims and alleged 
perpetrators, public release poses very considerable risks to both victims 
and perpetrators. Redactions for privacy reasons may in any case be likely 
to render the document virtually meaningless. Anything less by way of 
redaction is likely to lead to an avalanche of speculation in which neither 
the interests of the victims nor the alleged perpetrators are likely to be well 
served. 
The nature of the alleged abuse suffered by victims has already been widely 
publicised in general terms; in particular, through the release of a redacted 
Volume 1. It is not apparent what greater public interest would be satisfied 
by the disclosure of additional detail of these allegations where they remain 
unproven or where victims have expressly indicated they do not support 
more general disclosure of their suffering. The risk to these victims is that 
their trauma will be revisited. The risk to alleged perpetrators is that their 
lives, families and reputations are likely to be irrevocably damaged whether 
or not the allegations against them are proven. Victims who seek 
accountability on the part of their perpetrators can be informed of the 
outcome after due process has been followed.47 
5.39 The Defence Abuse Response Taskforce considered that the question of 
'[w]hether or not to release Volume 2 [was] a matter for the Minister for Defence, not 
the Taskforce'. However, it noted that information or recommendations in relation to 
44  Submission 12, p. 4.  
45  Submission 7, pp 2-3.  
46  Submission 17, p. 7.  
47  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice 13 August 2014, Question 23, p. 1. 
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specific allegations set out in Parts 1-23 of Volume 2 are taken into account as part of 
the Taskforce's assessment processes. Further:  
[T]he Taskforce notes that Volume 2 of the DLA Piper Report contains 
detailed personal information and specific recommendations dealing with 
individual complaints of abuse. For privacy and fairness reasons, any 
published summary or redaction would need to remove information which 
could identify complainants and alleged abusers, together with information 
on individuals accused of mismanaging abuse incidents. 
Given the fact that the majority of the content of Volume 2 is personal 
information, a redacted version would contain little information of 
substance, while still potentially risking the privacy of people who made 
complaints to DLA Piper. 
Redacting Volume 2 in its entirety would be a significant undertaking in 
terms of time and resources.48 
The need for a Royal Commission 
5.40 One of the Taskforce's terms of reference is 'to advise whether a Royal 
Commission would be merited into any categories of allegation raised with the DLA 
Piper review of the Taskforce, in particular the ADFA 24 cases'. A Royal Commission 
is a formal public inquiry established by the Governor-General on the advice of the 
government and formally appointed by Letters Patent. A Royal Commissioner has 
considerable powers in conducting his/her inquiry, but is restricted to the terms of 
reference of appointment.  
5.41 Following the ABC Four Corners report on abuse in Defence titled Chamber 
of Horrors in June 2014, the Chair of the Taskforce made a statement which included 
commentary on the need for a Royal Commission:  
The question whether a Royal Commission is needed to deal with abuse in 
Defence is one that will attract serious consideration and ongoing 
discussion both within the Government and in the public at large. I have 
expressed some concerns about whether a Royal Commission is the most 
appropriate way of responding to allegations of abuse in Defence. In 
particular, I am concerned about the impact that a Royal Commission may 
have on victims of abuse, if they are compelled to talk about the abuse they 
suffered, and whether there are practical outcomes that could be achieved 
from the process. 
However, I still believe that it is premature to express a final view on this 
matter until the Taskforce has finished its work. Our priority remains 
providing tailored outcomes to people who have made complaints of abuse 
in Defence.49 
48  Submission 21, p. 7.  
49  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, 'A Message from the Chair of the Taskforce', June 2014, 
pp 1-2.  
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5.42 At the public hearing on 13 August 2014, the Chair told the committee: 
At the moment, however, I have difficulty in seeing what a royal 
commission could do in this space presently which the Taskforce is not 
doing and which would achieve what it seems to me people who are 
advocating for it are claiming—namely, to hold people to account.50 
5.43 In its seventh interim report, the Taskforce provided an update on complaints 
in relation to the 'ADFA 24'. It indicated the Taskforce had received complaints from 
11 women who allege they had experience sexual abuse at ADFA in the mid-1990s 
and been contacted by three others who were considering whether they will make a 
complaint. Overall the Taskforce had received 72 complaints relating to abuse which 
occurred at ADFA. It noted a de-identified public report regarding abuse alleged to 
have occurred at ADFA, including the cases of sexual abuse in the mid-1990s, would 
be released later in the year.51 
5.44 Several witnesses and submissions put forward positions in relation to the 
creation of a Royal Commission to investigate incidents of abuse in the Defence. In 
particular, Dr Rumble supported the creation of a general Royal Commission in 
relation to abuse in Defence and highlighted the need to address deficiencies in 
relation to the response to the 'ADFA legacy issues'. He argued that '[m]ale on male 
sexual assault at ADFA – as well as male on female assault – should be within the 
scope of inquiry set for a Royal Commission':  
An appropriately commissioned and resourced Royal Commission would 
be best placed to encourage individuals who have relevant information – 
including victims who have not yet spoken about their experience to anyone 
and/or victims who had no interest in the range of outcomes for 
complainants which the DART offered – to come forward and to enable 
informed and convincing resolutions on the systemic issues.52 
5.45 At the hearing on 13 August 2014, Dr Rumble stated: 
I recommend that this committee call for the government to establish a 
royal commission to inquire into the ADFA legacy and what can be done 
about it. That should be an open ended inquiry and not limited to options 
available to the ADF under its current procedures.53 
A royal commission generates its own publicity and would have the real 
prospect of attracting a lot more people. The more information that is 
gathered the more prospect there is of realistic action against individual 
perpetrators.54 
50  Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 38.  
51  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh interim report to the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p. 32.  
52  Submission 8, Part 3, p. 3.  
53  Dr Gary Rumble, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 15. 
54  Dr Gary Rumble, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 15. 
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We need to have a high level of confidence about our leaders—and our 
leaders include our officers and our NCO leadership. There are some things 
where you need to be above suspicion. If there were a royal commission 
which was supported by the Defence leadership, and that is crucial, then if 
people who have witnessed things which they previously have not spoken 
about believe there is a serious inquiry—people who may have been 
victims who have not previously spoken but who have confidence that the 
Defence leadership is actually interested in knowing who is fit to be in the 
Defence Force, who is fit to lead, who is fit to be the next Chief of Army 
and who is fit to be the next Chief of the Defence Force—I believe they 
will step forward.55 
A royal commission generates its own publicity. A royal commission is a 
very strong signal that this is a serious matter and that serious action is 
going to be taken. The more people you have telling stories of consistent 
conduct against one person the more likely it is that you will be able to take 
some definitive action against that person, be it criminal prosecution or be it 
administrative. As I say, beyond that, a question for the royal commission 
should always be: if there is nothing available on the current book of 
remedies, is that appropriate? As I said before, there are some positions 
where it is not good enough for people not to be proven guilty. There are 
some positions where we have to have a high level of confidence in the 
fitness of people for those positions.56 
5.46 In particular Dr Rumble emphasised that Lieutenant Colonel Ken Northwood, 
who originally drew attention to the serious sexual assaults at ADFA as part of the 
Grey Review, had publicly supported the establishment of a royal commission into 
abuse in Defence.57 
5.47 Mr Neil Stuart's submission to the inquiry highlighted his experiences with 
DLA Piper review and Taskforce processes, in particular what he perceived as a lack 
of genuine commitment to institutional reform in Defence and a 'culture of silence' 
concerning abuse. He stated:  
I need for there to be a process which enables me, as a person who has 
experienced sexual abuse within Defence, to make common cause with 
others who have experienced like abuse. Maybe the process needs to be 
widened to provide for something like a Royal Commission so that the 
secrecy and silence are blown away and Defence is held publicly 
accountable for how it must change.58  
5.48 However, Mr Brian Briggs from Slater and Gordon Lawyers noted: 
55  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 18.  
56  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 19. 
57  Transcript of ABC, 'Chamber of Horrors', Four Corners program, 9 June 2014, tabled by 
Dr Gary Rumble at the hearing on 13 August 2014, p. 2.  
58  Submission 3, p. 7.  
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Whilst there is an invitation with the DART to request a possible referral to 
a Royal Commission in the areas of the ADFA 24 and HMAS Leeuwin, it 
is my belief that given the enormous expense of a Royal Commission, the 
money would be better invested on support for the victims utilizing current 
schemes. In addition, Volume 2 of the DLA Piper Review and the 
information provided to DART, we expect has already resulted in sufficient 
information to Government and the current leadership of the ADF. 
It would appear that many of the ADFA 24 have not come forward to 
DART. A Royal Commission may prompt them to do so, alternatively it 
may not.59 
5.49 Similarly, Mr Barry Heffernan considered a Royal Commission 'would be a 
complete waste of time'. He considered that it was clear there was ongoing abuse in 
abuse in ADF and stated '[w]e do not need a royal commission to tell us that'.60  
5.50 The Taskforce report on HMAS Leeuwin noted that in relation to incidents of 
abuse at that training establishment while 'the powers of a Royal Commission may 
lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the institutional response to abuse…a 
Royal Commission may not necessarily result in a broader understanding of the nature 
or extent of abuse at HMAS Leeuwin'. Further, many of the incidents of abuse at 
HMAS Leeuwin could be investigated by the existing Royal Commission.61 In the 
seventh interim report of the Taskforce, it noted that '[t]he question whether a Royal 
Commission is warranted for any other categories of complaints received by the 
Taskforce, including those relating to abuse at ADFA, will be considered in the next 
Taskforce report'.62 
Model litigant obligations 
5.51 The Legal Services Directions 2005 are a set of binding rules about the 
performance of Commonwealth legal work.63 Under the Directions, Commonwealth 
agencies have various obligations, including an obligation to act as a model litigant. 
Some witnesses considered that the Commonwealth was not acting in accordance with 
these model litigant obligations in relation to claims for compensation for abuse in 
Defence. For example, Ms Rachael James described litigation as being 'conducted in a 
very aggressive and adversarial way'. Mr Adair Donaldson also commented:  
[T]he Australian government, as that model litigant, has obligations which 
stipulate that it should not put claims to proof on matters it knows to be true 
and not to rely on technical defences. The duty to act as a model litigant 
59  Submission 1, pp 4-5.  
60  Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 7.  
61  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Report on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, 2014, p. 94.  
62  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, September 2014, p.7. 
63  Legal Services Directions 2005, Appendix B.  
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goes beyond the requirement for lawyers to act in accordance with ethnical 
obligations. Put bluntly, the government and its legal advisers have a higher 
duty than religious or private organisations and, accordingly, they should be 
held to a higher standard.64 
5.52 Dr Gary Rumble also considered that there was a real risk that the 
Commonwealth was in breach of its model litigant obligations. He believed the 
Commonwealth had both moral and model litigant obligations 'to individuals affected 
by abuse in the ADF to bring into DVA processes relevant information which is 
currently scattered in Defence and DVA files'.65 
 
 
64  Mr Adair Donaldson, Shine Lawyers, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 4.  
65  Submission 8, Part 1, p. 9.  
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Conclusion and recommendations 
Introduction 
6.1 The committee's terms of reference are directed to the accessibility and 
adequacy of the current mechanisms and processes to support victims of sexual and 
other abuse in Defence. While evidence was received on other issues during the 
inquiry, such as the issue of serving officers who are the subject of allegations of 
abuse, the committee's focus is on support and assistance for current and past victims 
of abuse in Defence.  
Taskforce outcomes 
6.2 Having followed the progress of the Taskforce from its establishment through 
two inquiries, the committee has, in general, been impressed with the results achieved. 
The reparation payment scheme, the counselling support and the restorative 
engagement program appear in the majority of cases to have provided positive 
outcomes and assistance for the victims of abuse in Defence. The nature of the 
problems faced by victims is particularly revealed by the large number of reparation 
payments which takes account of the mismanagement by Defence in handling the 
abuse.1 The committee recognises that the reparation payment scheme will never fully 
compensate for the abuse suffered by victims. However, for many of those who have 
received reparation payments, it can be seen as a tangible acknowledgment that 
wrongs have occurred and that recognition has its own value. 
6.3 On the evidence received, the committee considers that the staff of the 
Taskforce have undertaken their work effectively and conscientiously, and have dealt 
compassionately and, on the whole, very professionally with victims of abuse in 
Defence. This view of the Taskforce has also been reflected in commentary from 
others, including many of those who have been engaged with its processes as 
complainants. Some complainants have not been satisfied with the conduct of the 
Taskforce. However, the committee has not received any evidence which would 
suggest that the policies and practices implemented by the Taskforce are in any way 
unjustified. In particular, the committee explicitly rejects the personal criticism 
received during the inquiry of the Chair of the Taskforce, the Hon Len Roberts-Smith 
QC. The committee has not engaged with this commentary during the inquiry, and 
does not intend to give it further attention here. 
6.4 Some of those who contacted the committee during the inquiry argued that the 
Taskforce has been too restrictive in its interpretation of the scope of abuse within its 
1  'Key statistics' tabled by the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at the public hearing on 
26 September 2014, p. 1.   
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terms of reference. The term 'abuse' is clearly a subjective one and could potentially 
extend to a broad range of behaviour and practices. The committee considers the 
Taskforce has appropriately determined the scope of the abuse claims which fall 
within its terms of reference. The committee notes that other potential remedies exist 
for most of the claims of abuse, such as employment related disputes, which have 
been determined by the Taskforce to fall outside of its definition.  
6.5 The committee acknowledges the concerns raised by Dr Rumble regarding 
media, anonymous and third party allegations of abuse in Defence. However, the 
committee also recognises that the Taskforce is limited by its terms of reference which 
include 'determining in consultation with those who have made complaints 
appropriate actions in response to those complaints'. If a person who may have 
suffered abuse in Defence (and is aware of the processes of the Taskforce) makes a 
decision not to engage with processes of the Taskforce, their wishes should be 
respected. It should also be noted that those persons who have suffered abuse in 
Defence are not restricted to making reports to the Taskforce and can also 
independently pursue complaints and remedies through other avenues. The Taskforce 
has indicated the media, anonymous and third party allegations of abuse will be taken 
into account in its advice to Defence regarding systemic issues. 
Taskforce legacy issues 
6.6 The Taskforce is funded, and will continue to provide, services in relation to 
the restorative engagement program into 2016. The committee understands that 
recommendations in relation to the other 'legacy issues' will form part of the final 
report of the Taskforce. The committee wishes to comment on one major aspect of 
these legacy issues.  
6.7 A key criticism of the Taskforce's activities concerns the initial stage of 
awareness raising and communications with potential complainants. It is clear that 
there remain victims of abuse in Defence who were not aware of the existence of the 
Taskforce before the 'cut-off' dates for applications, including some of those who have 
made submissions to the inquiry.2  
6.8 This is a complex issue. As was pointed out during the inquiry, because of 
their experiences victims of abuse in Defence may actively avoid mentions in the 
media of Defence in general, and of abuse in particular.3 The DLA Piper Review also 
faced similar issues in raising awareness of its activities. The apology made by former 
Minister Smith for abuse in Defence and the announcement of the Taskforce and its 
subsequent activities have received significant media attention. However, there does 
not seem to have been a communications strategy undertaken to reach out to those 
victims of abuse in Defence who were unlikely to have been informed about the 
activities of the Taskforce or would be reluctant to come forward. The committee 
2  For example, Mr Glyn Treadwell, Submission 26, p. 1.  
3  For example, Mr Adair Donaldson, Shine Lawyers, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 2.  
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considers that, with hindsight, more could have been done by the Taskforce, by 
Defence and the Australian Government to raise awareness of the activities of the 
Taskforce and the associated support mechanisms available for victims of abuse in 
Defence.  
6.9 The challenges of raising awareness amongst victims of abuse in Defence 
have contributed to the issues regarding the cut-off dates for making applications to 
the Taskforce. The committee is concerned that there is a significant cohort of former 
members of Defence who have suffered abuse who have not had the opportunity to 
access the outcomes offered by the Taskforce. The committee notes that a large 
number of complainants have contacted the Taskforce after the 'cut off' date of 
31 May 2013.4 There is also a risk that confusion regarding the limited waiver of non-
disclosure agreements could have deterred victims of abuse in Defence from making a 
claim to the Taskforce before the cut-off dates.5 
6.10 The committee does not agree that the operations of the Taskforce should be 
open-ended. However, the Defence cultural reforms are still continuing, and will not 
be completed for a further two years. Some actions to rectify problems with processes 
for responding to abuse, such as when administrative action may be taken by 
commanders, have only recently been undertaken by Defence. The committee is also 
acutely aware that the incidents of abuse in Defence continue to occur. In the view of 
the committee, the Australian Government should examine reopening the Taskforce 
processes to new applications from victims of abuse in Defence with a cut-off date 
that reflects the expected completion of the Defence cultural reform program. This 
extension should be accompanied by an extensive communications campaign aimed at 
reaching those who may be eligible and should not only rely on traditional media 
advertising and Defence publications.  
6.11 The staff of the Taskforce have developed considerable expertise in assisting 
victims of abuse in Defence, collecting relevant information, assessing complaints and 
providing outcomes. They should continue to be utilised to assist victims of abuse in 
Defence until the cultural reforms are completed. 
Recommendation 1 
6.12 The committee recommends that the Australian Government extend the 
activities of the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce to support victims of abuse in 
Defence, including allowing new complainants to make claims up to 
30 June 2015. 
4  Correspondence from the Hon Len Roberts-Smith, Chair, Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, 
17 September 2014. 
5  For example, Ms Julia Delaforce, Submission 16, pp 1-2.  
                                              
86 
Continuing cultural reform in Defence 
6.13 A challenging number of recommendations for reform were developed 
through the Defence cultural reviews – including many which support or assist victims 
of abuse. Defence has progressed a large number of these reforms through the 
Pathway to Change strategy, in particular establishing the Sexual Misconduct 
Prevention Response Office (SeMPRO).  
6.14 Defence has also assisted the Taskforce in undertaking its activities. In 
particular, the committee is pleased to see the broad participation of senior Defence 
officers in the restorative engagement program. This extensive program, which will 
continue to operate for some time, is likely to be one of the most valuable in terms of 
effecting Defence cultural reform.  
6.15 The examples provided of administrative and disciplinary action, including 
termination actions, taken in relation to unacceptable behaviour onboard 
HMAS Newcastle, against the Army personnel involved in the 'Jedi Council' and 
against Air Force personnel for 'acts of indecency' indicate that Defence's zero 
tolerance approach is being applied.6 Additionally, there appears to have been an 
increase in reports of incidents in Defence, particularly in relation to sexual assault. 
The committee agrees with the suggestion that this is an indication of successful 
reform and that victims of abuse may now feel more confident in making reports. The 
sexual ethics program being developed and rolled out by Defence to its training 
institutions also appears to be a positive development. 
6.16 In contrast to these achievements, Defence could have been more open to 
consultation in relation to the Rethinking Systems Review and its consequent reform 
implementation.7 The committee considers that the overall message of the cultural 
reviews is that Defence can be strengthened through engaging with external 
perspectives. In this context, the committee urges Defence to continue its relationship 
with the Australian Human Rights Commission in reviewing, auditing and assessing 
cultural change occurring within the organisation. 
6.17 The committee also notes the lack of urgency on the part of Defence in 
undertaking some critical reforms. In particular, the revised Defence Instructions 
(General) relating to the management of response to sexual assaults (clarifying when 
administrative and disciplinary action could be taken) was not released until 2014, 
some three years after this issue was identified by the DLA Piper Review.  
6.18 A number of criticisms were made of the restricted disclosure processes 
adopted by Defence in establishing the processes of SeMPRO. The committee accepts 
6  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice from the hearing on 13 August 2014, 
Question 12, pp 2-3.  
7  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Sixth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Defence, June 2014, p. 23. 
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that the approach taken by Defence to restricted disclosures is necessarily constrained 
by a number of legal and practical realities. However, in the view of the committee 
there is room for improvement in relation to communication of these exceptions to 
victims. Other communications to victims of sexual assault could also be improved. In 
particular, the SeMPRO should develop resources which clearly advise persons 
considering contacting SeMPRO regarding options for the collection of forensic 
evidence and to clarify support options for former members of Defence.  
6.19 The importance of trust in support services for victims of sexual assault was 
emphasised by a number of witnesses in relation to SeMPRO. The committee is 
concerned that, as a telephone service, SEMPRO is not providing the sort of personal 
assistance which would be most beneficial for victims of sexual offences. A local 
SeMPRO Support Officer (SSO) Network is being developed to provide on the 
ground support and information to clients, witnesses and their commanders and 
managers. However, in the view of the committee, SeMPRO should undertake more 
'outreach' activities to build relationships of trust with Defence personnel and to 
facilitate face-to-face support for victims of sexual assault.  
6.20 Defence recruits a large number of new personnel each year. The DLA Piper 
Review report highlighted that there are aspects of ADF environments which carry 
risk of abuse occurring and there are strong cultural factors which discourage 
reporting of abuse in Defence. Defence should not solely rely on the low levels of 
reported abuse or survey results in monitoring this issue. The committee believes 
Defence needs to be focused on prevention of abuse occurring at all times, even when 
there are no signs of trouble and particularly when there are signs of trouble such as 
spikes in absenteeism, disciplinary problems, or personnel reporting sick or leaving 
Defence. 
Recommendation 2 
6.21 The committee recommends that the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and 
Response Office (SeMPRO) develop resources to clearly advise persons 
considering contacting SeMPRO regarding options for the collection of forensic 
evidence and support options for former members of Defence.  
Recommendation 3 
6.22 The committee recommends that the Australian Government provide 
additional resources to SeMPRO to facilitate further outreach activities and 
personal support to victims of sexual assault in Defence.  
Systemic issues raised in DLA Piper review reports 
6.23 The committee was not provided with specific responses from Defence or the 
Australian Government in respect of the 35 systemic issues identified in the DLA 
Piper Review report. As part of its response to the committee's previous report into the 
DLA Piper review and related issues, the Australian Government indicated that:  
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Noting that Pathway to Change is Defence's response to the Reviews 
initiated in 2011, Defence will consider the systemic issues and findings of 
the DLA Piper Review in this context. 
6.24 The committee notes that the Chair has indicated that systemic issues will be 
included as part of the Taskforce's final report.8 Defence has also indicated the 
systemic issues identified by the DLA Piper Review reports have been considered as 
part of the Rethinking Systems Review. 
6.25 The systemic issues identified (or recommended for further consideration) as 
part of the DLA Piper Review should be explicitly responded to by the Australian 
Government. For example, in the committee's previous report it highlighted Issue S12 
raised in the Supplement to Volume 1 which asked Phase 2 to consider whether it 
would be appropriate for Defence to seek the making of a regulation under the 
Crimes Act 1914 that would add recruitment into the ADF to the exclusions from the 
operation of the spent convictions legislation. As far as the committee is aware there 
does not appear to be a Defence or Australian Government decision on this issue. This 
issue is relevant to character checks at point of entry into the ADF of personnel who 
may have access to vulnerable Defence personnel. 
6.26  The committee is concerned that a response to these systemic issues may be 
lost between the Pathway to Change reforms (initiated by the former Minister), the 
Taskforce's recommendations (developed independently of Defence) and the 
Rethinking Systems Review (initiated by Defence itself). Following the next interim 
report of the Taskforce, the Minister for Defence is best-positioned to formally 
respond to the systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review.  
Recommendation 4 
6.27 The committee recommends that following the next interim report of the 
Taskforce, the Minister for Defence table a formal substantive response to the 
systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review.  
Access to veterans' entitlements and support  
6.28 The committee considers that the recent changes to access to non-liability 
health care will operate to assist some victims of abuse in Defence. However, there 
also appears to be potential gaps in this support. Where a person was discharged at 
their own request, before the three year requirement and not on medical grounds, they 
may not be eligible to access these services.9 One of the challenges identified during 
the inquiry is that persons who have suffered abuse may leave military service early 
after an adverse experience and whose true reason for leaving may not be reflected in 
their official record of service. DVA should examine options to close this gap, 
8  The Hon Len Roberts-Smith, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 28.  
9  Mr Shane Carmody, DVA, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 48.  
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including through a recommendation for legislative change to the Australian 
Government if necessary.  
Recommendation 5 
6.29 The committee recommends the Australian Government introduce 
amending legislation to remove the three year minimum service requirement for 
eligibility for Non-Liability Health Care (NLHC) and to make NLHC available to 
any person who has had completed any service. 
6.30 There was considerable time spent during the inquiry on the various 
evidentiary tests for access to different assistance for victims of abuse in Defence. It is 
easy to understand the frustration experienced by victims of abuse who are denied 
access to DVA assistance 'on the balance of probabilities' after their claims of abuse 
have been determined to be 'plausible' by the Taskforce. The committee accepts that 
DVA officers are bound by the evidentiary burdens set by legislation in assessing the 
eligibility of applicants for compensation and assistance. However, it was made clear 
during the inquiry that victims of abuse can have a number of difficulties in making 
their claims, particularly where military records may be inaccurate. 
6.31 It is encouraging that DVA is seeking to obtain information regarding 
'clusters' of abuse identified by the Taskforce and may be able to take that information 
into account in assessing the claims of victims of abuse in Defence. However, the 
committee notes that difficulties with establishing eligibility for DVA benefits and 
support are relevant to persons affected by abuse in the Defence who have not come 
into Taskforce processes. Further, the difficulties in establishing eligibility for DVA 
benefits will continue to be relevant to persons affected by abuse in Defence after the 
Taskforce has ceased to operate. 
6.32 Accordingly, it is the opinion of the committee that it is insufficient for DVA 
to confine consideration of patterns and clusters to information provided to DVA by 
the Taskforce. The committee recommends that the Minister for Veteran's Affairs 
direct the DVA to report to Parliament on what would be required to analyse DVA's 
own file material for clusters and patterns of abuse which could assist claimants to 
establish entitlements to DVA benefits. 
Recommendation 6 
6.33 The committee recommends that the Minister for Veterans' Affairs direct 
the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) to commence consultation with 
veterans' representative organisations and to report back on: 
• the legal and practical barriers there are to victims of abuse in the ADF 
succeeding in establishing the facts necessary to access entitlements to 
DVA benefits; 
• what Defence and DVA could do and what resources they will require to 
gather and share information which could assist such individuals to 
establish those facts to the satisfaction of DVA and tribunal decision-
makers; 
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• what can be done in liaison with veterans' groups, other Australian 
Government agencies and community groups, and what resources will be 
required to reach out to individuals affected by abuse who may be 
eligible for DVA benefits – including individuals who have previously 
applied and been rejected. 
Community-based support 
6.34 During the inquiry the committee also received evidence from 
Mr Barry Heffernan from the William Kibby VC Veterans' Shed regarding a proposal 
for community based support for veterans who have suffered abuse. He described the 
initiative, Community-Based Defence Abuse Support (COMBADAS), as taking up 
where the Taskforce leaves off and providing a low cost alternative assistance 
program to victims of abuse in Defence: 
COMBADAS will provide safe, supportive, non-judgemental community-
based facilities for the support of ex-ADF members who have experienced 
abuse, and will address unmet emotional and communal needs. 
COMBADAS will provide emotional, psychological, and financial/legal 
assistance to family members of veterans, so as to better enable them to 
come to terms with the emotional traumas experienced by their loved ones, 
and to handle the subsequently emotional burdens thereby imposed upon 
them.10 
6.35 Given the large number of victims of abuse in Defence, many of whom 
potentially have not accessed the Taskforce or DVA assistance, alternative community 
based support may be a valuable and accessible resource. In the light of outcomes 
achieved to date and evidence from the Hon Len Roberts-Smith, the committee 
considers that the COMBADAS program is worthy of further consideration by the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs to ascertain if it could form the basis of a sustainable, 
national approach to supporting victims of Defence abuse. Any funding agreements 
with community-based support organisations should allow them to continue to 
advocate for victims of abuse in Defence. 
Recommendation 7 
6.36 The committee recommends the Department of Veterans' Affairs 
examine options to provide financial assistance to support a national, sustainable 
community-based approach to assisting veterans who have suffered abuse. 
The need for a Royal Commission 
6.37 The committee notes that some of the abuse suffered in Defence training 
institutions, where the victims were under 18 years of age, appear to fall within the 
scope of the terms of reference of the existing Royal Commission into Institutional 
10  Submission 22, p. 9-10. 
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Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.11 In the view of the committee, these cases of 
institutionalised abuse of minors, illustrated by the Taskforce report into HMAS 
Leeuwin, should be considered as part of that Royal Commission. The committee 
notes that the Taskforce has provided a copy of its HMAS Leeuwin report to the 
Royal Commission and understands some victims have already raised their 
experiences with the Royal Commission.12 
6.38 The question of whether a Royal Commission into abuse in Defence is 
necessary is a key part of the terms of reference of the Taskforce. The Chair of the 
Taskforce is in the best position to make that recommendation, and the committee has 
confidence that he will make an appropriate decision. That said, the committee 
considers that this should not be perceived as a limited binary choice. While royal 
commissions have extensive inquiry powers, the committee does not agree with the 
concept that they are the sole possible solution if a further investigation or inquiry into 
abuse in Defence is considered necessary. Any further response to past abuse in 
Defence should be appropriately tailored to achieve defined outcomes and minimise 
the risk of creating further suffering for past victims of abuse in Defence. 
6.39 The situation in relation to abuse in Defence is not always clear-cut. As the 
DLA Piper Review reports made clear, some of those who were initially victims of 
abuse in Defence, were influenced by their experiences and the prevailing institutional 
expectations and culture to become abusers themselves. Witnesses also emphasised to 
the committee that Defence does not exist in a vacuum and is constantly impacted by 
the problems of abuse which exist in the wider Australian community. In this context, 
the allocation of personal, institutional and societal responsibility can be ambiguous.  
6.40 A key issue is the presence of persons within Defence, identified by the 
Taskforce, who are the subject to allegations of abuse. Some submitters to the inquiry 
considered that a Royal Commission was the only way to 'get' the perpetrators of 
abuse in Defence. However, the Taskforce through it processes (and with the consent 
of the complainant) has referred a number of allegations for investigation by the 
police or to Defence for administrative and disciplinary action. Existing administrative 
and disciplinary options within Defence may be sufficient to remove perpetrators of 
abuse. For example, the committee notes that amendments to Defence regulations 
have introduced a 'good character' consideration for personnel determinations and 
there are existing provisions to terminate the service of Defence personnel based on 
broad criteria such as 'performance', 'behaviour' or where the retention is not in the 
interest of the Defence Force.13  
6.41 The committee notes that the Taskforce in its seventh interim report stated 
that in October 2013 Mr Roberts-Smith had made recommendations to the CDF to 
11  Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Terms of Reference, 
available at: http://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/about-us/terms-of-reference.  
12  Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Report on abuse at HMAS Leeuwin, June 2014, p. 94.  
13  Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002.  
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take action in relation to at least 12 serving members of the ADF, and to consider 
further action in another 13 cases. 
6.42 Procedural fairness issues should not be ignored in considering any 
appropriate approach to abuse in Defence. Royal commissions can also produce 
negative outcomes in the course of their proceedings.14 The committee notes that the 
Royal Commissions Act 1902 was amended to facilitate private sessions of the Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. Additional 
legislative amendments may be required if a Royal Commission into abuse in Defence 
is considered necessary. 
6.43 The committee encourages the Taskforce and the Australian Government to 
consider a range of flexible options or mechanisms. The committee notes that 
overseas jurisdictions have successfully established and operated commissions to 
achieve truth and reconciliation outcomes in relation to past wrongs committed in a 
variety of institutions. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada established to reveal past abuse in relation to the Canadian Indian residential 
school system demonstrates how such commissions can be tailored to meet the 
specific requirements. 
Recommendation 8 
6.44 The committee recommends that the Taskforce and the Australian 
Government assess the appropriateness of a range of responses to abuse in 
Defence, in addition to determining whether a Royal Commission should be 
established. The welfare of victims of abuse in Defence should be the primary 
consideration in any decision made.  
Release of Volume 2 of the DLA Piper report 
6.45 During the inquiry, the committee requested access to Volume 2 of the DLA 
Piper report. This was undertaken in private at Parliament House with access 
arrangements which reflected the confidentiality of the material, as well as the needs 
of senators to consider the material. The committee wishes to acknowledge its 
appreciation for the efforts of staff of the Taskforce and the Minister of Defence who 
facilitated this process. 
6.46 On 21 August 2014, the committee wrote to the Taskforce requesting that 
specific parts of Volume 2 flagged by senators be released to the committee and, 
where necessary, redacted of any personal information or any material which could 
potentially identify any individual. The first tranche of these flagged documents 
containing summary and explanatory material (which did not require extensive 
redaction) were provided to the committee on 25 September 2014.  
14  Saxby Pridmore and Milford McArthur, 'Suicide and reputation damage', Australian 
Psychiatry, Vol 16, No. 5, October 2008, p. 312. Malcolm Brown, 'Holding judgement', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June 2007, p. 28. 
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6.47 On 14 October 2014, the Taskforce wrote to the committee regarding the 
second tranche of flagged documents which contained sensitive personal information 
and had been requested by the committee to be provided following redaction. The 
Taskforce included correspondence with the Minister of Defence regarding the release 
of this second tranche of documents which discussed a number of privacy concerns, 
including the situation of victims of abuse who had provided information to the DLA 
Piper Review in confidence. In particular, the Taskforce requested the Minister 
consider making a public interest immunity claim in relation to the documents. The 
Minister agreed there were grounds for a valid public interest immunity claim but 
requested the Taskforce consider further negotiation with the committee that may 
negate the need for the claim to be made. 
6.48 The committee acknowledges that differing views exist in regard to the value 
of the releasing of Volume 2 of the DLA Piper report. In particular, the committee 
does not wish to cause any additional concern or anxiety for persons who provided 
information to the DLA Piper Review in confidence. Due to the subject matter and the 
privacy concerns raised by the Taskforce and the Minister, the committee has made 
the decision not to further pursue the release of the second tranche of the flagged parts 
of Volume 2 which contained information about specific allegations and detailed 
personal information. 
Recommendation 9 
6.49 The committee recommends that no further parts of Volume 2 of the 
DLA Piper report should be released in summary or redacted form. 
Conclusion 
6.50 Overall, the committee's views have not significantly changed in relation to 
this topic since its previous report. While the committee shares the frustration 
expressed by some during the inquiry with the slow progress of reforms, it was always 
anticipated it would take time to achieve cultural change within Defence. As noted in 
the committee's previous inquiry, it is important to recognise that the issue of sexual 
and other abuse is not unique to Defence. It is a serious issue facing workplaces, 
educational institutions, cultural and religious organisations across Australia. Like any 
other large organisation, Defence will be required to undertake constant work both to 
prevent abuse, and to support and assist victims of abuse. In this context it is 
important for Defence's cultural reform programs to continue to be implemented and 
reviewed to ensure they are achieving success. 
6.51 In the view of the committee, real progress has been achieved by Defence 
since the commencement of the Pathway to Change strategy. Support mechanisms for 
victims of abuse in Defence have improved since the DLA Piper Review. In 
particular, the committee was heartened by the evidence that there is an upward trend 
in the number of people within Defence who understand how they can make a 
complaint and have confidence that the Defence chain of command will act on their 
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behalf.15 Nonetheless, there is clearly more work to be done. The committee 
anticipates that the Taskforce will have further recommendations to assist Defence to 
improve its cultural reform programs and prevent further abuse from occurring. 
6.52 The establishment and operation of the Taskforce has been a bold initiative in 
assisting past victims of abuse in Defence. While many of its processes have not yet 
been completed it has achieved an impressive range of positive outcomes for victims 
of abuse. In contrast to the previous failures of the Australian Government's duty of 
care to protect victims of abuse in Defence, the Taskforce has professionally and 
respectfully provided assistance. In the view of the committee, its operations should 
be extended to assist the victims of abuse in Defence who are still seeking support.  
 
 
 
 
Senator Alex Gallacher 
Chair 
15  Mr Geoff Earley, IGADF, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 27. 
                                              
 Dissenting report of Senator Jacqui Lambie, 
Palmer United Party 
 
1.1 It is no secret that I have campaigned for a Royal Commission into staff abuse 
in the Australian Defence Force. My work on this committee, seeing and hearing the 
evidence I have, has only strengthened my resolve that this is the only way this matter 
will ever be properly resolved and fixed now. 
1.2 In fact any reasonable person reviewing the evidence presented to the 
Committee would conclude this can be the only way now, given the total lack of 
confidence by the public in the ADF to properly care for its people. ADF's appalling 
failures to care properly for its staff and to protect them from sexual and physical 
abuse has been known now publicly for many, many years. The former parliamentary 
Senate Committee inquiries into this very same matter shows it has been known by 
governments and the ADF for decades, at least as early as 1970. The facts that the 
abuse is continuing, even now is evidence in itself we can no longer trust the ADF to 
investigate and properly respond to this issue anymore.  
1.3 The ADF has lost all confidence from the public to deal with this matter 
properly. Even if they had a will now, the public and I think any reasonable person 
looking into this matter would have absolutely no confidence left in the ADF on this 
issue. 
1.4 It will take ADF management years now to rebuild that confidence with their 
personnel and the public, in the meantime ADF staff are still at risk of sexual assault 
and abuse in their workplaces. Failure to act independently of the ADF could, and in 
my opinion would mean thousands more will suffer terrible abuses of a similar nature 
in the ADF. Just as we have seen happen between the 1994 Senate inquiry 20 years 
ago. If we don't act swiftly and call a Royal Commission into this matter now the 
question remains, given all we know now, how many more ADF staff will be sexually 
or physically abused, tortured by sexual predators we now know continue to work in 
the ADF today.  
1.5 The long history of this matter dating back 40 years at least has left thousands 
of men and woman of the ADF scarred for life, mentally traumatised and some have 
even taken their lives. How many more must suffer this terrible fate or lose their lives 
before the government accepts the ADF has shown, again and again that it is simply 
incapable, or totally unwilling (I suspect both) to deal with this very dire issue still 
continuing to harming so many. 
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1.6 I am thankful that the Committee has not ruled out that a Royal Commission 
is needed in this matter.  I am however stunned and shocked that the Committee has 
left this very critical decision in the hands of a former ADF manager, Mr Len Smith-
Roberts, himself a former senior manager of the ADF in the period of time these 
terrible events have unfolded. Whilst he may be an honourable man, it is staggering 
that the Committee cannot see the clear conflict of interest, or perceived conflict of 
interest that will be attached to any decision he makes.   
1.7 The men and woman, and the families of the men and woman of the ADF 
past, present deserve better. They deserve a single body, completely separate and 
independent of the ADF, with appropriate judicial and investigative powers to finally 
look into this matter properly. To pull it apart and to work it out: What has happened, 
how did it happen and how did it go on for so long. Answering these questions 
properly will allow the relevant Royal Commission appointed in this matter to make 
recommendations that will prevent similar systemic and widespread sexual and 
physical abuses in the future. 
1.8 Both the former head of the famous DLA Piper review (Dr Rumble) and the 
current head of the DART (Mr Len Roberts-Smith) both acknowledge in their various 
submissions that there would be high ranking officers currently working in the ADF 
who are sexual predators and who have the potential to continue to pose enormous 
ongoing risk to staff.   
1.9 The fact that the head of the DART admits in Committee hearings to the 
Parliament that they know there are sexual predators working in the ADF right now 
and they are unable to deal with some of them, is truly alarming on its own.  To then 
realise no single body has ever collated all the evidence of abuse across the ADF, over 
time and across many military facilities to identify other potential predators of this 
nature, is truly scary. How much risk do these people continue to pose to current ADF 
staff? 
1.10 How on earth can any of these risks be properly identified and dealt with 
effectively if the current work of DART and the management of the ADF, 
acknowledge it exists but also acknowledge there are barriers to them sharing and 
gathering evidence across agencies (i.e.; between the Department of Veterans' Affairs 
and the ADF) which would identify it all and help prevent others from being seriously 
harmed. I am certain, based on all the evidence I have seen and heard as a Committee 
member that if we do not act, and act quickly many more ADF staff will suffer serious 
sexual assault and physical abuses in the ADF, often repetitive abuse which in many 
cases could only be described by any reasonable person as tortures. 
1.11 Many more ADF staff will be forced to leave the careers they love to avoid 
those abuses and many will become significantly disabled by debilitating mental 
health issues that has flow on from these abuses in the past. 
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1.12 Recommendation 
A. I recommend the Government immediately call a Royal Commission into 
the ADF and the sexual and physical abuse suffered by their staffs by 
other employees of the ADF since 1970. The Commission should be given 
wide ranging terms of reference which would give it sufficient powers to 
take and collect evidence from the ADF, the Department of Veteran 
Affairs, the State and Federal Police Services and any other relevant 
source in relation to the cases of sexual and physical abuses and tortures, 
as well as ADF management’s response to those events. 
B. I recommend that the Royal Commission should be given wide terms of 
reference which would enable it to gather and take evidence from any 
relevant source necessary, including the ADF to establish what the overall 
management response was, and has been by management of the ADF to 
this problem (which has been well known to them by at least the 1970's). 
C. I recommend that the Royal Commission should be given wide terms of 
reference which would enable it to gather and take evidence from any 
relevant source necessary to identify the personal and public costs suffered 
by ADF staff who were victims of sexual and physical abuses in the ADF 
and the true number of ADF staff members who have suicided as a result 
this abuse. The ramifications of the effects on the community and 
individuals of this would be learning for other agencies in the future. 
Learning designed to proactively encourage that these terrible chain of 
events is never allowed to again prosper as it has in the ADF for so long. 
D. I recommend the Royal Commission which is established be headed by an 
appropriately qualified judicial officer who has no direct or indirect 
connect, past of present with the ADF.  This will provide confidence to the 
public and the men and woman of the ADF in its true and perceived 
independence. 
E. I recommend that the Royal Commission be given powers to prosecute 
people it finds has, or may have (to the relevant criminal standard of 
proof) committed offence/s; or alternatively  
F. Immediately refer the matter to the relevant State or Federal police for 
prosecution, any persons it finds during its investigation and hearing of 
this matter, is responsible for commission of any State or Federal criminal 
offences. 
The recommendations at D and E are necessary to ensure the public and the victims of 
these terrible events feel confident that the commission of inquiry is the 
commencement of change, not just another inquiry which they may perceive will go 
nowhere. They want, and I think they deserve, those responsible for the terrible 
crimes, and the cover ups of those crimes, held accountable in an open and transparent 
process those in no way mirrors that of the past in this matter. 
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Context: History of staff abuse in the Australian Defence Force 
1.13 For the report to be read in context, it is important for the reader to be aware 
of some background about the very long history of systemic sexual and physical abuse 
suffered by staff of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). 
1.14 For the past 40 years significant evidence has come to light by way of the 
media, Ministers and former Parliamentary Senate Committee inquiries that has 
revealed thousands of employees of the ADF have suffered rape, serious sexual 
assaults and torture by colleagues and senior ranking officers. There have been many 
cases over many decades of entrenched systemic abuse occurring in various ADF 
establishments, often involving hundreds of ADF members in single establishments.   
1.15 Despite numerous Parliamentary and Ministerial inquiries and reviews over 
the past 40 years nothing appears to have changed in that time and rape, serious sexual 
assaults and tortures continue to be suffered by ADF members. 
1.16 The management of the ADF responded to each of these inquiries in the same 
way; they have promised they will stamp it out. 20 years ago they told a Parliamentary 
Senate inquiry similar to this one that they had developed "systems" and would be 
fixing the cultural problems which they agreed were causing the widespread abuse in 
the ADF. 20 years on and they are making similar promises, that they have now 
implemented new systems and will be working on cultural change to stem the tide of 
abuse in its ranks. 
1.17 A quick review of the submission to DART and the DLA Piper report reveals 
that there have been at least 11 formal reviews and inquiries into this matter since 
1970. These include: 
1. In May 1970 there was a Four Corners program covering the 'bastardisation 
scandal' at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. 
2. 1970's: At some point there was another inquiry which Dr Rumble referred to 
in his evidence before the inquiry (Dr Rumble was the head of the DLA piper 
review). Dr Rumble advised this report of Inquiry, which occurred in the 
1970's that this report had been lost by the ADF. He sought a copy of it when 
he commenced the DLA piper Review Inquiry in 2011. 
3. In 1994 there was a Senate inquiry into "Sexual Harassment in Australian 
Defence Force" which found incidents of systemic and serious sexual and 
physical abuse of members occurring across the ADF, this inquiry also 
revealed management of the ADF knew about these abuses, or ought to have 
known about them but had failed to respond to the problem. 
4. In 1998 the ADF released the Grey Review, a report concerning 'bastardisation' 
and sexual harassment at the ADF Academy; the review was conducted by a 
Defence official, Ms Bronwen Grey. The “Grey Review” found that a high 
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level of unacceptable behaviour was occurring at ADF Academy, including 
sexual harassment and sexual offences.  
5. In 2001 there was a Senate inquiry into the recruitment and retention within the 
ADF. The Committee examined the reasons for the apparent reluctance of 
young people to join the ADF and for the growing number of personnel 
wishing to leave the organisation. Evidence of wide spread abuse arose in that 
inquiry as well. 
6. In 2008 there was a final report released into a review of the Justice System in 
the ADF.  That report also discussed abuse in the ADF and the inadequacies in 
the ADF justice system to appropriately deal with these matters. 
7. 2011- 2012 - DLA Piper Review, Report of the Review of allegations of sexual 
and other abuse in Defence: "Facing the problems of the past", Volume 1 – 
General findings and recommendations, Supplement to Volume 1, April 2012. 
8. In April 2011, media reports indicated that an incident had occurred at the 
Australian Defence Force Academy where a first year female cadet was filmed 
without her consent having sex with a male colleague and the footage sent via 
Skype to other cadets in a nearby room. 
9. In June 2011 a report by the ABC's Four Corners program on abuse in Defence 
titled 'Culture of Silence' on 13 June 2011 significantly increased the number of 
persons raising matters with the DLA Piper Review. Approximately 550 
communications came to the Review in the four days following the broadcast. 
10. On 7 March 2012, the Minister released the outcomes of the Kirkham inquiry. 
The Minister stated that the inquiry had found that neither the ADF Academy 
Commandant, nor the Deputy Commandant, had made an error of judgement in 
their decision to commence and conclude disciplinary proceedings against the 
female cadet who was herself victim of sexual abuse and was charged after 
reporting the abuse. Despite the report finding the Minister at the time 
remained of the view that this was an error of judgement. 
11. 2011 to 2012 review by the Australian Human Rights Commission - Report of 
the Review into the Treatment of Women in the ADF made a large number of 
recommendations in relation to sexual abuse and harassment. In particular, the 
report recommended the establishment of a dedicated Sexual Misconduct 
Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO) 'to coordinate timely responses, 
victim support, education, policy, practice and reporting for any misconduct of 
a sexual nature, including sexual harassment and sexual abuse in the ADF' 
Incredibly, the ADF only responded to implement some "systems" after this 
review by the Human Rights Commission and then only whilst still under 
constant pressure from adverse media reports and the then Minister of Defence 
this gives the impression the ADF has only acted recently to manage this 
matter in any way when forced to and this may be the reason the Committee, 
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having reviewed some of the systems they have recently implemented have 
been critical of the steps they have taken to date. Overall it hardly inspires 
confidence that the ADF really has the will to respond to this even now, after 
being confronted with a plethora of evidence over decades, that thousands of its 
members have been seriously harmed. This response by the ADF is even more 
extraordinary when closely examining the findings of the 1994 Parliamentary 
Inquiry. After that inquiry the ADF promised to fix this problem and 20 years 
on even now appear reluctant to accept the seriousness of the matter or the need 
for urgent and careful response to it. 
1.18 The 1994 Parliamentary Senate inquiry looked at sexual harassment and 
related abuses in the ADF 20 years ago. That inquiry found the same things happening 
then as we are seeing today, widespread systemic sexual and physical abuse occurring 
across the ADF and with management failing to respond to it and in some cases, 
actively covering it up. 
1.19 A review of the 1994 Senate inquiry report also reveals the ADF management 
made assurances and promises to the then government stating they had implemented 
new systems and would properly deal with the issue. They assured the Senate inquiry 
that they were determined to stamp it out. 20 years after they made those promises 
nothing has happened and widespread systemic abuse is continuing to occur. 
1.20 Whilst no one can say, due to the secrecy of the response of the ADF to 
individual cases of abuse, the true numbers of ADF members who are victims of this 
abuse, even the numbers we now know about due to the work of DART are truly 
staggering. What I can say is that many more hundreds of victims have suffered 
terrible sexual and physical abuse since the 1994 Senate inquiry and promises by the 
ADF at that time that they would deal with the matter and stop the abuse has not 
happened. Twenty years later the public, Defence Force members are asking for the 
same promises to be acted upon. Is this going to happen? How can the ADF 
reasonably expect anyone to have any faith in their ability or true desire to confront 
this issue, tackle it properly once and for all and really makes changes within the ADF 
that would stem the tide of these terrible, atrocious abuses within their ranks.  How 
can we expect this at all when you consider the history of this matter, look at what is 
still happening today and reach the very reasonable conclusion the ADF has been 
either so unable, or so unwilling to do this over decades now. 
1.21 Even when the 2001 Senate committee inquiry found this was an issue 
causing problems with recruitment and retention they failed to act. In fact along every 
step of the way they have failed to act since these terrible issues come to light as far 
back as the 1970's. 
1.22 The evidence that has come to light in the many inquiries since 1994 clearly 
demonstrates that the ADF have failed again and again to meet their duty of care as 
employers to all of those members who have suffered terrible sexual and physical 
abuse since that time. 
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1.23 I was a serving member of the ADF at the time that inquiry took place in 
1994. So effective, or rather ineffective was the response of the ADF at that time I did 
not even learn that an inquiry had occurred at that time, despite being a serving 
member. In fact I did not learn of this Senate inquiry in 1994 or any of the ADF's 
promises to fix the problem in 1994 until I commenced working in the Senate four 
months ago. 
1.24 As a former member of the ADF I can speak from personal experience, 
having been approached by many colleagues who had suffered abuse and who would 
tell me they could not report them for various reasons ranging from fear of retribution 
to loss of their career, this was a common perception for all that served in the ADF. It 
was that simple. 
1.25 I can also comment on the hundreds of people, past and present members of 
the ADF who have been seriously sexually or physically abused, that have contacted 
my Senate offices. What I do know, at least on anecdotal evidence (and much of this 
was corroborated by many submissions to the inquiry) that under reporting of sexual 
and physical abuse in the ADF remains a significant problem today. Given the 
staggering numbers coming to light of people reporting abuses to the DART and now 
the Department of Veterans' Affairs the mind boggles at the thought of how many 
people may have suffered this sort of abuse and have chosen not to report it, or as 
evidence shows, to leave the ADF without reporting it. 
1.26 Despite there having been so many inquiries to date none of them have looked 
at this issue from a systematic approach, that is to say to study all abuse that has 
occurred over time, the causes for it and the potential solutions to it. Instead the 
review and inquiries to date appear to have been done in a piecemeal fashion, looking 
at series of events that may have occurred at a specific ADF facility but not abuse 
across the ADF over a period of time.  This is the only way we will ever be able to see 
a true and accurate picture of this matter and the only way to do this is via a Royal 
Commission. I am supported in my calls for a Royal Commission by Dr Rumble who 
presided over the DLA Piper Review, perhaps the only wider review of this issue to 
date.  
1.27 The calls for a Royal Commission are strengthened when one looks at the 
atrocious and very long history of abuse in the ADF over several decades, and then 
closely considers the evidence taken during the course of the current inquiry. Any 
reasonable person doing that would be able to conclude at least two things: 
1. Despite significant reviews and inquiries over the space of 40 years nothing has 
changed, widespread systemic sexual and physical abuse is still occurring in 
the ADF today; 
2. Management of the ADF has been given ample opportunity again and again 
over 40 years to deal with this systemic abuse of its members and have 
promised to do so a number of times but have demonstrated they are either 
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unwilling, or unable to respond to the matter. Their failure has allowed the 
abuse to continue and has caused hundreds more members to suffer. 
1.28 The Committee acknowledges in its report that it has heard evidence during 
this inquiry that leads it to believe abuse is still continuing to happen in the ADF 
today, in fact they have called upon the DARTs work to be extended to cater for 
many, many more victims to come forward and use the processes. 
1.29 The exact number of members who have suffered is not known due to under 
reporting of incidents and the secrecy surrounding how both the ADF and the DART 
are managing certain matters. Despite that, the numbers we do know about are in the 
thousands and by anybody's measure that is truly staggering. 
1.30 The effects on many of these victim's is immeasurable. 
1.31 More evidence of continuing abuse came from the Department of Veteran 
Affairs in the Senate Estimate Committees. They advised they were still receiving 
around 6 claims a month from ADF staff that had been sexually or physically abused.  
This is just those Defence force personnel who feel safe to report their abuse, this 
committee heard evidence that many people still did not feel safe to come forward, 
even to DART which they know is headed by a former high ranking ADF member. 
1.32 Having dealt with the historical matters in this case I now turn to the current 
inquiry. 
The current inquiry 
1.33 This Committee's terms of reference were only to look at the 'accessibility and 
adequacy of the current mechanisms and processes to support victims of sexual and 
other abuse in Defence'. The Committee report states: 'While evidence was received 
on other issues during the inquiry, such as the issue of serving officers who are 
subject of allegations of abuse, the committee's focus is on support and assistance for 
the current and past victims of abuse in Defence'. 
1.34 When the Committee's report refers to concerns about current serving officers 
of the defence force being the 'subject to allegations of abuse', the real concern they 
are referring to is current serving members of the ADF of all ranks who have been 
identified as being sexual predators. Whilst DART and the ADF managers have tried 
to assure the Committee that they are working to identify all these individuals and 
appropriately deal with them, there are many barriers to that happening. As such 
current members of the defence force who are sexual predators currently continue to 
pose a serious and significant risk to the health and safety of their colleagues. 
1.35 One major problem with proving sexual assaults, including rapes, is for the 
victim to prove the offence where often it is one person's word against another. A way 
to overcome this is through corroborative evidence of multiple victims of the same 
offender.  
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1.36 Therefore the only way anyone could ever be confident is to encourage all 
victims of abuse, or at least as many of them as possible to come forward and only 
then will patterns of abuse and sexual predators in the ADF begin to emerge and 
confidence could be had that these predators are removed and the risk eliminated of 
further abuse by them. 
1.37 The ADF is not investigating these matters to establish this pattern of practice 
and to identify sexual predators who are continuing to pose a serious risk to members 
of the ADF. 
1.38 As stated, people are still reluctant to come forward and report abuses because 
they lack faith in the ADF processes and many fear retribution which could end their 
careers and leave them without employment. Indeed the case of one lady who did 
report abuse only to be charged by management herself is a case which deters would 
be victims from reporting the crimes committed against them. 
1.39 Although the work of DART has helped many victims, it has not looked at the 
systemic causes of abuse in the defence force and more importantly how abuse in the 
ADF could be prevented more broadly now. DART's focus which is based on their 
reports to the inquiry, have been largely based on responding to victims of abuse, not 
preventing continuing abuse in the ADF. 
1.40 Given that there is a plethora of evidence available showing that the highest 
ranks of the ADF have failed in their duty to respond to systemic abuse in the ADF I 
am extremely alarmed that the Committee seems comfortable with leaving the 
decision about what should happen now to the head of the DART Taskforce. 
1.41 Whilst I acknowledge Mr Len Roberts-Smith may be an honourable man he is 
a former long serving member and high ranking officer of the ADF. A review of his 
DART records submitted to the inquiry show that he has spent a considerable period 
of his time consulting with current senior members of the ADF during his work on 
DART, work that is supposed to be dealing more directly with the victims of ADF 
abuse. 
1.42 Putting that aside, given the enormous failings of senior ranking officers over 
decades to respond appropriately to systemic sexual and physical abuse of its 
members it is extremely alarming that the Committee would not see that there is a 
clear conflict of interest, or perceived conflict of interest in this matter for Mr Len 
Roberts-Smith. I have had former and current members of the ADF approach my 
Senate Officers and tell me they are scared to approach DART to report their abuse 
because it is headed up and staffed by ADF personnel. To then see that the Committee 
intends to leave the decision about whether a Royal Commission should be called in 
this matter is, to be frank, appalling. 
1.43 Given that the failures by management to respond to these matters over 
decades occurred whilst Mr Len Roberts-Smith was himself a senior member of the 
ADF one wonders how sound it would be to suggest he should make this decision.   
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1.44 I feel that the only way this matter can be properly dealt with at this point is 
by Royal Commission. Only a Royal Commission will have the powers necessary to 
properly examine what has occurred in the past, why it has happened and make 
appropriate recommendations to stop the ongoing systemic sexual and physical abuse 
of ADF members. 
1.45 In August 2014 I indicated publicly I was concerned that Mr Len Roberts-
Smith should not have been appointed as the head of DART and that a retired judicial 
officer, someone separate to the ADF, should have been appointed to this role.  I stand 
by those comments.  It is not a matter of whether one had an actual conflict of interest 
but clearly in this case many people already "perceive" Roberts-Smith has a conflict 
of interest both in heading up the DART processes and now in being tasked with 
being the sole decision maker on whether or not a Royal Commission is warranted in 
this matter. 
1.46 The reasons for my own concerns are logical; as a committee member, unlike 
ordinary Australians, I had the right to view the explosive, highly sensitive and secret 
second report authored by Dr Rumble, into defence sexual assault and other abuse.  
And while I had strict conditions imposed on me, I viewed and attempted to read the 
33 top secret, lever arch files. (This filled the Senate Committee Room table and have 
been kept secret by the Department of Defence for 2 years). 
1.47 I'm still able to reveal that, while I was shocked and sickened by the 
individual alleged incidents of sexual assault and other abuse – what shocked and 
sickened me even more, is the evidence of a complete failure, over a long period of 
time, by the Australian military justice system and a high-level cover up of alleged 
serious crimes.  This accords with the many previous inquiries and Ministerial reviews 
dating back 40 years. 
1.48 In those files I saw for example that there are strong indications of high-level 
systemic destruction and/or cover up of military files and service police records 
containing evidence or allegations of sexual assaults. 
1.49 On reviewing those files it became very clear to me then, that should a Royal 
Commission into ADF Abuse with broad terms of reference be established - then 
many former senior leaders of the Australian Military including, Governor General 
Cosgrove and Hurley and the DART Taskforce Chairman himself - Mr Len Roberts-
Smith, a career soldier who was also Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the ADF - 
could all be important Royal Commission witnesses. 
1.50 Indeed, I am personally shocked and stunned, having served on this 
Committee, and reviewed the evidence I have now because of that; that successive 
Governments have allowed a situation to develop where Mr Len Roberts-Smith, who 
has a long work history in the area of Australian Military Justice, should be placed in 
a position where he has to recommend or not, a Royal Commission which 
fundamentally scrutinizes Australian military justice. 
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1.51 As I have said, you don't need a law degree to understand the legal concept of 
Conflict of Interest. Any Google search will show you that for a Conflict of Interest to 
exist, all that's needed is the appearance of - or potential for, a clash between the 
current professional obligations of Mr Len Roberts-Smith as chair of the DART and 
his personal or former professional interests. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Jacqui Lambie 
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 Additional comments by Senator Xenophon 
1.1 While I support recommendations 1 to 7 in the committee's report, I cannot 
support recommendation 8. It is important to set out how successive governments, 
parliaments, and our Defence Force have, over half a century, abysmally failed - boys 
and girls, men and women who have suffered horrendous abuse while serving their 
country. The failure of the committee to call for a Royal Commission into defence 
abuse is a chasm that cannot be ignored. 
1.2 In relation to the Pathway to Change strategy released by Defence in March 
2012 as to the response to the Culture Reviews, it should be noted that Volume 1 of 
the DLA Piper Review report1 appears not have been considered in the formulation of 
this strategy, notwithstanding that Volume 1 was available at the time. This is a 
glaring omission.2 
1.3 Further to 2.51 of the committee's report related to CDF General David 
Hurley's apology to the victims, it should be noted that the CDF's comments were 
high-level general statements, and failed to be an adequately powerful statement. The 
fact that General Hurley had not seen, at the time of the apology, the detailed accounts 
in Volume 2 of the DLA Piper Review report may explain the lack of force in his 
apology. General Hurley had not seen Volume 2 because the Government decided that 
Volume 2 not go to Defence, contrary to DLA Piper's terms of reference.3 This too is 
most unsatisfactory.  
1.4 In relation to the ADFA 24, I am concerned that the Taskforce has yet to 
provide a report on this, almost two years since the Taskforce was established. Given 
the gravity of the issues raised - the alleged rape of 26 female cadets by 24 male 
cadets - and recognition that there were many more similar incidents in the years 
preceding 1998, this is simply unacceptable. 
1.5 I am also concerned that this drawn out process in respect of the ADFA 24 
will discourage victims of abuse from participating in any investigation and may 
dissuade other victims from coming forward. 
1.6 Further on the ADFA 24, I note that the Taskforce in its 7th report (page 26) 
in September 2014, stated that in October 2013 Mr Roberts-Smith had made 
recommendations to the CDF to take action in relation to at least 12 still serving 
members of the ADF, and to consider further action in another 13 cases. These are 
matters of great national importance, that go to the heart of the integrity of the 
processes that are meant to protect ADF personnel. The fact the outcomes of those 
1  http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/DLAPiper/Background.asp  
2  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice from the hearing on 13 August 2014. 
3  Submission 8, Supplementary 1, Annexure 2. 
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recommendations are not yet known to the committee is indicative of deep systemic 
failures within Defence and government.  
1.7 In relation to the report on HMAS Leeuwin, I note that although the Taskforce 
delivered a lengthy 98 page report, the Taskforce did not offer any detailed 
recommendations to respond to the ongoing aspects of the abuse. 
1.8 I would also note that the Taskforce acknowledged that that Defence training 
establishments like HMAS Leeuwin may still have a high risk of abuse occurring, and 
flagged there would be recommendations in later reports. However, it is extraordinary 
that not even basic or preliminary recommendations were included in that report, 
given such establishments are high risk for abuse of the most vulnerable members of 
the ADF. The lack of any recommendations on the part of the Taskforce shows an 
appalling lack of urgency on its part. 
1.9 One of the ten recommendations set out by the 2013 Senate committee inquiry 
was a recommendation that Defence should formally report on each response to all of 
the systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review report.4 When again asked to 
provide a response at the 13 August 2014 hearing, the ADF provided a written 
response which was general, without stating what actual decisions have been made. 
Frankly, I find this to be offensive to the Senate and the victims of abuse. 
1.10 On the topic of whether there was sufficient publicity for the Taskforce, I note 
that many of the victims of abuse are so socially isolated and marginalised that they 
would be unlikely to see conventional newspaper advertising of the Taskforce.5 
1.11 Further I also query whether the Taskforce could have used other forms of 
media including talkback radio, breakfast TV, and social media to raise the profile of 
its important work and reach out to victims. 
1.12 In addition, the Taskforce appears to have done nothing to inform victims of 
sexual assault in the ADF, who previously were told that Defence would do nothing 
with their complaints because of the former flawed DI(G)6, that Defence could now 
consider action.7 
1.13 On the issue of the rank of ADF personnel participating in the restorative 
engagement program, I note that Dr Rumble in his evidence raised the legitimate 
concern that the program only involved senior officers and therefore would not bring 
4  Report of the DLA Piper Review and the Government’s Response, June 2013, p. xii. 
5  Mr Barry Heffernan, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 8 
6  Dr Rumble, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p.17. Dr Rumble, responses to questions on 
notice from hearing 26 September 2014 – Answer to Question 1. DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, 
pp 139-145; DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, pp 67-70. 
7  Submission 8, Supplementary 4, p. 35.    
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understanding of abuse impacts across the ADF ranks generally.8 Limiting the 
restorative engagement program to senior officer limits its capacity to effect cultural 
change. 
1.14 In relation to access to counselling services and other support for victims of 
abuse in the ADF - the Taskforce Chair's comments beg the broader question of the 
role of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) in providing ongoing support to 
victims of abuse. 
1.15 In relation to whether Taskforce consideration of media allegations should be 
dependent on a complainant opting in to the Taskforce process, I am concerned that 
the narrow construction the Taskforce has taken of its role may mean, for instance, the 
lack of a public Government response to unsubstantiated allegations of a cover-up 
which can be republished at any time may discourage other victims from coming 
forward. The fact that such allegations have been published in the media should have 
triggered action from the Taskforce - and ultimately the Government - irrespective of 
the specific consent of a victim. Furthermore, some of the allegations involved 
allegations of Defence mismanagement which could and should be investigated, 
reported on and publicly responded to by Defence without any need to involve a 
victim.  
1.16 It is not clear to me why the ADF have not committed to zero incidence of 
sexual assault and abuse, when employers generally commit to zero incidence of 
workplace injury.9  
1.17 I am concerned at the apparent lack of urgency in Defence introducing the 
new DI(G) to replace the flawed DI(G) dealing with management of allegations of 
sexual assault. The flawed DI(G) directed that if there was an allegation of sexual 
assault against an ADF member no administrative or disciplinary action should be 
taken. Defence had been alerted to the problems with the DI(G) by the DLA Piper 
Review report of October 2011.10 Vice Admiral Griggs acknowledged in his 
appearance before the committee that there had been problems with the DI(G): 
I would say it was fair to say that there was a period there where we gave 
primacy to the investigative process, the formal police investigative 
process, and there was a reluctance to take administrative action because 
there was a fear that this was some sort of double-jeopardy thing. Now it 
8  Submission 8, Supplementary 4, pp 43-44. 
9  Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p.60. 
10  http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/DLAPiper/Background.asp. DLA Piper 
Review, Volume 1, pp.139-145. Dr Gary Rumble, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 17. 
Dr Gary Rumble responses to questions on hearing 26 September 2014 – Answer to Question 1. 
DLA Piper Review, Volume 1, pp 139-145.; DLA Piper Review, Supplement to Volume 1, 
pp 67-70.  
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actually is not…there was a policy statement earlier this year to reinforce 
that.11 
1.18 The fact that it took from 2011 to 2014 for there to be any Defence response 
to this disastrous DI(G) which in effect protected abusers, including perpetrators of 
rape, is shameful. 
1.19 I also note with concern that it seems the replacement DI(G) - DI(G) PERS 
35-4 - which was provided to the committee by Defence after the 13 August 2014 
hearing, appears not to have come into force until 19 August 2014. 
1.20 The committee's report has noted that in its first year of operation, SeMPRO 
has not had a single report of sexual assault within 72 hours of the incident.12 I am 
concerned that victims therefore have not been getting prompt assistance from 
SeMPRO. Further, as no forensic evidence has been collected this has minimised the 
chance of effective action against perpetrators. SeMPRO has also not been able to 
alert the ADF promptly of risks to serving ADF personnel. 
1.21 The new DI(G) PRS 35-4 which came into effect on 19 August 2014, sets out 
the basis upon which SeMPRO will refuse to accept a disclosure on a restricted basis. 
Dr Rumble raised a pertinent question as to whether those grounds of refusal are 
actually required by law as asserted by Defence. This assertion based on Dr Rumble's 
detailed analysis is dubious at best.13 If the law does prevent Defence from being able 
to offer victims genuine restricted reporting then a real question is raised as to whether 
the law should be changed. 
1.22 The 35 systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review report over two 
years ago are wide-ranging. It is not acceptable that all that the ADF has told the 
committee is that they are taking those issues 'into account'. For example, surely the 
ADF has had enough time to make a decision about Issue 16, as set out in October 
2011 in Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Review report: 
The ADF should consider establishing a system for liaison with local 
civilian police forces similar to the US Military's Sexual Assault Regional 
Team, either dealing with ADF/civilian police interactions generally or 
limited to sexual assault issues. 
1.23 Surely Defence could have reached a prompt conclusion one way or the other 
over such an unambiguous recommendation.  
 
 
11  Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 57. 
12  Department of Defence, responses to questions on notice from the hearing on 13 August 2014. 
13  Submission 8, Supplementary 4, pp.30-34. 
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Recommendation  
The Minister of Defence should direct Defence to report to the committee on 
what specific decisions have been made by the ADF and the Government about 
each of the 35 systemic issues identified in the DLA Piper Review report within 
30 days of tabling of this report. 
1.24 Further to the committee's recommendation 6 in this report I make the 
following comments: 
1.25 Over the course of this reference the Committee has heard some very 
disturbing accounts of abuse, and of ADF mismanagement of abuse and abuse 
allegations. Many of these accounts relate to incidents from many years back. 
However, some of the accounts relate to quite recent events.14 
1.26 Volume 1 of the DLA Piper Report summarised many previous reports 
identifying cultural pressures which have discouraged reporting in the ADF (Chapters 
4 and 5).  
1.27 The committee heard consistent evidence from many witnesses to the effect 
that there are still very strong cultural factors discouraging current ADF personnel 
from reporting abuse.15 That indicates a very serious systemic issue. 
1.28 I note further that Mr Roberts-Smith has explained to the Committee that only 
a small minority of individuals who have come into the Taskforce's processes have 
agreed to have their matters referred to the ADF for possible disciplinary or 
administrative action against the perpetrators.16 This indicates a very concerning lack 
of confidence and trust in ADF processes. That lack of confidence signals an 
underlying major systemic issue. 
1.29 If ADF personnel do not report abuse and do not want to participate in 
disciplinary or administrative processes to deal with perpetrators, then it must follow 
that there are still perpetrators in the ADF who represent risks to other ADF 
personnel. The Taskforce itself has not carried out any investigation.17 
1.30 It must also follow that many of these perpetrators will still be amongst the 
ranks of the officers and NCOs. Officers and NCOs are the very people who should be 
role models and who should be driving and entrenching positive cultural change. 
14  Ms Rachael James and Mr Adair Donaldson, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 3. 
15  Ms Rachael James and Mr Adair Donaldson, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, pp 3, 5; 
Mr Barry Heffernan, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 3; Dr Gary Rumble, 
Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, pp 13, 16-17. 
16  Mr Barry Heffernan, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 3.  
17  The Hon Len Roberts-Smith, Committee Hansard, 26 September 2014, p. 21.  
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Having any perpetrators serving in Defence, particularly in these roles, is a cancer on 
the ADF. 
1.31 This must represent a threat to the culture of the ADF and has the potential to 
undermine the Pathway to Change strategy for cultural change. That signals another 
underlying major systemic issue. 
1.32 I note that Mr Roberts-Smith in his recent appearance before this Committee 
on 26 September 2014 stated that: 
We have seen so many cases where it would have taken just one person in 
the chain of command to do the right thing to either stop an incident of 
abuse or at least deal with it and hold the abuser to account immediately. 
1.33 That raises very serious issues about the adequacy of ADF's response to abuse 
over time. 
1.34 That is yet another major systemic issue. 
1.35 There is no doubt - over the last few years - the ADF has moved to change 
culture at many levels.  However, the ADF has shown a reluctance to change in some 
other ways which are directly relevant to the welfare and safety of ADF personnel. 
For instance: 
• In its first year of operations, the version of 'restricted reporting' which 
Defence has introduced through SeMPRO failed to attract a single report of 
sexual assault within the first 72 hours after an incident. 
• The Vice Chief of the Defence Force told the Committee that the ADF refuses 
to commit to zero incidence of abuse in the ADF 'because 'We will never get 
to zero incidence'.18 
• Defence has refused to seek to identify areas where unreported abuse may be 
occurring.19 
• It took Defence three years to amend the defective DI(G) which told 
Commanding Officers that they should not take any administrative action on 
allegations of sexual assault.  That signals a breathtaking complacency and 
lack of urgency on the part of Defence to deal with sexual assault issues. 
1.36 These failures approach culpable negligence in relation to the safety and 
welfare of ADF personnel.  
1.37 These decisions are very bad news for individual ADF members affected by 
abuse. These decisions also very bad news for the integrity of the ADF. 
18  Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, Committee Hansard, 13 August 2014, p. 61. 
19  Submission 8, Part II, Annexures 1-5. 
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1.38 We have also seen that individuals who were damaged by abuse in the ADF 
face considerable barriers to making out their eligibility for DVA benefits and 
support.20 
1.39 Serious questions have been raised about whether the Commonwealth through 
Defence and DVA has fulfilled its model litigant and moral obligations to these 
individuals and their families.21 
1.40 The fact that there is this institutional resistance to change demonstrates why 
the important systemic issues can only be attacked effectively by a well-resourced 
body with authority and standing to apply rigour and intensive investigation. Only a 
Royal Commission can do this. 
Recommendation 
That there be a Royal Commission to inquire into: 
• the adequacy of Defence and Government responses to abuse in the ADF; 
• the adequacy of Defence and Government responses to support all 
victims of abuse in the ADF – not just those who have come into the 
Taskforce's processes; 
• what can be done to improve rates of reporting of abuse in the ADF; 
• what can be done to improve confidence of ADF personnel in ADF 
processes for responding to allegations of abuse; and 
• whether there are still perpetrators of abuse in the ADF and if so what to 
do about that. 
1.41 It has been suggested that a Royal Commission would in some way be unfair 
to suspected perpetrators. To this I say: 
• ADF personnel are used to requirements of vetting for national security and 
other issues. There are some roles for which people need to be beyond 
suspicion. 
• No doubt a Royal Commission would be sensitive to the need to provide 
procedural fairness in the conduct of its investigations. 
1.42 A Royal Commission need not be and should not be the only response. There 
should also be assistance for victims – such as the assistance which has been offered 
by the Taskforce and DVA – in parallel with the Royal Commission's work. There is 
no reason why a Royal Commission could not coordinate its work with processes 
providing such assistance. 
20  Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Committee Hansard, 14 August 2014, pp 40-50. 
21  Submission 8, Attachment 2, Annexure 3. 
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1.43 An appropriately commissioned and resourced Royal Commission would be 
best placed to encourage individuals who have relevant information – including 
victims who have not yet spoken about their experience to anyone and/or victims who 
had no interest in the range of outcomes for complainants which the Taskforce offered 
– to come forward and to enable informed and convincing resolutions on the systemic 
issues. 
1.44 The Royal Commission into Institutional Response to Child Sexual Abuse 
provides a model of how a Royal Commission can be conducted in a manner which 
takes into account the sensitivities and needs of victims of abuse and which actually 
empowers and assists victims of abuse including many who had not previously told 
their story to anyone. 
1.45 The Royal Commission into Institutional Response to Child Sexual Abuse is 
demonstrating the impact which contemporaneous media reporting of real people's 
stories told to the Commission can have in raising understanding of the issues 
amongst the institutions and amongst the general community. 
1.46 I note there have not been many voices to date calling for such a Royal 
Commission. 
1.47 Given the strong cultural factors which discourage members of the ADF from 
reporting even within ADF processes it is not surprising that members of the ADF 
have not been stepping out of the ranks to make that call. 
1.48 However, there have been two individuals who have deep knowledge of thse 
issues who have supported the establishment of a Royal Commission. 
1.49 One of these individuals is Colonel (ret) Ken Northwood who conducted the 
investigations of the ADFA 24 in 1998 and who worked with the Taskforce on these 
issues again in 2013. On a recent Four Corners program, Colonel Northwood called 
for a Royal Commission.22 
1.50 Dr Gary Rumble who led the DLA Piper Review has also called for a Royal 
Commission and has supported that call with his detailed submissions to the 
Committee. 
1.51 I give weight to the fact that these two individuals who have deep knowledge 
of the issues and of the ADF's and successive Governments' responses to these issues 
have supported a Royal Commission. 
22  Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Chamber of Horrors, Four Corners, 9 June 2014, 
available at: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2014/06/09/4019501.htm (accessed 30 
October 2014). Transcript tabled by Dr Gary Rumble at public hearing 13 August 2014. 
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1.52 I also give weight to the submission to this committee of Mr Neil Stuart who 
went through a Restorative Engagement session. His submission includes these 
powerful perspectives: 
I have been reflecting on my perspective since approaching DLA Piper and 
what I've heard of abuse experience of other people in Defence.  As I'm 
seeing it, the Response (the institutional response) has been to focus on the 
individuals who've told their stories and to offer some balm and quieten 
them down.  So all my energy and input has been contained and channelled 
into the four sets of responses determined by DART. It is as if I am one of a 
list of cases and one by one they are being methodically ticked off. Now 
I've been ticked off. 
…I submit what we are faced with is an institution which has systematically 
insulated itself from knowing about the intentional sexual abuse which has 
happened and is happening.  The silence, the failure to talk openly about 
what happens or might (page 5) happen fosters secrecy, putting it out of 
sight or hearing. Men do rape men, soldiers rape fellow-soldiers – that has 
to be said, not just in counselling, not just in the CO's office, not just in the 
restorative engagement conferences but out there in the public arena. 
The DART processes have placed much emphasis on confidentiality.  For 
instance, at the end of the Restorative Engagement Conference, I was asked 
to sign an agreement that I would not disclose what took place in that 
Conference.  Perhaps there are times for confidentiality. My sense is that 
what happened is that I have become confined and isolated. My sense if that 
the practices of secrecy and silence are being reinforced. I have nothing to 
hide. Does DART? Does Defence? 
Restorative Engagement hasn't changed/restored what happened and can't 
change/restore what's happened. That's an illusion. I haven't (page 6) 
bought into that illusion. Nothing makes up for what has been broken… My 
life, the lives of others abused, aren't going to be restored. The main good 
thing, I was thinking, is that my story had been truly listened to and seems 
to have been believed. Now, having read about the experience of Aaron 
Frazer…I wonder just how fair dinkum is the statement that my story is 
believed. If it is to be fair dinkum there's got to be more that individual 
solace. That listening has to come out of the confessional/clinical reporting 
process, the Restorative Engagement Conference, into which it's been 
channelled and into the wider culture of Defence which permits these 
abuses. 
… 
There has to be more than treating the hurt of the injured individuals – 
which is akin to keeping everything within the confessional or within the 
treatment room or within the family, which is the way the DART casework 
approach has been shaped. I'm not a case – it's bigger than me or any other 
individuals…  
I challenge the Committee to understand Defence's responsibility for an 
institutional culture which permits, maintains and maybe even rewards 
silence around rape and other sexual abuses within Defence. I challenge 
(page 7) the Committee to understand how stigma works as a tool of 
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silencing and of removal of freedoms, especially freedom to speak. I 
challenge the Committee to break open the culture of silence.  I don't need 
pity. I have never needed pity. What I need is to see emerge a culture which 
permits, even celebrates, my right and the rights of others to speak of what 
we have experienced. I need and end of silence. If the Committee does not 
understand these things, then it understands very little. 
I need for there to be a process which enables me, as a person who has 
experienced sexual abuse within Defence, to make a common cause with 
others who have experienced like abuse. 
Maybe the process needs to be widened to provide for something like a 
Royal Commission so that the secrecy and the silence are blown away and 
Defence is held accountable for how it must change. 
1.53 Another victim – a woman who experienced two years of abuse and bullying 
at ADFA pre-1998 – told Dr Rumble: 
It is time that the ADF was held to account. A Royal commission would be 
the most powerful statement that this is not an acceptable part of Australian 
society. I feel also feel that ADF needs to weed out the bad eggs, if for no 
other reason than that the decent people of the ADF do not have a shadow 
caste over their careers. They should also ensure that people who have been 
abused are cared for, as not everyone is OK. 
1.54 I agree. If a Royal Commission is not established, I fear this Parliament may 
well revisit these issues again in the next few years, when the next scandal of abuse in 
Defence surfaces.  
1.55 I acknowledge that the Government and the Opposition do not support calls 
for a Royal Commission - yet my plea to any member or former member of the ADF 
reading this who has experienced or knowledge of abuse, particularly victims of the 
ADFA 24, to speak out in support of such a Royal Commission. I understand that 
survivors of abuse may not wish to speak out publicly. However, if survivors wish to 
meet with members of the Government and Opposition to tell them face-to-face of 
what happened to them, I am prepared to assist personally to facilitate any such 
private and confidential meeting. To para-phrase Edmund Burke: 
All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men, and women do 
nothing. 
I can be contacted at Senator.Xenophon@aph.gov.au or on 08 8232 1144. 
1.56 Finally, I dedicate these additional comments to Neil Batten who had the 
enormous courage to come and see me over three and half years ago (with the 
tremendous assistance and advocacy of Barry Heffernan from COMBADAS). His 
recounting of the abuse he suffered over 40 years ago as a 15 year old naval junior 
recruit at HMAS Leeuwin still shocks and appals me. The dreams of a boy wanting to 
proudly serve his country were destroyed in a disgusting and brutal manner. However, 
what is even worse is that the perpetrators went on to pursue successful careers in the 
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Navy, whilst Neil's life was deeply traumatised. This is for you Neil, and so many 
others like you. 
 
 
 
 
Senator Nick Xenophon 
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• Correspondence from the Hon Len Roberts-Smith RFD QC, Chair of the 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, received 20 October 2014 
Additional Information 
• ABC Four Corners episode "Chamber of Horrors" (9 June 2014) - Tabled by 
Dr Gary Rumble at public hearing on 13 August 2014, Canberra.   
• Transcript of Radio National interview with CDF General David Hurley (28 April 
2014) - Tabled by Dr Gary Rumble at publc hearing on 13 August 2014, Canberra.   
• Correspondence with the office of the Minister for Defence (part 1)- Tabled by Dr 
Gary Rumble at public hearing on 13 August 2014, Canberra   
• Correspondence with the office of the Minister for Defence (part 2) - Tabled by Dr 
Gary Rumble at public hearing on 13 August 2014, Canberra.   
• Opening statement by Inspector General Australian Defence Force at public hearing 
on 13 August 2014, Canberra.   
• Opening statement by Hon Len Roberts-Smith RFD, QC at public hearing on 
13 August 2014, Canberra.   
• Opening statement by Vice Admiral Griggs AO, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, 
Department of Defence at public hearing on 13 August 2014, Canberra   
• Key Statistics tabled by Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at public hearing on 
26 September 2014, Canberra   
• Feedback from Complainants tabled by Defence Abuse Response Taskforce at public 
hearing on 26 September 2014, Canberra 
• Opening statement by Hon Len Roberts-Smith RFD, QC at public hearing on 
26 September 2014, Canberra   
Answers to questions on notice 
Wednesday 13 August 2014 — Canberra     
• Roberts-Smith, The Hon Leonard William, RFD, QC, Chair, Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce 
• Department of Defence  
• Department of Veteran's Affairs 
• James, Ms Rachael, Slater & Gordon Lawyers 
Friday 26 September 2014 — Canberra   
• Roberts-Smith, The Hon Leonard William, RFD, QC, Chair, Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce 
• Rumble, Dr Gary Albert, Private capacity 
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 Appendix 4 
Previous recommendations of the committee and 
government response 
Recommendation 1  
The committee recommends that Defence 
prominently display, and commemorate, 
the apology by the Minister of Defence 
and the Chief of the Defence Force to 
victims of abuse in Defence. 
 
Government Response - Agree 
The apologies delivered by the Chief of 
the Defence Force and the then Minister 
are accessible to all Australians on the 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce 
website and on Defence's internal and 
external websites. Defence referred to the 
apologies in its Annual Report. 
Recommendation 2  
The committee recommends that Defence 
formally respond to the systemic issues 
and findings of the DLA Piper Review in 
its public reporting on the progress of the 
implementation of the Pathway to Change 
Defence cultural reforms. 
 
Government Response – Agree 
Noting that Pathway to Change is 
Defence's response to the Reviews 
initiated in 2011, Defence will consider 
the systemic issues and findings of the 
DLA Piper Review in this context. 
Recommendation 3  
The committee recommends that Defence 
actively encourage senior officers to 
participate in the Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce's restorative 
engagement program with victims of 
abuse. 
 
Government response – Agree 
Defence has affirmed to the Chair of the 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce…its 
commitment to supporting and 
participating in the Restorative 
Engagement Program. 
The Defence Abuse Response Taskforce 
and Defence are working collaboratively 
to establish arrangements for 
implementing the program, including a 
framework underpinned by the best 
practice principles and values of 
restorative practice and mediation.  
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Recommendation 4  
The committee recommends that Defence 
provide a waiver of any confidentiality or 
non-disclosure agreement which could 
prevent a person from engaging with the 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce. 
 
Government response – Agree 
Defence, in consultation with the Defence 
Abuse Response Taskforce, has prepared 
a 'limited waiver of confidentiality and 
deed of release and indemnity' so that 
persons who have previously settled a 
claim against Defence involving 
allegations of sexual or other forms of 
abuse by Defence personnel are not 
prevented from having their matter dealt 
with by the Taskforce 
Recommendation 5  
The committee recommends that, 
following the conclusion of the Defence 
Abuse Response Taskforce's operation, 
the Minister for Defence facilitate the 
productive use of the Taskforce's 
depersonalised statistical database of 
information regarding reported incidents 
of abuse in Defence. 
 
Government response – Agree 
Defence and the Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce have agreed the 
value of providing an appropriately 
depersonalised database. Work is 
underway to achieve this outcome. 
Recommendation 6  
The committee recommends that the 
Australian Government commission an 
independent review to determine whether 
any of the functions of the Defence Abuse 
Response Taskforce's should continue 
and how to ensure these functions can 
continue to be performed effectively. This 
independent review will report its 
findings and make recommendations to 
the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-
General and the Minister for Veterans 
Affairs.  
The committee recommends that, at the 
conclusion of this independent review, the 
Minister for Defence, the Attorney-
General and the Minister for Veterans' 
Government response – agree in principle 
The Australian Government notes that the 
Defence Abuse Response Taskforce is 
independent of Defence and it has advised 
that it sees value in some form of review 
taking place toward the end of its 
outcome delivery phase. Such a review 
could then be assessed by the Minister for 
Defence, the Attorney-General and the 
Minister for Veterans' Affairs, to decide if 
any of the functions of the Taskforce 
should continue in another form. 
While the Australian Government is 
supportive of a review taking place, it 
considers that it is too early, at this time, 
to form a clear view on exactly what form 
the review should take. The Taskforce is 
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Affairs, should assess whether any of the 
functions of the Defence Abuse Response 
Taskforce should continue in another 
form. 
currently approved to operate to the end 
of November 2014 and the terms and 
scope of any review should be 
reconsidered at a later stage 
Recommendation 7  
The committee recommends that Defence 
implement recommendation 19 of the 
Inspector-General of the Australian 
Defence Force's review—that the 
appointment of case officers to support 
complainants and respondents should be 
required in all cases. 
Government response – Agree 
This recommendation was agreed as part 
of Pathway to Change and is being 
implemented. 
Recommendation 8 
The committee recommends that Defence 
assess whether additional support services 
for victims of non-sexual forms of abuse 
should be included within the Pathway to 
Change cultural reforms. 
Government response – Agree 
The Australian Government notes action 
by Defence in Pathway to Change that 
will, through sustained effort to 
implement practical measures, corrective 
processes and structure and support, 
achieve Defence's cultural intent.  
Recommendation 9  
The committee recommends that Defence 
engage in dialogue with associations 
which represent the interests of victims of 
abuse in Defence. 
Government response – Agree 
Defence will examine, in conjunction 
with the Department of Veterans' Affairs, 
avenues for dialogue. 
Recommendation 10 
The committee recommends that, at the 
completion of the implementation of the 
Pathway to Change strategy, the 
Australian Government conduct an 
independent review of its outcomes and 
an assessment of the need for further 
reform in Defence. 
Government response – agree in principle 
Noting existing mechanisms of reporting 
and oversight of Pathway to Change by 
Government and the Parliament, the 
Australian Government will consider the 
necessary activity for evaluating 
Defence's efforts to achieve cultural 
change and measures of success.  
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